Corporate group

About: Corporate group is a(n) research topic. Over the lifetime, 1747 publication(s) have been published within this topic receiving 46868 citation(s).

Corporate Ownership Around the World

Abstract: We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means’s image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash f low rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.

Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? an analysis of diversified indian business groups

Abstract: Emerging markets like India have poorly functioning institutions, leading to severe agency and information problems. Business groups in these markets have the potential both to offer benefits to member firms, and to destroy value. We analyze the performance of affiliates of diversified Indian business groups relative to unaffiliated firms. We find that accounting and stock market measures of firm performance initially decline with group diversification and subsequently increase once group diversification exceeds a certain level. Unlike U.S. conglomerates' lines of business, and similar to the affiliates of U.S. LBO associations, affiliates of the most diversified business groups outperform unaffiliated firms.

Estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging markets

Abstract: Business groups—confederations of legally independent firms—are ubiquitous in emerging economies, yet very little is known about their effects on the performance of affiliated firms. We conceive of business groups as responses to market failures and high transaction costs. In doing so, we develop hypotheses about the effects of group affiliation on firm profitability: affiliation could either boost or depress firm profitability, and members of a group are likely to earn rates of return similar to other members of the same group. Using a unique data set compiled largely from local sources, we test for these effects in 14 emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. We find evidence that business groups indeed affect the broad patterns of economic performance in 12 of the markets we examine. Group affiliation appears to have as profound an effect on profitability as does industry membership, yet strategy scholars have a much clearer grasp of industries than of groups. Moreover, membership in a group raises the profitability of the average group member in several of the markets we examine. This runs contrary to the wisdom, conventional in advanced economies, that unrelated diversification depresses profitability. Overall, our findings suggest that the roots of sustained differences in profitability may vary across institutional contexts; conclusions drawn in one context may well not apply to another. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Review Paper Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal-Principal Perspective

Abstract: Instead of traditional principal-agent conflicts espoused in most research dealing with developed economies, principal-principal conflicts have been identified as a major concern of corporate governance in emerging economies. Principal-principal conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders result from concentrated ownership, extensive family ownership and control, business group structures, and weak legal protection of minority shareholders. Such principal-principal conflicts alter the dynamics of the corporate governance process and, in turn, require remedies different from those that deal with principal-agent conflicts. This article reviews and synthesizes recent research from strategy, finance, and economics on principal-principal conflicts with an emphasis on their institutional antecedents and organizational consequences. The resulting integration provides a foundation upon which future research can continue to build.

Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal-principal perspective: Review paper

Abstract: Instead of traditional principal–agent conflicts espoused in most research dealing with developed economies, principal–principal conflicts have been identified as a major concern of corporate governance in emerging economies. Principal–principal conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders result from concentrated ownership, extensive family ownership and control, business group structures, and weak legal protection of minority shareholders. Such principal–principal conflicts alter the dynamics of the corporate governance process and, in turn, require remedies different from those that deal with principal–agent conflicts. This article reviews and synthesizes recent research from strategy, finance, and economics on principal–principal conflicts with an emphasis on their institutional antecedents and organizational consequences. The resulting integration provides a foundation upon which future research can continue to build.