Topic
Corporate governance
About: Corporate governance is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 118591 publications have been published within this topic receiving 2793582 citations.
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors suggest that institutional owners' investment horizons, as well as the frequency and coordination of institutional owners’ activism, moderate the institutional ownership -CSP relationship.
402 citations
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15 Jan 1998
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present an analysis of a sample of recent Divestitures and their relationship with WACC and CCF models, as well as their relationship between CCF and APV models.
Abstract: I. TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS IN PRACTICE. 1. The Takeover Process. 2. The Legal and Regulatory Framework. Appendix A: Legal Due Diligence Preliminary Information Request. 3. Accounting for M&As. 4. Deal Structuring (Methods of Payment, Taxes, Collars, Contingent Payouts.) II. M&As IN THEORY AND PRACTICE. 5. Strategic Processes. 6. Theories of Mergers and Tender Offers. Appendix A: Measurement of Abnormal Returns. Appendix B: Chemical Industry Case Study. 7. The Timing of Merger Activity. 8. Empirical Tests of M&A Performance. Appendix A: Analysis of a Recent M&A Sample. III. VALUATION-THE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE. 9. Alternative Approaches to Valuation. Appendix A: Derivation of Revenue Growth Valuation Formulas. 10. Increasing the Value of the Organization. Appendix A: Calculating Growth Rates. IV. RESTRUCTURING. 11. Restructuring and Divestitures. Appendix A: Restructuring in the Diversified Natural Gas Industry in the 1990s. 12. Empirical Tests of Corporate Restructuring and Divestitures. Appendix A: Analysis of a Sample of Recent Divestitures. 13. Financial Restructuring. V. M&A STRATEGIES. 14. Alliances and Joint Ventures. 15. ESOPs and MLPs. 16. Going Private and Leveraged Buyouts. Appendix A: Relation between WACC and CCF Models. Appendix B: Relation between CCF and APV Models. 17. International Takeovers and Restructuring. VI. STRATEGIES FOR CREATING VALUE. 18. Share Repurchases. 19. Takeover Defenses. 20. Corporate Governance and Performance. 21. Merger Arbitrage. 22. Implementation and Management Guides for M&As.
402 citations
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TL;DR: This article found that a trend toward greater board diligence will lead, sometimes through subtle or indirect mechanisms, to trends toward more external candidates becoming CEO, shorter tenures for CEOs, more effort/less perquisite consumption by CEOs and greater CEO compensation.
Abstract: The popular press and scholarly studies have noted a number of trends in corporate governance. This article addresses, from a theoretical perspective, whether these trends are linked. And, if so, how? The article finds that a trend toward greater board diligence will lead, sometimes through subtle or indirect mechanisms, to trends toward more external candidates becoming CEO, shorter tenures for CEOs, more effort/less perquisite consumption by CEOs (even though such behavior is not directly monitored), and greater CEO compensation. An additional prediction is that, under plausible conditions, externally hired CEOs should have shorter tenures, on average, than internally hired CEOs.
401 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, a broad corporate governance index was constructed and five additional variables related to ownership structure, board characteristics, and leverage were applied to provide a comprehensive description of firm-level corporate governance for a representative sample of Swiss firms.
Abstract: Recent empirical research shows evidence of a positive relationship between the quality of firm-specific corporate governance and firm valuation. Instead of looking at one single corporate governance mechanism in isolation, we construct a broad corporate governance index and apply five additional variables related to ownership structure, board characteristics, and leverage to provide a comprehensive description of firm-level corporate governance for a representative sample of Swiss firms. To control for potential endogeneity of these six governance mechanisms, we develop a system of simultaneous equations and apply three-stage least squares (3SLS). Our results support the widespread hypothesis of a positive relationship between corporate governance and firm valuation.
401 citations
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TL;DR: Li et al. as mentioned in this paper investigate executive compensation and corporate governance in China's publicly traded firms and compare executive pay in China to the USA, and find that executive compensation is positively correlated to firm performance.
Abstract: We investigate executive compensation and corporate governance in China’s publicly traded firms. We also compare executive pay in China to the USA. Consistent with agency theory, we find that executive compensation is positively correlated to firm performance. The study shows that executive pay and CEO incentives are lower in State controlled firms and firms with concentrated ownership structures. Boardroom governance is important. We find that firms with more independent directors on the board have a higher pay-for-performance link. Non-State (private) controlled firms and firms with more independent directors on the board are more likely to replace the CEO for poor performance. Finally, we document that US executive pay (salary and bonus) is about seventeen times higher than in China. Significant differences in US-China pay persist even after controlling for economic and governance factors.
401 citations