Corporate governance

About: Corporate governance is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 118591 publications have been published within this topic receiving 2793582 citations.

Theories of democratic network governance

Abstract: Introduction E.Sorensen & J.Torfing Theoretical Approaches to Governance Network Dynamics E.Sorensen & J.Torfing Mechanisms of Governance Network Formation: A Contextual Rational Choice Perspective N.Hertting Virtuous and Viscous Circles in Democratic Network Governance B.G.Peters Decentred Theory, Change and Network Governance M.Bevir & R.A.W.Rhodes Theoretical Approaches to Governance Network Failure E.Sorensen & J.Torfing Closure and Governance L.Schaap Consensus and Conflict in Policy Networks: Too Much or Too Little? J.F.M.Koppenjan Network Governance: Effective and Legitimate? T.A.Boerzel & D.Panke Theoretical Approaches to Metagovernance E.Sorensen & J.Torfing Governing the Formation and Mobilization of Governance Networks P.Triantafillou Meta-governance as Network Management E-H.Klijn & J.Edelenbos Governing Outputs and Outcomes of Governance Networks L.J.O'Toole, Jr. Theoretical Approaches to Democratic Network Governance E.Sorensen & J.Torfing Governance Networks and Participation A.D.Hansen Networks and Democratic Ideals: Equality, Freedom and Communication J.S.Dryzek Democratic Accountability and Network Governance: Problems and Potentials A.Esmark

Transaction-cost Economics in Real Time

Abstract: This paper attempts to place the theq of the boundaries of thejirm within the context of the passage of time. More precisely, it resurrects and places in a modem frame some of the insights of the chsical and Marshallian theories of organization. The modem reinterpretation of those theories centers around the 'capabilities' view of the jirm. Taken together with governance costs, the capabilities ofjirm and market determine the boundaries of the jirm in the short run. Ovw time, capabilities change as firms and markets learn, which implies a kind of information or knowledge cost-the cost of trandewing the firm's capability to the market w vice versa. These 'dynamic' governance costs are the costs of persuading, negotiating and coordinating with, and teaching others. They arise in the face of change, notably txchnological and organizational innovation. In fit, they are the costs of not having the capabilities you need when you need them. Dynamic transaction costs provide an explanation for vertical integration that is arguably more general than those dominant in the literature. In the face of uncertainty and divwgent views ofthe future, common ownership of multiple stages of production is a supwior institutional arrangement for coordinating systemic change. Asset-specrfity is neither necessary nor suffient for this to be true. Dynamic governance costs may also affIt internal organization. It may sometimes be costly-in 3 terms of persuasion, negotiation and teaching-to create within the firm capabilities _ readily available on the market. Indeed, in cases in which systemic coordination is not 4 the issue, the market may turn out to be the superior institution of coordination. In E 2 genwal, the capabilities view of the jirm suggests that we look atfim2 and market as alternative-and sometimes overlapping-institutions of learning. $ 1. Transaction costs in the long rzln and the short 9 X Classical and neoclassical perspectives

The Political Economy of Corporate Governance

Abstract: The paper analyzes the political decision that determines the degree of investor protection We show that, in some circumstances, entrepreneurs and workers agree to trade low investor protection for high employment protection The feasibility of this "corporatist" agreement depends on the distribution of wealth and on technological factors Otherwise, a "non-corporatist" outcome will occur, featuring high investor protection and low employment protection Therefore, our main prediction is that employment and investor protection is negatively correlated across countries The model also predicts that the frequency of mergers and acquisitions is negatively correlated with employment protection Both predictions are consistent with OECD evidence

Risk Management, Corporate Governance, and Bank Performance in the Financial Crisis

Abstract: The recent financial crisis has raised several questions with respect to the corporate governance of financial institutions. This paper investigates whether risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms, such as for example the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in a bank’s executive board and whether the CRO reports to the CEO or directly to the board of directors, are associated with a better bank performance during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. We measure bank performance by buy-and-hold returns and ROE and we control for standard corporate governance variables such as CEO ownership, board size, and board independence. Most importantly, our results indicate that banks, in which the CRO directly reports to the board of directors and not to the CEO (or other corporate entities), exhibit significantly higher (i.e., less negative) stock returns and ROE during the crisis. In contrast, standard corporate governance variables are mostly insignificantly or even negatively related to the banks’ performance during the crisis.

Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia / Joseph P. H. Fan and T.J. Wong

Abstract: In emerging markets, the concentration of corporate ownership has created agency conflicts between controlling owners and minority shareholders, which are difficult to mitigate through conventional corporate control mechanisms such as boards of directors and takeovers This study examines whether external independent auditors could be employed as monitors and as bonding mechanisms to alleviate these agency conflicts Using a broad sample of firms from eight East Asian economies, we document that firms are more likely to employ Big Five auditors when they are subject to the agency problem imbedded in their ownership structure In addition, among East Asian auditees subject to the agency problem, Big Five auditors charge a higher fee and set a lower audit modification threshold while non-Big Five auditors do not Taken together, this evidence suggests that Big Five auditors in emerging markets do have a corporate governance role