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Corporate group

About: Corporate group is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1747 publications have been published within this topic receiving 46868 citations.


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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored the impact of B Corp certification and its associated impact assessment on four case studies of small and medium-sized Brazilian companies certified as B Corps and found that although all companies had achieved high scores in the certification assessment, awarded on the basis of existing performance, they did not subsequently develop road maps for the future to improve their scores in a way which the B Corp Impact Assessment process endorses as one of the benefits of certification.
Abstract: This study explores the impact of B Corp certification and its associated impact assessment on four case studies of small and medium-sized Brazilian companies certified as B Corps. The results reveal that although all companies had achieved high scores in the certification assessment, awarded on the basis of existing performance, they did not subsequently develop road maps for the future to improve their scores in the way which the B Corp Impact Assessment process endorses as one of the benefits of certification. Their incremental changes are discussed in the light of the main motivations and expectations of these companies’ founders with regard to the certification. A central role of the B Corp certification for this group of companies was to improve their external reputation with investors, clients and consumers. They were not strongly driven to reshape internal processes in ways which would advance their scores in the impact assessment and which would tackle complex problems of corporate governance. Our findings contribute to enriching the discussion of stakeholder engagement and corporate governance in hybrid organizations and contribute to the emerging agenda on studying change over time in B Corps.

44 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: For example, the authors pointed out that there is a "crisis in corporate law" and pointed out the need to increase the accountability of management to the corporation's shareholders, which is the central problem of the accountability problem.
Abstract: I. CRISISAt a recent corporate law conference, I found myself seated beside a young professor from one of the leading east coast law schools.(1) Referring to the brochure advertising our symposium on "New Directions in Corporate Law," which he had received in the mail, he recalled his surprise--and incredulity--at the asserted existence of a "crisis in corporate law." He related that he had puzzled over this for a while and finally turned to a faculty colleague for enlightenment. That person could not identify any crisis either. So, one may ask, is there really a crisis in corporate law, or, instead, is the title of this essay just a misleading marketing ploy?We are in the midst of a crisis. It is a crisis of uncertainty over corporate law's normative foundations. For much of this century, at least since the publication of Berle and Means' classic in 1932,(2) the orthodox assumption has been that corporate law's objective is to develop legal structures that will maximize shareholder wealth. This shareholder primacy vision of corporate law therefore disregards claims of various nonshareholder constituencies (including employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and communities in which firms operate) whose interests may be adversely affected by managerial pursuit of shareholder welfare. Managerial accountability to shareholders is corporate law's central problem. Nonshareholder interests, if entitled to any legal protection at all, are for other, noncorporate law legal regimes.To say that shareholder primacy has been corporate law's governing norm is not to say that corporate law has succeeded to everyone's satisfaction in achieving its shareholder welfare objective. To the contrary, the ongoing theme in corporate law discourse has been the need to increase the accountability of management to the corporation's shareholders. Berle and Means articulated this concern in their book, identifying the separation between ownership and control as the source of the accountability problem. A complete solution has proved elusive. For one thing, as economic theorists have pointed out, the costs of delegation of managerial authority--so-called agency costs--can never be eliminated entirely because at some point the marginal costs of remedial measures exceed the marginal benefits.(3) More importantly, legal doctrine has displayed a certain degree of ambivalence on the accountability question. As with any difficult public policy problem, there are countervailing considerations. Deference to managerial discretion has been thought to have a value of its own, if for no other reason than the recognition that courts, staffed by lawyers rather than professional managers and sitting in an ex post posture, lack the expertise to make sound judgments about business policy.(4) In addition, corporate law has always understood--though usually only dimly--that truly relentless pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization is inconsistent with actual business practice and socially unacceptable in any event.(5) Even as these considerations have mitigated against a wholehog commitment to shareholder wealth maximization, it is still clear that shareholder primacy has served as corporate law's governing norm for much of this century. It is otherwise impossible to understand corporate law's basic doctrinal structures (for example, shareholder voting rights and directors' fiduciary duties to shareholders) as well as its academic discourse.(6)The hostile takeover explosion of the 1980s initially held out the promise of a final resolution of the accountability problem. An active market for corporate control would create a mechanism for managerial discipline far more formidable than the lax constraints of the voting rights and fiduciary duty systems. The beauty of the hostile tender offer, of course, was that it allowed the bidder to do an end run around target company management, appealing directly to the shareholders with the enticement of a hefty premium over current stock market price. …

43 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provided the first systematic evidence on the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in the Philippines and found that the substantial portion of the Philippines economy that is under the control of group networks incentivize managers in ways other than through use of pay-performance schemes.
Abstract: This paper provides the first systematic evidence on the nature of the relation between executive compensation and firm performance in the Philippines. Comparable to studies of Japan, Korea, and China, we find a positive relation between executive compensation and performance in the Philippines for those firms not affiliated to a corporate group, but that this relation does not hold for affiliated firms. We conclude that the substantial portion of the Philippine economy that is under the control of group networks incentivize managers in ways other than through use of pay–performance schemes.

43 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Wang et al. as discussed by the authors investigated the impact of firms' business group affiliations on their performance in CSR in China and found that firms with a dual status of being a business group member and a state-owned enterprise (SOE) at the same time have weaker CSR performance.

43 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Choi et al. as discussed by the authors showed that business group (chaebol) firms have overall stronger governance practices but weaker shareholder rights and lower dividend payout ratios than independent firms do.
Abstract: Using a unique, comprehensive data set from a survey on corporate governance practices among Korean listed firms, this paper shows that business group (chaebol) firms have overall stronger governance practices but weaker shareholder rights and lower dividend payout ratios than independent firms do. We also find that the adverse effect of chaebol firms' weak shareholder rights on dividend payout ratios appears to exemplify with the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. In addition, our regression results show that the positive correlation between corporate governance practices and dividend payout ratios is weaker among chaebol firms. Finally, we find that improving corporate governance enhances payout policies over time but is statistically significant only for independent firms. Our results suggest that the entrenched control by chaebol firm owners that stems from their control rights much above the cash flow rights puts less weight on protecting minority shareholders, resulting in smaller distributions of dividend payments.

43 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
202321
202249
202165
202078
201967
201874