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Corporate group

About: Corporate group is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1747 publications have been published within this topic receiving 46868 citations.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on six components that successful and innovative companies have in common and support their argument with case studies to show how these companies have found different ways to give substance to the six components.
Abstract: Recent regulatory initiatives that attempt to encourage shareholder engagement, ensure board independence and improve the operation and transparency of corporate groups are of great interest to both academics and practitioners. These initiatives reflect a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach that may lead to disappointing and counterproductive results and could destabilize and disrupt workable arrangements between management, the board of directors and investors. In this paper, we take a different perspective by showing how there is more to corporate governance than just providing protection to investors and other stakeholders. An important reason for corporate governance is that it also facilitates companies to be innovative, create value and maintain a competitive advantage. To show this, this paper focuses on six components that successful and innovative companies have in common. We support our argument with case studies to show how these companies have found different ways to give substance to the six components.

15 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors empirically examined whether the research and development (R&D) activities of foreign-owned firms in Japan differ notably from the R&D activities of domestically owned firms based on a firm-level panel dataset.

15 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the firms in business groups avoid tax by related party transactions by making transactions at a level that can minimize the tax of both the firm that reduces the taxable income through related parties transactions and the firm whose taxable income increases.
Abstract: This study aims to examine if the firms in business groups avoid tax by related party transactions. If other conditions are the same, firms have an incentive to maximize after-tax profits by minimizing tax burden. If the firms are in business groups, they tend to minimize tax at the business group level. It is expected that the level of tax avoidance of both parties of related party transactions will be high if tax is minimized at the business group level as the transactions will be made at a level that can minimize the tax of both the firm that reduces the taxable income through related party transactions and the firm whose taxable income increases. In addition, the effect of being in a Chaebol business group and the effect of the Unfair Related Party Transactions Tax Law on the association with related party transactions and tax avoidance are also examined. According to this study, the firms in business groups avoid tax by related party transactions. It is also found out that tax avoidance by related party transactions is done more aggressively in Chaebol member firms than non-Chaebol firms, while tax avoidance by related party transactions in Chaebol business groups decreases after the implementation of the Unfair Related Party Transactions Tax Law.

15 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: The authors argued that the U.S. commitment to private ordering in corporate law may not be a simple political choice that other countries can copy at will, but rather the reflection of various deep-seated institutional and social characteristics.
Abstract: American corporate law stands out when compared to other legal systems. At no time is this more apparent than with regard to the use of mandatory law. Corporate law in the United States is largely enabling, whereas most other countries around the globe rely heavily on mandatory corporate law.The traditional view seeks to explain this American exceptionalism by pointing to the phenomenon of regulatory competition. According to this view, regulatory competition has eroded mandatory corporate law norms in the United States, whereas the absence of such competition has allowed mandatory norms to persist in other countries. This narrative, however, confuses cause and effect. Regulatory competition exists where it is allowed to exist; the decisive question is why so many countries have chosen to protect their mandatory corporate law norms by suppressing regulatory competition while the United States has done the opposite.This article argues that efficiency considerations are key to understanding this mandatory law puzzle. The efficiency of enabling versus mandatory corporate law is not uniform across countries; instead, it depends on numerous social and institutional factors, particularly the efficiency of stock markets, ownership patterns, judicial infrastructure, and labor market flexibility. As a result, enabling corporate law is substantially more efficient in the United States than it is in Europe and many other countries. In other words, the U.S. commitment to private ordering in corporate law may not be a simple political choice that other countries can copy at will, but rather the reflection of various deep-seated institutional and social characteristics.

15 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
07 Dec 2015
TL;DR: An extensive empirical analysis of the Italian ownership network, which, with its 3.9M nodes, is 30× the largest network studied so far, is conducted.
Abstract: We present a framework for the analysis of corporate governance problems using network science and graph algorithms on ownership networks. In such networks, nodes model companies/shareholders and edges model shares owned. Inspired by the widespread pyramidal organization of corporate groups of companies, we model ownership networks as layered graphs, and exploit the layered structure to design feasible and efficient solutions to three key problems of corporate governance. The first one is the long-standing problem of computing direct and indirect ownership (integrated ownership problem). The other two problems are introduced here: computing direct and indirect dividends (dividend problem), and computing the group of companies controlled by a parent shareholder (corporate group problem). We conduct an extensive empirical analysis of the Italian ownership network, which, with its 3.9M nodes, is 30× the largest network studied so far.

15 citations


Network Information
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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
202321
202249
202165
202078
201967
201874