Corporate governance

About: Corporate governance is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 118591 publications have been published within this topic receiving 2793582 citations.

Does Religion Matter in Corporate Decision Making in America

Abstract: We examine how corporate culture influences firms' behaviors and, more specifically, how the level of religiosity in a firm's environment affects its investment decisions. We focus on one country (the U.S.) to minimize differences in legal and economic environments. Prior research suggests a positive link between individual religiosity and risk aversion. We find that this relation also influences organizational behavior. Specifically, firms located in counties with higher levels of religiosity display lower degrees of risk exposure as measured by variances in equity returns or in returns on assets. In turn, such firms require a higher internal rate of return before investing. They exhibit a lower rate of investment either in tangible capital or in R&D but generate a more positive market reaction when they announce new investments. Their long-term growth is also lower. Finally, we document that CEOs are more likely to join firms with similar religious environment as their last firm when they switch employers. All results are both economically and statistically significant. They are robust to many alternative specifications that minimize the risk of omitted variables or endogenous relations.

The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure

Abstract: Crisis management has become a defining feature of contemporary governance. In times of crisis, communities and members of organizations expect their leaders to minimize the impact of the crisis at ...

Public and private bureaucracies: a transaction cost economics perspectives

Abstract: The public bureaucracy is a puzzle. How is it that an organizational form that is so widely used is also believed to be inefficient—both in relation to a hypothetical ideal and in comparison with private bureaucracies? This article examines public bureaucracy through the lens of transaction cost economics, according to which the public bureaucracy, like other alternative modes of governance, is well suited to some transactions and poorly suited to others. Rather than proceed in a completely general way, I focus on what James Q. Wilson describes as “sovereign transactions,” of which foreign affairs is an example. I ask what it is that distinguishes sovereign transactions, after which I compare the efficacy of public and private bureaucracies for managing such transactions. I conclude that there is an efficiency place for public bureaucracy, but that all modes of governance (markets, hybrids, firms, regulation), of which public bureaucracy is one, need to be kept in their place. I further observe that public bureaucracies are not all of a kind and that differences between them need to be distinguished. The public bureau has had a mixed reputation within economics. At the one extreme is the older and resilient (but increasingly discredited) public finance tradition, where public agencies (and the government to which they report) are treated as “omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent” instruments (Dixit, 1996:8). 1 The property rights view—that the public agency is a haven for inef

Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality

Abstract: The effectiveness of control exercised over executive remuneration and the quality of information disclosed in financial statements have given rise to concern and have led to proposals for the reform of corporate governance. A model of the optimal disclosure decision is presented in terms of managerial incentives and the impact of corporate governance structures. An investigation into the quality of share option disclosure in financial statements is used as the basis for testing hypotheses derived from the model and for assessing alternative policy options. The results support the need for guidance on the duties and responsibilities of audit committees and non-executive directors but fall short of providing a basis for deciding whether regulatory action is required. The evidence also supports the view that a threat to monitoring quality exists where the roles of chief executive and chairman are combined.