Corporate group

About: Corporate group is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1747 publications have been published within this topic receiving 46868 citations.

Business groups and the boundaries of the firm

Abstract: Purpose – This paper aims to show that the business group – i.e. the set of firms under common ownership and control – is the most appropriate unit to study the behavior and organization of firms and define their boundaries. Particular emphasis is given to notions such as unitary direction – i.e. the influence over strategic decisions – and administrative co‐ordination which allow owners to exercise supervision and authority over the controlled companies.Design/methodology/approach – Given these aims the paper adopts an interdisciplinary perspective that relies on economics, management and law. This multidisciplinary approach is necessary for analyzing the different aspects characterizing business groups in terms of ownership, control, economic synergies between firms and internal organizational mechanisms. To support the propositions, data and information from various sources are used, ranging from official statistics on the firm's population, to sample surveys, case studies and juridical evidence. The u...

Business Group Affiliation and Corporate Sustainability Strategies of Firms: An Investigation of Firms in India

Abstract: In spite of an overwhelming importance of business groups (BG) in the economic development of many countries, systematic inquiry on how the BGs and their affiliated firms approach and contribute to shared value creation and sustainable development is rare. In this paper we address this research gap by investigating two related questions—do BG-affiliated firms differ from non-BG firms in their corporate sustainability strategy (CSS) and how does BG affiliation influence the relationship between stock of fungible resources and CSS of firms? Drawing from the BG literature we theorize that BG-affiliated firms tend to adopt of both environmental and social sustainability strategies more than non-BG firms. We also argue that although according to resource-based view, the stock of fungible resources of firms positively influences CSS, BG affiliation negatively moderates the relationship between stock of fungible resources and CSS of firms. Stock of fungible resources matters less for BG-affiliated firms in undertaking CSS as they have access to resources of the BG network. We test our theoretical predictions using a proprietary data set of 163 Indian publicly listed firms, out of which 76 are BG-affiliated firms belonging to 74 BGs. The data for corporate environmental and social sustainability strategies have been obtained by administering a survey instrument among the top level executives of the participating firms. We find support for our theoretical predictions that signify that BGs and their affiliates make important contributions to shared value creation and sustainable development in emerging economies like India.

Stock Market Reaction to Corporate Crime: Evidence from South Korea

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of corporate crime on the stock market in South Korea. Specifically, we examine the effect of crime type (white-collar vs. street crime, operational vs. financial), industry type (financial vs. industrial), business group affiliation (chaebol-affiliated vs. non-chaebol-affiliated), and corporate governance (strong vs. weak board structure index) on the relationship between corporate crime announcement and stock market reaction. We find negative reactions to stock prices around the announcements of corporate crimes but no significant difference in reactions between announcements of individual and organizational crimes. Individual white-collar crimes have a stronger negative impact on stock prices than do individual street crimes on average, while financial crimes have a significantly greater negative impact than do operational crimes in organizations. Moreover, financial sector firms are impacted more significantly by the announcement of corporate crimes than are non-financial firms. In addition, the stock prices of chaebol-affiliated firms decrease less than do those of non-chaebol-affiliated firms, and those with a higher board committee subindex seem to be influenced less by news of corporate crimes if the size control variable is excluded. Multivariate cross-sectional analyses show consistent findings after controlling for firm-specific factors, crime-type effect, and industry and year effects. The results of this study provide valuable insights because it covers several types of corporate crime, including those committed by individuals and those perpetrated by firms.

Organization and Development of Russian Business: A Firm-Level Analysis

Abstract: Preface INTRODUCTION Emergence of Russian Corporations: from the Soviet Enterprise to a Market Firm PART I: OWNERSHIP, INTERNAL CONTROL, AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Stock Ownership and Corporate Control Legal Form of Incorporation Structure of Corporate Boards Impacts of Corporate Governance and Firm Performance on Managerial Turnover Managerial Teams and Firm Restructuring PART II: BUSINESS INTEGRATION AND ITS IMPACT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Organizational Patterns of Corporate Control and Business Integration Corporate Governance and Decision-Making in Business Groups Impact of Business Integration on Corporate Restructuring and Performance PART III: THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE The Banking Sector and Corporate Finance Business Associations: Incentives and Benefits from the Viewpoint Of Corporate Governance State-Business Relationship and Improvement of Corporate Governance CONCLUSIONS Appendix: Outline of the Joint Enterprise Survey

An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy

Abstract: This article contends that the important recent literature exploring historical and political influences on American corporate law has neglected a crucial component of corporate governance: corporate bankruptcy. Only by appreciating the complementary relationship between corporate law and corporate bankruptcy can we understand how corporate governance operates in any given nation. To show this, I contrast American corporate governance with Japan and Germany. America's market-driven corporate governance can only function effectively if the bankruptcy framework includes a manager-driven reorganization option. The relational shareholding that characterizes Japanese and German corporate governance, by contrast, requires a much harsher bankruptcy regime. Drawing on recent insights in corporate finance, I argue that a permanent change in the corporate governance approach (such as an increase in relational governance in the United States, as some commentators have advocated) would require a corresponding change in corporate bankruptcy, and vice versa. In order to understand why American corporate governance differs so dramatically from Japan and Germany, I explore the evolution of corporate governance and corporate bankruptcy in the three countries in historical and political terms. Focusing in greatest detail on the United States, I provide a more complete account (including extensive research of primary sources) of the remarkable history of corporate reorganization in this country than any previous analysis; and demonstrate that market-driven corporate governance and corporate reorganization did, as my theory predicts, develop in complementary fashion. My analysis of interest group activity, as well as structural and ideological factors, in the United States and in Japan and Germany suggests that corporate governance patterns will remain surprisingly stable in each of the three countries, despite the increasing internationalization of markets. This is not to say that one of the two systems is now and will continue to be superior to the other, however. The two approaches appear both to be generally efficient and to have characteristic biases.