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Corporate governance

About: Corporate governance is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 118591 publications have been published within this topic receiving 2793582 citations.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore how much state is necessary to make governance work and identify functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy, and discuss to what extent they can help overcome issues of legitimacy and effectiveness in areas of limited statehood.
Abstract: In this article we explore how much state is necessary to make governance work. We begin by clarifying concepts of governance and the “shadow of hierarchy” and we follow this clarification with a brief overview of empirical findings on governance research in developed countries. We then discuss the dilemmas for governance in areas of limited statehood, where political institutions are too weak to hierarchically adopt and enforce collectively binding rules. While prospects for effective policymaking appear to be rather bleak in these areas, we argue that governance research has consistently overlooked the existence of functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy. We assert that governance with(out) government can work even in the absence of a strong shadow of hierarchy, we identify functional equivalents to the shadow of hierarchy, and we discuss to what extent they can help overcome issues of legitimacy and effectiveness in areas of limited statehood.

519 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the hypothesised link between board demography and firm performance under three predominant theories in corporate governance research, namely agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory.
Abstract: We examine hypothesised links between the board of directors and firm performance as predicted by the three predominant theories in corporate governance research, namely agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory. By employing a pattern matching analysis of seven cases, we are able to examine the hypothesised link between board demography and firm performance expected under each theory. We find that while each theory can explain a particular case, no single theory explains the general pattern of results. We conclude by endorsing recent calls for a more process-orientated approach to both theory and empirical analysis, if we are to understand how boards add value.

518 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the debate on "corporate citizenship" (CC) has only paid limited attention to the actual notion of citizenship, and they conclude that corporations do not easily fit the "liberal minimalist" model of citizenship.
Abstract: This paper investigates whether, in theoretical terms, corpora- tions can be citizens. The argument is based on the observation that the debate on "corporate citizenship" (CC) has only paid limited attention to the actual notion of citizenship. Where it has been discussed, authors have either largely left the concept of CC unquestioned, or applied rather uni- dimensional and decontextualized notions of citizenship to the corporate sphere. The paper opens with a critical discussion of a major contribution to the CC literature, the work of Logsdon and Wood (Wood and Logsdon 2001; Logsdon and Wood 2002). It continues with a consideration of the nature and role of metaphors for business and of the contestable nature of the political concept of citizenship. It evaluates corporations as citizens through a four-dimensional framework of democratic citizenship offered by Stokes (2002), The analysis suggests that corporations do not easily fit the "liberal minimalist" model of citizenship. It finds, however some possibilities for fit with the three more participatory models. The paper concludes by cautioning against basing corporate citizenship on legal and administrative status or identity, and mapping out specific criteria by which we might determine whether corporations could be considered as citizens by virtue of their participation in processes of governance.

518 citations

Book
15 Dec 2001
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the forces, both external and internal, that lead corporations to behave efficiently and to create wealth and argue that shareholders are the constituency that bear business risk and therefore have the appropriate incentives to maximize corporate value.
Abstract: This collection examines the forces, both external and internal, that lead corporations to behave efficiently and to create wealth. Corporations vest control rights in shareholders, the author argues, because they are the constituency that bear business risk and therefore have the appropriate incentives to maximize corporate value. Assigning control to any other group would be tantamount to allowing that group to play poker with someone else's money, and would create inefficiencies. The implicit denial of this propositions is the fallacy of the so-called stakeholder theory of the corporation, which argues that corporations should be run in the interests of all stakeholders. This theory offers no account of how conflicts between different stakeholders are to be resolved, and gives managers no principle on which to base decisions, except to follow their own preferences. In practice, shareholders delegate their control rights to a board of directors, who hire, fire and set the compensation of the chief officers of the firm. However, because agents have different incentives than the principals they represent, they can destroy corporate value unless closely monitored. This happened in the 1960s and led to hostile takeovers in the market for corporate control in the 1970s and 1980s. The author argues that the takeover movement generated increases in corporate efficiency that exceede $1.5 trillion and helped to lay the foundation for the great economic boom of the 1990s.

518 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that key differences between the UK and the US in the importance ascribed to a company's social responsibilities reflect differences in the corporate governance arrangements in these two countries, and draw on a model of instrumental, relational and moral motives to explore why institutional investors in the UK are becoming concerned with firms' social and environmental actions.
Abstract: This paper argues that key differences between the UK and the US in the importance ascribed to a company's social responsibilities (CSR) reflect differences in the corporate governance arrangements in these two countries. Specifically, we analyse the role of a salient type of owner in the UK and the US, institutional investors, in emphasising firm-level CSR actions. We explore differences between institutional investors in the UK and the US concerning CSR, and draw on a model of instrumental, relational and moral motives to explore why institutional investors in the UK are becoming concerned with firms’ social and environmental actions. We conclude with some suggestions for future research in this area.

517 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20251
202415
20239,644
202219,289
20215,513
20206,174