Corporate group

About: Corporate group is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1747 publications have been published within this topic receiving 46868 citations.

Resource Deepening vs. Resource Extension: Impact on Asset-Seeking Acquisition Performance

Abstract: Seeking critical assets is known to be a key motivation for emerging economy firms to make acquisitions in foreign markets, especially those in developed economies. In this study, we probe this motivation further by identifying two categories of asset-seeking acquisitions: resource deepening and resource extension. Using a sample of 1004 cross-border acquisitions conducted by Indian firms during the period 2000–2010, we find support for the hypothesis that the type of resources sought and their intended utility impacts acquisition performance. Additionally, for resource extension acquisitions, we find that acquisition performance outcomes vary by the assimilative capacity of the firm and the extent of experience in acquisitions at the firm and business group level.

Contests for Corporate Control: Corporate Governance and Economic Performance in the United States and Germany

Abstract: During the 1990s, corporate governance became a hot issue in all of the advanced economies. For decades, major business corporations had reinvested earnings and developed long-term relations with their labour forces as they expanded the scale and scope of their operations. As a result, these corporations had made themselves central to resource allocation and economic performance in the national economies in which they had evolved. Then, beginning in the 1980s and picking up momentum in the 1990s, came the contests for corporate control. Previously silent stockholders, now empowered by institutional investors, demanded that corporations be run to 'maximize shareholder value'. In the United States many, if not most, top corporate executives have now embraced this ideology. In this highly original book, Mary O'Sullivan provides a critical analysis of the theoretical foundations for the shareholder value principle of corporate governance and for the alternative perspective that corporations should be run in the interests of 'stakeholders'. She embeds her arguments on the relation between corporate governance and economic performance in historical accounts of the dynamics of corporate growth in the United States and Germany over the course of the twentieth century. O'Sullivan explains the emergence and consequences of 'maximizing shareholder value' as a principle of corporate governance in the United States over the past two decades, and provides unique insights into the contests for corporate control that have unfolded in Germany over the past few years.

Strategy Meets Institutions: The Transformation of Management-Labor Relations at Deutsche Telekom and NTT

Abstract: This comparison of labor-management relations at Deutsche Telekom (DT) and NTT Group (formerly Nippon Telephone and Telegraph) demonstrates the value of considering both institutions and strategic decision-making to under stand the interaction between companies and unions. As corporations diversify, multi-divisional or holding company structures emerge, but the degree of diversity introduced in employment relations within the corporate group de pends on the interaction between corporate strategy and the strategy of orga nized labor. The authors' field research, based on interviews with managers and labor leaders, shows that despite a broadly similar corporate strategy of diversi fication by DT and NTT after the liberalization of telecommunication markets, employment relations became more decentralized?both for unions and for works councils?within the DT group than within the NTT group. This differ ence in outcomes is explained by the relative power and strategic choices of labor and management, rather than by constraints and opportunities specific to the existing national institutions.

Studies in international corporate finance and governance systems : a comparison of the U.S., Japan, and Europe

Abstract: The past decade has given rise to a growing debate over the relative efficiency of different national economic systems. There are two basic corporate finance and governance systems that predominate in todays developed economies. One is the Anglo-American market based model, with widely dispersed shareholders and a fairly vigorous corporate control market. The other is the Japanese and German relationship based system, with its large bank and intercorporate holdings (and conspicuous absence of takeovers). Given the increasing globalization of business, which of these two systems can be expected to prevail over time? Or will the most valuable aspects of each be blended into a single new system? The story now being told by economists and management experts -- one that this book attempts to present -- is a complicated one. Here is a sampling of the arguments: Corporate strategist Michael Porter states that the U.S. system of allocating capital both within and across companies appears to be failing because of both capital market and internal pressures on U.S. companies to underinvest in the relatively intangible assets that contribute to corporate capabilities. In contrast to Porter, financial economist Michael Jensen maintains that the most formidable challenge now facing the U.S. economy -- and, indeed, the economies of all industrialized nations -- is the corporate overinvestment problem, a problem that was addressed in the U.S. by the leveraged restructuring of the 1980s. Nobel-Prize economist Merton Miller answers both Porters concern about U.S. underinvestment and Jensens pessimism about U.S. control systems with a classic defense of the shareholder-value principle. Corporate strategist C.K. Prahalad, unconvinced by the arguments of both Miller and Jensen, challenges the wisdom of corporate Americas commitment to maximizing shareholder value. In a roundtable discussion, Prahalad debates with shareholder value advocate Bennett Stewart about the effects of shareholder primacy in the U.S. and its absence in Japan. Studies in International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems consists of 27 articles (and two roundtable discussions) written by academic and management experts in the fields of corporate finance and governance. Given its commitment to translating outstanding academic research into relatively plain English for practicing businessmen, this book should prove especially useful for corporate executives as well as students in MBA and executive development programs.

The Mad Hatter's corporate tea party

Abstract: This paper aims to provide an insight into the corporate greed and consequent corporate collapses of companies such as HIH, One.Tel and Harris Scarfe in Australia, while concurrently, Enron, WorldCom and other companies were attracting the attention of the accounting profession, the regulators and the general public in the USA. It is argued that the rise in economic rationalism and the related increased materialism of both the public and company directors and managers, fed the corporate excesses that resulted in spectacular corporate collapses, including one of the world’s largest accounting firms. The opportunistic behaviour of directors, and managers and the lack of transparency and integrity in corporations, was compounded by the failure of the corporate watch‐dogs, such as auditors and regulators, to protect the public interest. If the history of bad corporate behaviour is not to be repeated, the religion of materialism needs to be recognised and addressed, to ensure any corporate governance reforms proposed for the future will be effective.