Credibility

About: Credibility is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 13730 publications have been published within this topic receiving 331944 citations. The topic is also known as: believability & plausibility.

Webelievability: A Path Model Examining How Convenience and Reliance Predict Online Credibility:

Abstract: Fears that credibility among traditional media will be dragged down by perceptions that the Internet is not a believable source seem to have abated as studies suggest that credibility ratings for both the Internet and traditional media may be on the rise.' Specifically, studies indicate that as more people are drawn to the Internet as a convenient source of information they are becoming increasingly savvy about which information and sources to believe and which to discredit.* But while several studies, as well as poll results, suggest that people now rate the Internet as a credible source, less attention has been paid to

Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility

Abstract: The view that assertions are governed by the rule that we should assert only what we know, is enjoying growing popularity. This paper argues that it is more plausible to assume that assertions are governed by the rule that we should assert only what is rationally credible to us. Specifically, it is shown that while the two rules are equally able to accommodate the relevant linguistic data, the latter is simpler than the former. There is a growing consensus among philosophers that the following rule governs the practice of assertion: One should assert only what one knows. (1) Call this the knowledge rule of assertion (or simply the knowledge rule), and call the thesis that (1) governs the practice of assertion the knowledge account of assertion. The present paper aims to make a case for a rival account of assertion, to wit (what I will refer to as) the rational credibility account of assertion. According to this, assertion is governed by the rational credibility rule, that is, the rule that One should assert only what is rationally credible to one. (2) Thus, on the view I will defend it is not required that a proposition be known for it to be warrantedly assertable; rational credibility suffices for that. In order to explain the methodology to be assumed in the following, I should note that in my view the project of determining which rule governs the practice of assertion is best not conceived as being an a priori investigation into the nature of assertion but rather as an empirical project, and that therefore any proposal that is being made in the course of this project is subject to the exact same standards of evaluation as are employed in the empirical sciences generally. That is to say, any hypothesis stating that a particular rule governs the practice of assertion must face the linguistic data about that practice; and if two or more such hypotheses are equally able to accommodate those data, then we may appeal to the so-called theoretical virtues (such as, most notably, simplicity) to help us choose between these hypotheses. I do not expect there to be any serious disagreement about the appropriateness of these methodological standards. Most proponents of the knowledge account 1See, for example, DeRose 1991, 1996, 2002, Brandom 1994, Williamson 1996, 2000, Sundholm 1999, 2004, and Adler 2002. In a rudimentary form, the view is already present in Black 1952, Moore 1962a, and Unger 1975.

Calculating credibility : how leaders assess military threats

Abstract: Calculating Credibility examines-and ultimately rejects-a fundamental belief held by laypeople and the makers of American foreign policy: the notion that backing down during a crisis reduces a country's future credibility. Fear of diminished credibility motivated America's costly participation in the Korean and Vietnam wars, and, since the end of the Cold War, this concern has continued to guide American policy decisions. Daryl G. Press uses historical evidence, including declassified documents, to answer two crucial questions: When a country backs down in a crisis, does its credibility suffer? How do leaders assess their adversaries' credibility? Press illuminates the decision-making processes behind events such as the crises in Europe that preceded World War II, the superpower showdowns over Berlin in the 1950s and 60s, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. When leaders face the prospect of high-stakes military conflicts, Press shows, they do not assess their adversaries' credibility by peering into their opponents' past and evaluating their history of keeping or breaking commitments. Power and interests in the current crisis-not past actions-determine the credibility of a threat. Press demonstrates that threats are credible only if backed by sufficient power and only if pursuing important interests. Press believes that Washington's obsession with the dangers of backing down has made U.S. foreign policy unnecessarily rigid. In every competitive environment-sports, gambling, warfare-competitors use feints and bluffs to tremendous advantage. Understanding the real sources of credibility, Press asserts, would permit a more flexible, and more effective, foreign policy.

Cooperation and conflict : Evidence on self- enforcing arrangements and heterogeneous groups

Abstract: A conventional wisdom in the literature contends that without a system of formal enforcement, heterogeneous groups are unable to peacefully interact for mutual benefit and are prone to erup- tions of violent conflict. This article maintains that the amount of such conflict has been dramatically overstated and the occurrence of peace- ful interaction dramatically understated. The common view reverses the empirical reality of the world. Historical evidence indicates that where formal institutions are absent, heterogeneous individuals signal credibility to one another by engaging in shared customs and prac- tices, enabling peaceful intergroup exchange. This evidence chal- lenges prevailing beliefs and suggests that peaceful cooperation characterizes most heterogeneous group interaction.

Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Signalling

Abstract: Empirical experience and theory both suggest that policy reforms can be aborted or reversed if they lack sufficient credibility. One reason for credibility problems is the doubt regarding how serious the government really is about the reform. This paper considers a framework in which the private sector is unable to distinguish between a genuinely reformist government and a government that simply feigns interest in reform because it is a precondition for foreign assistance. The general conclusion is that the magnitude of the reform may serve to convey the government's future intentions and, hence, act as a signal of its "type." Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.