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Corporate group

About: Corporate group is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1747 publications have been published within this topic receiving 46868 citations.


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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the increase in subsidiarization from 1981 to 1995 as a means of assessing the utility of four theoretical perspectives to explain change in corporate form, and demonstrate how corporate financial conditions, national business laws, and organizational characteristics combine to affect the rate of subsidy of U.S. corporations.
Abstract: Between 1981 and 1995 the dominant form of Fortune 500 firms changed from the multidivisional form to the multisubsidiary form (Zey and Camp 1996). The explanation for the movement toward subsidiarization originates in changes during the late 1970s and 1980s in the political economy, the relationship between corporations and capital, and the regulation of corporations. As a result of the declining capital accumulation of the 1970s, the federal government instituted two measures of corporate welfare, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and the Revenue Act of 1987 (RA87), that provided corporations with nontaxable ways to restructure their acquisitions and divisions as subsidiaries. Thus, by the process of subsidiarization, corporations were able to continue capital flows. We examine the increase in subsidiarization from 1981–1995 as a means of assessing the utility of four theoretical perspectives to explain change in corporate form. A one-way random effects panel analysis demonstrates how corporate financial conditions, national business laws, and organizational characteristics combine to affect the rate of subsidiarization of U.S. corporations. Separate panel models for 1981–1985 (pre- TRA86) and 1986–1995 (post- TRA86) reveal that changes in corporate tax laws affect capital accumulation and result in significant change in corporate form. This analysis supports the structural political economy contingency theory arguing that change in capital accumulation, brought about by macro changes in political legal conditions of corporations, leads to the transformation of corporate form.

13 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: In this article, the authors extend the Palia, Ravid and Wang (2008) model of family succession and argue that family CEOs can be successful if certain characteristics, such as private knowledge, non monetary benefits from managing the firm, and personal skills are met.
Abstract: We extend the Palia, Ravid and Wang (2008) model of family succession, and argue that family CEOs can be successful if certain characteristics, such as private knowledge, non monetary benefits from managing the firm, and personal skills are met. We use Carvajal, a large Colombian business group, to support our ideas and show that, contrary to international empirical evidence, there are certain circumstances where efforts made by heirs can be similar to those of the founder and exceed those of outside managers.

13 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper examined the effect of business group affiliation on innovation and found that group affiliation is particularly important in industries that rely more on external finance and have a higher degree of information asymmetry, and also found that the innovation of affiliates is less sensitive to operating cash flows.
Abstract: Using novel data on European firms, this paper examines the effect of business group affiliation on innovation. We find that business groups foster the scale and novelty of corporate innovation. Group affiliation is particularly important in industries that rely more on external finance and have a higher degree of information asymmetry. We also find that the innovation of affiliates is less sensitive to operating cash flows. We interpret our results as supporting the "bright side" of business group internal capital markets and explain how legal boundaries between group affiliates mitigate the inefficiencies found in internal capital markets of US conglomerates.

13 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors apply the Team Production Theory developed by American corporate law scholars, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, to argue that Canadian corporate law's understanding of public corporations that are not controlled by a single shareholder or group of shareholders reflects a director primacy norm rather than a shareholder primacy.
Abstract: The article applies the Team Production Theory developed by American corporate law scholars, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, to argue that Canadian corporate law's understanding of public corporations that are not controlled by a single shareholder or group of shareholders reflects a director primacy norm rather than a shareholder primacy norm. Canadian corporate law provides that directors of such public corporations with widely-held share ownership and voting rights are free from direct control by any corporate stakeholders. A potential departing point for Canadian corporate law. the oppression remedy, continues to develop to deal with extra-legal advantages rooted primarily in unequal power relations among corporate stakeholders. However, in its current and predicted future applications, the oppression remedy does not provide any given stakeholder group with an ability to dominate the boards of public corporations and obviate the director primacy norm. The article suggests that because the director primacy norm accurately describes Canadian corporate law, further consideration needs to be given to corporate law's relative relevance in dictating how Canadian corporations currently operate.

13 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: For example, the authors argues that if we cannot as a matter of constitutional law keep corporations out of our democracy, then we must as a Matter of corporate law have more democracy in our corporations.
Abstract: The Supreme Court held in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010) that the First Amendment forbids Congress from restricting the political speech of corporations. While corporate theory did little to inform the Court’s thinking in Citizens United, this Article argues that the holding in Citizens United requires us to rethink corporate theory. The shareholder primacy norm in American corporate governance relies on the assumption that corporations can be restrained from influencing external governmental operations. We can enjoy the efficiencies generated by shareholder primacy in corporate governance, mainstream corporate theorists have long argued, because we can rely on external regulation to curb or cure the excesses that such a framework will predictably visit upon nonshareholding stakeholders, such as workers, consumers, and communities. Citizens United removes this lynchpin from canonical justifications for exclusive shareholder orientation in firm governance. This Article argues that if we cannot as a matter of constitutional law keep corporations out of our democracy, then we must as a matter of corporate law have more democracy in our corporations. After Citizens United, we must begin to restructure corporate law to require boards of directors to actively attend to the interests of multiple stakeholders at the level of firm governance.

13 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
202321
202249
202165
202078
201967
201874