Corporate governance

About: Corporate governance is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 118591 publications have been published within this topic receiving 2793582 citations.

An empirical examination of transaction- and firm-level influences on the vertical boundaries of the firm

Abstract: A large literature has successfully employed transaction cost economic theory to describe how exchange conditions affect the optimal form of organization. However, this approach has historically not accounted for the influence of firm-specific attributes on the governance decision. This paper develops a model based on insights from transaction cost economics, the resource-based view, and real options theory to examine how transaction-level characteristics, firm-specific capabilities, and product-market scope influence the governance of production. Empirical evidence derived from analysis of 469 make-or-buy decisions involving 117 semiconductor firms indicates that decisions regarding the governance of production activities are strongly influenced by both transaction- and firm-level effects. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Firm self-regulation through international certifiable standards: determinants of symbolic versus substantive implementation

Abstract: International certifiable management standards that have been advocated as a governance mechanism for firm self-regulation of corporate social responsibility issues are effective only if certified firms comply with the requirements of the standards. Our empirical analysis shows that ISO-certified firms in China strategically select their level of compliance depending on customer preferences, customer monitoring, and expected sanctions by customers. Our findings have implications for the effectiveness of a global system of self-regulation based on certifiable standards, research on certifiable standards, and for practicing managers who require suppliers to obtain standard certifications.

Corporate Governance and Bank Performance: A Joint Analysis of the Static, Selection, and Dynamic Effects of Domestic, Foreign, and State Ownership

Abstract: We jointly analyze the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership on bank performance. We argue that it is important to include indicators of all the relevant governance effects in the same model. "Nonrobustness" checks (which purposely exclude some indicators) support this argument. Using data from Argentina in the 1990s, our strongest and most robust results concern state ownership. State-owned banks have poor long-term performance (static effect), those undergoing privatization had particularly poor performance beforehand (selection effect), and these banks dramatically improved following privatization (dynamic effect). However, much of the measured improvement is likely due to placing nonperforming loans into residual entities, leaving "good" privatized banks.

Good Enough Governance Revisited

Abstract: The concept of good enough governance provides a platform for questioning the long menu of institutional changes and capacity-building initiatives currently deemed important (or essential) for development. Nevertheless, it falls short of being a tool to explore what, specifically, needs to be done in any real world context. Thus, as argued by the author in 2004, given the limited resources of money, time, knowledge, and human and organisational capacities, practitioners are correct in searching for the best ways to move towards better governance in a particular country context. This article suggests that the feasibility of particular interventions can be assessed by analysing the context for change and the implications of the content of the intervention being considered.