Topic
Corporate group
About: Corporate group is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1747 publications have been published within this topic receiving 46868 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
More filters
••
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the use of offering cash rights share issues in Turkish business group firms for the period 1991-2003 and found evidence for the existence of propping during a period of moderate negative growth.
26 citations
••
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed the individual and joint impact of family control and diversification on the performance of major Spanish corporations, considering the nature of the ultimate owner of non-family groups.
26 citations
••
TL;DR: In this paper, a new theory that incorporates dimensions of the existing perspectives is presented, which maintains that corporate change occurs as a dialectical process which in the 1980s involved a shift of corporate control from managers to owners, resulting from a crisis in the accumulation of capital in the corporation.
Abstract: In the 1980s, the corporate form shifted from multidivisional forms to corporate groups of subsidiaries. Although many aspects of corporate change during the 1980s have been examined, the magnitude and nature of changes in corporate form have received relatively little attention. Moreover, this transformation of corporate form has been inadequately explained by the dominant theoretical perspectives on corporate form—managerialism, institutionalism, and agency theory. A new theory that incorporates dimensions of the existing perspectives is presented. This perspective maintains that corporate change occurs as a dialectical process, which in the 1980s involved a shift of corporate control from managers to owners, resulting from a crisis in the accumulation of capital in the corporation. After gaining control through institutional investments, owners insisted on greater return on their investments. Mergers and acquisitions transferred corporate capital from corporations, controlled by managers, to shareholders. The relative utility of this perspective compared to existing perspectives for explaining the transformation of corporate form in the 1980s is demonstrated, and hypotheses for understanding changes in corporate form in the 1990s are proposed.
26 citations
••
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that Belgian firms affiliated to a business group (holding) manage their earnings more than stand-alone firms and that earnings management is especially prevalent in fully owned group firms compared to group firms with minority shareholders.
Abstract: This study provides evidence that Belgian firms affiliated to a business group (holding) manage their earnings more than stand-alone firms. Earnings management is especially more prevalent in fully owned group firms compared to group firms with minority shareholders. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that controlling shareholders face fewer constraints to manage earnings if opportunistic earnings management cannot adversely affect the value of minority shareholders and is inconsistent with the claim that group firms would engage in earnings management to hide controlling shareholders’ self-serving transactions. On the incentive part, we find that group firms strategically manage earnings in response to tax incentives. More specifically, we show that signed discretionary accruals of group firms depend significantly more on the marginal tax rate status of the firm as compared to independent firms. Finally, we document that earnings management is particularly facilitated through intra-group transactions.
25 citations