Showing papers on "Corporate group published in 1990"

Corporate Control: Markets and Rules

Abstract: It is likely that the impact of statutes on transactions in corporate control in the United Kingdom will increase in the near future, whether as a result of recent scandals or because of the introduction of legislation to harmonise rules within the EEC For these reasons it is appropriate to consider again the interests of those who are affected by the operation of the market for corporate control Traditionally, comment on, and regulation of, take-overs has focused on three issues: (1) the maintenance of proper balances between managerial and ownership interests within companies which are the targets of take-over attempts, (2) the maintenance of a balance between the interests of predators and shareholders in the target company, and (3) the protection of the public interest The first issue can be traced to the identification by Berle and Means of a potential conflict between the interests of owners and the interests of controllers of large corporations Since Berle and Means, much of the literature about corporations has concentrated on whether constraints on corporate managerial power are necessary in order to protect the interests of shareholders2 One of the most significant constraints on corporate managerial power seems to many commentators to be the market for corporate control, and the threat of displacement which it poses to corporate managements3 The idea of the market for corporate control seems to have originated with Berle and Means,4 but has since been refined5 The second issue arises out of the concern of regulators that predators should not profit at the expense of target company shareholders,6 and some of the refinements of the corporate control theory are relevant to this issue In practice, the third issue, the protection of the public interest, usually involves questions of competition policy7 These three issues all have different origins, but economic theory is relevant in all cases, as it suggests that markets operate in the public interest, except where there is market

Adapting to Doom: The Group Psychology of an Organization Threatened with Cultural Extinction

Abstract: This paper illustrates the role of unconscious activities in organizations and cultures. Through a case study, it describes the interplay between organizational fantasies and organizational realities in the political life of a medical corporation. This case study is of the decline of a corporate group that has been slowly allowed by its parent company to atrophy, and of the relationship between the subsidiary, which I shall call Managed Care Affiliate (MCA), and its corporate headquarters. It explores the dynamics of grief-work and of impediments to it posed by a sense of catastrophe. In this paper, I also explore my evolving role as an organizational consultant seeking to help — albeit in a limited way — the subsidiary, MCA, through its protracted uncertainty, rage, and grief. At the descriptive level, the case study interweaves two stories: (1) the story of an organization whose members are haunted by a sense of doom, and (2) the narrative of my role as organizational consultant, a role which both gave me access to the organizational narrative, and provided conflicting expectations for my interventions on behalf of MCA.

The emergence of virtual groups

Abstract: This article describes how groups emerge out of collective activity and explains the institutional processes that lead to the development of group activity embedded within existing institutional settings. It describes the formation of virtual groups by using divergent social settings as examples (SOFTEK, a modern industrial corporation [Stephenson 1990], and the Namabeya, a nonindustrialized community) to emphasize the applicability of this model to a variety of contexts. Many of the views about group emergence, its role in organizational change and its impact on corporate and community life are derived from extant ethnographic descriptions of classical anthropological settings. In this regard, the seminal fieldwork of Gulliver (1963, 1971, 1977, 1979) among the Ndendeuli of Africa is used to illustrate the relevance and utility of the model. Additionally, I present the work of eighteen months of participant observation in a New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) high-technology firm to which I have given the pseudonym, SOFTEK. Behavioral studies typically recognize the importance of ad hoc formations within institutional settings (Mintzberg 1979, 1983). Of particular interest is the ad hoc corporate group. "Adhocracy," a term coined by Bennis (1966) is an institutional structure that sustains the formation of corporate groups that are temporary by design. Such groups are highly suited for the performance of complex, innovative and uncertain tasks in turbulent environments (Galbraith 1971, 1974, 1977; Davis and Lawrence 1977, Kolodny 1981; Kanter 1983). I will illustrate how corporate groups coalesce around paradigmatic anomaly or cultural innovations. In so doing, these groups emerge and develop in an ad hoc manner and occasionally assume a life of their own?far exceeding the expectations of the individuals tangentially or centrally involved in the group. Paradoxically, the very presumption of perpetuity is antithetical to the ad hoc manner by which such groups initially emerge. In this sense, an ad hoc group may be considered "virtually" powerful because it is a dialectical reaction to generalized collective activity. This understanding of a virtual group is very different from traditional typologies of corporate groups (Smith 1974, 1978; Weber 1964, 1968; Mackenzie 1986; Mintzberg 1979,1983) and generic process studies (Moore 1975; Bourdieu 1977). Here, I develop and discuss a generative mechanism of how corporate groups evolve from collective activity. I focus on the institutional factors in the social organization of these groups as they materially bear upon group autonomy and are differentially invoked according to the specifics of situations. Incipient corporate groups are called virtual groups as they are mobile strategic positions within an existing institutional structure. As such,

Making America poorer: The cost of labor law Morgan O. Reynolds Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1987, 218 pp.

Abstract: None of the above suggests that Reynolds is incorrect in finding monopoly power in unions; neither is it suggested that labor relations law should not be considered as one source of that power. Reynolds is correct on both counts. However, his study is incomplete. There are additional sources which should also be identified and evaluated.Making America Poorer presents viewpoints held by some economists, some business groups, and some segments of the public. These views will be part of any national debate.

Bad Arguments in Corporate Law

Abstract: Corporate law has become a lively battleground in the last ten or fifteen years; few subjects have provoked as much debate in the scholarly literature and at symposia and other scholarly meetings. The major questions in this debate are whether any legal rules should be mandatory, and, if so, what these rules should be. These questions raise complex and difficult issues, which occasionally are obscured by some recurring bad arguments. The purpose of this article is to identify several of these bad arguments in the hope of removing some clutter from the stage.