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Corporate governance

About: Corporate governance is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 118591 publications have been published within this topic receiving 2793582 citations.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on the economic, corporate governance, and family business literatures to explain why the effects of family on family firms makes this governance form theoretically distinct from those of public and private non-family firms.
Abstract: We draw on the economic, corporate governance, and family business literatures to explain why the effects of family on family firms makes this governance form theoretically distinct from those of public and private non-family firms. Our thesis is that parental altruism, when combined with private ownership and owner-management, influences the ability of the firm's owner-manager to exercise self-control, which, in turn, can expose some family firms to conflicts rooted in the agency threats of moral hazard, hold-up, and adverse selection. We then discuss why some other family firms are able to minimize these dark side threats and thereby attain altruism's brighter side. Finally, we discuss how altruism's influence changes over time as ownership becomes dispersed among family members and across generations. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

600 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors draw together the many different facets of corporate governance that have been examined in the extensive literature in both strategic management and finance and identify a sample of firms and examine CEO compensation, CEO tenure, board composition, leadership structure and ownership structure and their co...

599 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors test alternative theories of corporate tax avoidance using unexplained differences between income reported to capital markets and to tax authorities, and find that the effect of tax avoidance on firm value is a function of firm governance.
Abstract: Do corporate tax avoidance activities advance shareholder interests? This paper tests alternative theories of corporate tax avoidance using unexplained differences between income reported to capital markets and to tax authorities. OLS estimates indicate that the effect of tax avoidance on firm value is a function of firm governance, as predicted by an agency perspective on corporate tax avoidance. Instrumental variables estimates based on exogenous changes in tax regulations yield larger overall effects and reinforce the basic result, as do several robustness checks. The results suggest that the simple view of corporate tax avoidance as a transfer of resources from the state to shareholders is incomplete given the agency problems characterizing shareholder-manager relations.

599 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors examined the interaction between corporate governance at two levels: internal organizational governance that is intended to distinguish among managers of a priori unknown abilities to determine who becomes CEO, and corporate board level that seeks to retain or fire the CEO based on observed performance.
Abstract: We examine the interaction between corporate governance at two levels: internal organizational governance that is intended to distinguish among managers of a priori unknown abilities to determine who becomes CEO, and corporate governance at the board level that seeks to retain or fire the CEO based on observed performance. An overconfident manager has a higher probability than a rational manager of being promoted to CEO under value-maximizing internal governance. Moreover, the overconfidence of a risk-averse CEO enhances firm value up to a point, but the effect is non-monotonic and differs from that of lower risk aversion. Overconfident CEOs also underinvest in information production. Corporate governance at the board level depends on the interaction between perceptions of CEO ability and overconfidence. The board fires both excessively diffident and excessively overconfident CEOs. Finally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is predicted to improve the precision of information provided to investors, but reduce aggregate investment and possibly firm values.

598 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a framework for exploring behavioural perspectives of boards and corporate governance, and develop a terminology that may help us accumulate knowledge and provide directions for a research agenda.
Abstract: What is board accountability, and how is such accountability created? This response to Roberts, McNulty and Stiles suggests a framework for exploring behavioural perspectives of boards and corporate governance. The contribution of this framework is to develop a terminology that may help us accumulate knowledge and provide directions for a research agenda. The consistent use of a terminology, the accumulation of knowledge and an accepted research agenda among a core group of scholar are some of the first steps in developing a promising research field with considerable potential to create actionable knowledge. The framework can help us sort some of the research, concepts and anecdotes that have been presented in efforts to open the black box of board research.

597 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20251
202415
20239,644
202219,289
20215,513
20206,174