Credit reference

About: Credit reference is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 7184 publications have been published within this topic receiving 185534 citations.

Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.

Abstract: According to basic economics, if demand exceeds supply, prices will rise, thus decreasing demand or increasing supply until demand and supply are in equilibrium; thus if prices do their job, rationing will not exist. However, credit rationing does exist. This paper demonstrates that even in equilibrium, credit rationing will exist in a loan market. Credit rationing is defined as occurring either (a) among loan applicants who appear identical, and some do and do not receive loans, even though the rejected applicants would pay higher interest rates; or (b) there are groups who, with a given credit supply, cannot obtain loans at any rate, even though with larger credit supply they would. A model is developed to provide the first theoretical justification for true credit rationing. The amount of the loan and the amount of collateral demanded affect the behavior and distribution of borrowers. Consequently, faced with increased credit demand, it may not be profitable to raise interest rates or collateral; instead banks deny loans to borrowers who are observationally indistinguishable from those receiving loans. It is not argued that credit rationing always occurs, but that it occurs under plausible assumptions about lender and borrower behavior. In the model, interest rates serve as screening devices for evaluating risk. Interest rates change the behavior (serve as incentive mechanism) for the borrower, increasing the relative attractiveness of riskier projects; banks ration credit, rather than increase rates when there is excess demand. Banks are shown not to increase collateral as a means of allocating credit; although collateral may have incentivizing effects, it may have adverse selection effects. Equity, nonlinear payment schedules, and contingency contracts may be introduced and yet there still may be rationing. The law of supply and demand is thus a result generated by specific assumptions and is model specific; credit rationing does exist. (TNM)

The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships

Abstract: This paper provides a simple model showing that the extent of competition in credit markets is important in determining the value of lending relationships. Creditors are more likely to finance credit constrained firms when credit markets are concentrated because it is easier for these creditors to internalize the benefits of assisting the firms. The model has implications about the availability and the price of credit as firms age in different markets. The paper offers evidence for these implications from small business data. It concludes with conjectures on the costs and benefits of liberalizing financial markets, as well as the timing of such reforms.

Financial Intermediation and Credit Policy in Business Cycle Analysis

Abstract: We develop a canonical framework to think about credit market frictions and aggregate economic activity in the context of the current crisis. We use the framework to address two issues in particular: first, how disruptions in financial intermediation can induce a crisis that affects real activity; and second, how various credit market interventions by the central bank and the Treasury of the type we have seen recently, might work to mitigate the crisis. We make use of earlier literature to develop our framework and characterize how very recent literature is incorporating insights from the crisis.

Who Takes the Credit?: Gender, Power, and Control Over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programmes in Bangladesh

Abstract: Special credit institutions in Bangladesh have dramatically increased the credit available to poor rural women since the mid-1980s. Though this is intended to contribute to women's empowerment, few evaluations of loan use investigate whether women actually control this credit. Most often, women's continued high demand for loans and their manifestly high propensity to repay is taken as a proxy indicator for control and empowerment. This paper challenges this assumption by exploring variations in the degree to which women borrowers control their loans directly; reporting on recent research which finds a significant proportion of women's loans to be controlled by male relatives. The paper finds that a preoccupation with “credit performance” — measured primarily in terms of high repayment rates — affects the incentives of fieldworkers dispensing and recovering credit, in ways which may outweigh concerns to ensure that women develop meaningful control over their investment activities.