Corporate governance

About: Corporate governance is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 118591 publications have been published within this topic receiving 2793582 citations.

Research, part of a Special Feature on New Methods for Adaptive Water Management Adaptive Water Governance: Assessing the Institutional Prescriptions of Adaptive (Co-)Management from a Governance Perspective and Defining a Research Agenda

Abstract: This article assesses the institutional prescriptions of adaptive (co-)management based on a literature review of the (water) governance literature. The adaptive (co-)management literature contains four institutional prescriptions: collaboration in a polycentric governance system, public participation, an experimental approach to resource management, and management at the bioregional scale. These prescriptions largely resonate with the theoretical and empirical insights embedded in the (water) governance literature. However, this literature also predicts various problems. In particular, attention is called to the complexities associated with participation and collaboration, the difficulty of experimenting in a real-world setting, and the politicized nature of discussion on governance at the bioregional scale. We conclude this article by outlining a common research agenda that invites the collaborative efforts of adaptive (co-)management and governance scholars.

The Future of Higher Education.

Abstract: Reassessing the future finished and unfinished business widening the access argument access and institutional change access - an overview governance and sectoral differentiation governance - the institutional viewpoint governance - an overview the future and further education quality in higher education quality and qualities - an overview access, quality and governance - one institution's struggle for progress appendix.

Corporate Social Responsibility and Institutional Theory: New Perspectives on Private Governance

Abstract: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become a pervasive topic in the business literature, but has largely neglected the role of institutions. This introductory article to the Special Issue of Socio-Economic Review examines the potential contributions of institutional theory to understanding CSR as a mode of governance. This perspective suggests going beyond grounding CSR in the voluntary behaviour of companies, and understanding the larger historical and political determinants of whether and in what forms corporations take on social responsibilities. Historically, the prevailing notion of CSR emerged through the defeat of more institutionalized forms of social solidarity in liberal market economies. Meanwhile, CSR is more tightly linked to formal institutions of stakeholder participation or state intervention in other advanced economies. The tensions between business-driven and multi-stakeholder forms of CSR extend to the transnational level, where the form and meaning of CSR remain highly contested. CSR research and practice thus rest on a basic paradox between a liberal notion of voluntary engagement and a contrary implication of socially binding responsibilities. Institutional theory seems to be a promising avenue to explore how the boundaries between business and society are constructed in different ways, and improve our understanding of the effectiveness of CSR within the wider institutional field of economic governance.

The Corporate Objective Revisited

Abstract: In this we paper we explain why maximizing shareholder value should be the sole objective function for governing the corporation and why that objective function is, on balance, good for all stakeholders. Shareholder value maximization is the ideal corporate goal because it is the best among all available alternatives for governing the corporation and, therefore, one that makes the most sense for managers formulating and implementing strategy. We construct a set of five normative arguments for the shareholder value maximization view. To support our position we trace the origins of the corporate governance debate from the late nineteenth century and its resulting implications for accepted corporate law and practice of corporate governance in the United States. We examine the debate as reflected in the shareholder/stakeholder arguments in the management and strategy literatures, and the contractarian/communitarian arguments as reflected in the legal literature.

Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity Prices

Abstract: This paper examines whether firms in noncompetitive industries benefit more from good governance than do firms in competitive industries. We find that weak governance firms have lower equity returns, worse operating performance, and lower firm value, but only in noncompetitive industries. When exploring the causes of the inefficiency, we find that weak governance firms have lower labor productivity and higher input costs, and make more value-destroying acquisitions, but, again, only in noncompetitive industries. We also find that weak governance firms in noncompetitive industries are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds, suggesting that investors take actions to mitigate the inefficiency. ECONOMISTS OFTEN ARGUE THATmanagersoffirmsincompetitiveindustrieshave strong incentives to reduce slack and maximize profits, or else the firm will go out of business. 1 Accordingly, the need to provide managers with incentives throughgoodgovernance—and thusthebenefitsofgoodgovernance—should be smaller for firms in competitive industries. In contrast, firms in noncompetitive industries, where lack of competitive pressure fails to enforce discipline on managers, should benefit relatively more from good governance. That firms with good governance have better performance on average is well established. In a seminal article, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003, GIM) find that a hedge portfolio that is long in good governance firms (“Democracy firms”) and short in weak governance firms (“Dictatorship firms”) earns a monthly alpha of 0.71%. Governance is measured using the G-index, which consists of 24 antitakeover and shareholder rights provisions. In addition to showing that good governance is associated with higher equity returns, GIM also show that it is associated with both higher firm value and better operating performance. 2 ∗ Giroud is at the NYU Stern School of Business. Mueller is at the NYU Stern School of Business, NBER, CEPR, and ECGI. We thank Cam Harvey (the Editor), an associate editor, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at NYU, Yale, Michigan, Illinois, the WFA Meetings in San Diego (2009), and the Harvard Law School/Sloan Foundation Corporate Governance Research Conference (2009) for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to Wei Jiang and Martijn Cremers for providing us with data.