Topic

# Cryptographic hash function

About: Cryptographic hash function is a(n) research topic. Over the lifetime, 3814 publication(s) have been published within this topic receiving 99410 citation(s). The topic is also known as: cryptographic hash.

##### Papers published on a yearly basis

##### Papers

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01 Apr 1992

TL;DR: This document describes the MD5 message-digest algorithm, which takes as input a message of arbitrary length and produces as output a 128-bit "fingerprint" or "message digest" of the input.

Abstract: This document describes the MD5 message-digest algorithm. The
algorithm takes as input a message of arbitrary length and produces as
output a 128-bit "fingerprint" or "message digest" of the input. This
memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not
specify an Internet standard.

3,429 citations

01 Feb 1997

TL;DR: This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication using cryptographic hash functions that can be used with any iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in combination with a secret shared key.

Abstract: This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication using cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in combination with a secret shared key. The cryptographic strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the underlying hash function.

2,184 citations

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18 Aug 1996TL;DR: Two new, simple, and practical constructions of message authentication schemes based on a cryptographic hash function, NMAC and HMAC, are proven to be secure as long as the underlying hash function has some reasonable cryptographic strengths.

Abstract: The use of cryptographic hash functions like MD5 or SHA-1 for message authentication has become a standard approach in many applications, particularly Internet security protocols. Though very easy to implement, these mechanisms are usually based on ad hoc techniques that lack a sound security analysis.
We present new, simple, and practical constructions of message authentication schemes based on a cryptographic hash function. Our schemes, NMAC and HMAC, are proven to be secure as long as the underlying hash function has some reasonable cryptographic strengths. Moreover we show, in a quantitative way, that the schemes retain almost all the security of the underlying hash function. The performance of our schemes is essentially that of the underlying hash function. Moreover they use the hash function (or its compression function) as a black box, so that widely available library code or hardwair can be used to implement them in a simple way, and replaceability of the underlying hash function is easily supported.

1,746 citations

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01 Nov 1999

TL;DR: Because the fuzzy commitment scheme is tolerant of error, it is capable of protecting biometric data just as conventional cryptographic techniques, like hash functions, are used to protect alphanumeric passwords.

Abstract: We combine well-known techniques from the areas of error-correcting codes and cryptography to achieve a new type of cryptographic primitive that we refer to as a fuzzy commitment scheme. Like a conventional cryptographic commitment scheme, our fuzzy commitment scheme is both concealing and binding: it is infeasible for an attacker to learn the committed value, and also for the committer to decommit a value in more than one way. In a conventional scheme, a commitment must be opened using a unique witness, which acts, essentially, as a decryption key. By contrast, our scheme is fuzzy in the sense that it accepts a witness that is close to the original encrypting witness in a suitable metric, but not necessarily identical.This characteristic of our fuzzy commitment scheme makes it useful for applications such as biometric authentication systems, in which data is subject to random noise. Because the scheme is tolerant of error, it is capable of protecting biometric data just as conventional cryptographic techniques, like hash functions, are used to protect alphanumeric passwords. This addresses a major outstanding problem in the theory of biometric authentication. We prove the security characteristics of our fuzzy commitment scheme relative to the properties of an underlying cryptographic hash function.

1,639 citations