Showing papers on "Damages published in 2000"

Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption

Abstract: In a bribery experiment, we test the hypothesis that distributive fairness considerations make relatively well-paid public officials less corruptible. Corrupt decisions impose damages to workers whose wage is varied in two treatments. However, there is no apparent difference in behaviour.

Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs

Abstract: Instrumental analysis of private law damage remedies noncontroversially assumes rational economic actors in a market environment. A privately-owned factory forced by the tort system to internalize $1000 in pollution costs suffered by a downstream neighbor will continue to pollute if, and only if, the private benefits of the pollution-producing activity exceed $1000. At least within the law and economics paradigm, we can safely take for granted the rather strong assumptions upon which this analysis rests. No one doubts, for example, that a profit-maximizing firm will tend to ignore social costs that are not reflected in financial outflows, or that it will take account of costs that are reflected in financial flows and, perhaps, change its behavior in response. These assumptions become problematic, however, when government is substituted for the private firm in this analysis. This substitution takes place routinely in discussions of constitutional remedies such as just compensation for takings, damages for constitutional torts, and the liability or property rule represented by the constitutional prohibition against federal "commandeering" of state governments. Each of these remedial systems seeks to deter government, to some socially optimal extent, from violating constitutional rights by forcing government agencies to internalize the costs of their constitutionally problematic conduct. But government does not internalize costs in the same way as a private firm. Government actors respond to political incentives, not financial ones. We cannot assume, therefore, that government will internalize social costs just because it is forced to make a budgetary outlay. While imposing financial outflows on government will ultimately create political costs (and benefits), the mechanism is complicated and depends on the model of government behavior used to translate between market costs and benefits and political costs and benefits. As the paper attempts to demonstrate, for all we currently know, government cannot be expected to respond to forced financial outflows in any predictable, let alone socially desirable, way. Having reached this conclusion, the paper proceeds to explore potential justifications for constitutional cost remedies other than optimal deterrence of government misconduct. As it turns out, the efficiency consequences of paying compensation, based on the incentives and welfare of private actors, are more likely to be perverse than beneficial. And the conventional philosophical justifications for compensation, offered in terms of morality or justice, are universally problematic and contestable. Discouraged by the seeming futility of compensation in the public law context, the paper concludes by suggesting how we might go about reinventing constitutional remedies in light of the insight that government responds to political, not market, incentives.

The Death of Liability

Abstract: Based on systems/strategic analysis, this paper predicts the complete failure of legal liability system. Liability is the system by which injured persons recover money damages from those who injure them. The system operates through the entry and enforcement of judgments by the courts. The paper argues that the system is vulnerable to defeat by a variety of judgment proofing techniques which can be categorized as secured debt strategies, ownership strategies, exemption strategies, and foreign haven strategies. Computerization has recently brought about dramatic reductions in the costs of pursuing these strategies, making them cost effective for more potential defendants. As use spreads, the cultural and political barriers to judgment proofing will decline, leading to wider use of the techniques and ultimately to system failure. The paper examines a variety of strategies by which the system might respond, including shareholder unlimited liability, involuntary creditor priority, asset provider liability, enterprise liability, mandatory insurance, and financial responsibility laws. The paper concludes that judgment- proofing strategists will be able to overcome all of them.

Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs

Abstract: Instrumental analysis of private law damage remedies noncontroversially assumes rational economic actors in a market environment. A privately-owned factory forced by the tort system to internalize $1000 in pollution costs suffered by a downstream neighbor will continue to pollute if, and only if, the private benefits of the pollution-producing activity exceed $1000. At least within the law and economics paradigm, we can safely take for granted the rather strong assumptions upon which this analysis rests. No one doubts, for example, that a profit-maximizing firm will tend to ignore social costs that are not reflected in financial outflows, or that it will take account of costs that are reflected in financial flows and, perhaps, change its behavior in response. These assumptions become problematic, however, when government is substituted for the private firm in this analysis. This substitution takes place routinely in discussions of constitutional remedies such as just compensation for takings, damages for constitutional torts, and the liability or property rule represented by the constitutional prohibition against federal "commandeering" of state governments. Each of these remedial systems seeks to deter government, to some socially optimal extent, from violating constitutional rights by forcing government agencies to internalize the costs of their constitutionally problematic conduct. But government does not internalize costs in the same way as a private firm. Government actors respond to political incentives, not financial ones. We cannot assume, therefore, that government will internalize social costs just because it is forced to make a budgetary outlay. While imposing financial outflows on government will ultimately create political costs (and benefits), the mechanism is complicated and depends on the model of government behavior used to translate between market costs and benefits and political costs and benefits. As the paper attempts to demonstrate, for all we currently know, government cannot be expected to respond to forced financial outflows in any predictable, let alone socially desirable, way. Having reached this conclusion, the paper proceeds to explore potential justifications for constitutional cost remedies other than optimal deterrence of government misconduct. As it turns out, the efficiency consequences of paying compensation, based on the incentives and welfare of private actors, are more likely to be perverse than beneficial. And the conventional philosophical justifications for compensation, offered in terms of morality or justice, are universally problematic and contestable. Discouraged by the seeming futility of compensation in the public law context, the paper concludes by suggesting how we might go about reinventing constitutional remedies in light of the insight that government responds to political, not market, incentives.

Therapeutic Consequences of Civil Actions for Damages and Compensation Claims by Victims of Sexual Abuse

Abstract: The article report the results from a study about how survivors of sexual abuse experience the legal system when they make claims from compensation. In particular, the authors tried to evaluate the processes within a therapeutic context drawn largely from the work of Judith Herman. The authors interviewed eighty-seven respondents 98 percent of whom were female. This number included forty-eight participants who had filed compensation claims with the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board of Ontario; thirteen Canadian litigants who had commenced civil actions for sexual battery; and twenty six participants whose claims were validated under the unique Agreement between the Grandview Survivors Group and the Government of Ontario. Respondents were questioned about what motivated them to initiate the claim for compensation. They were also asked about various aspects of the claiming processes, including the role of the family members, therapists, lawyers and judges; the impact of delay; and the impact of settlement actually obtained. Almost all respondents reported that financial goals had been secondary to therapeutic expectations. Most reported significant therapeutic consequences, some positive and some negative. The article relies heavily on the actual words used by the survivors to descrive their claiming experiences. These are their stories.

Be careful what you ask for: the effect of anchors on personal injury damages awards.

Abstract: These studies examined the effects of anchors in the context of personal injury damages awards. In 2 experiments, mock jurors read a case in which the presence and size of the plaintiff's damages request and the defense rebuttal were varied across conditions and then awarded damages. Award size and variability increased as the plaintiff's request increased but decreased with the most extreme request. Conversely, award size and variability decreased as the defense rebuttal decreased but increased with the most extreme rebuttal. In both studies, the award recommendations altered the upper and lower boundaries of awards mock jurors found acceptable but did not affect mock jurors' perception of injury severity. The findings suggest that award recommendations can produce biased and unpredictable awards. Language: en

Tangled Web: Tales of Digital Crime from the Shadows of Cyberspace

Abstract: From the Publisher: With the intense growth of e-business, we hear about an increase in hacking and technology-based criminal incidents. Institutions such as Citibank and Ebay have faced intrusions that have cost them millions of dollars in damages. With the onset of these criminal attacks, there is an increase in demand for products and services that provide more information for people. Tangled Web: Tales of Digital Crime from the Shadows of Cyberspace portrays the shadow side of cyberspace by taking you into the lairs of hackers, crackers, researchers, private investigators, law enforcement agents and intelligence officers. The book covers what kinds of cyber-crimes are going to affect business on the Internet, their cost, how they are investigated, and the motivation of hackers and virus writers. Also covered are the problems faced by law enforcement, corporate cyber security professionals, and real-world examples of cyber crimes and lessons learned.

Tort Law: Text and Materials

Abstract: 1. General introduction 2. Intentional interference with the person 3. Negligence - introduction 4. Breach of duty 5. Causation and remoteness 6. Defences to negligence 7. Negligence: duty of care - psychiatric illness 8. Negligence: duty of care - economic loss 9. Negligence: duty of care - omissions and acts of third parties 10. Negligence: duty of care - public bodies 11. Special liability regimes 12. Nuisance and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher 13. Defamation 14. Privacy 15. Vicarious Liability 16. Damages for Personal Injury 17. Death and Damages 18. How Tort Works

The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal Actions taken by Associations

Abstract: The European directive 98/27/EC of 15 of May 1998 widens the scope of action for consumer interests. The new directive follows the green book on the rights of the consumer of 11 June 1993. The necessity to transform this directive into national law has led to discussions on whether it is advisable to generally expand the scope of liability for widespread damages. Should the possibilities to collect damages for consumer associations and to establish new forms of bundling similar interests in cases of civil liability be widened? This article deals with economic consequences of such forms of bundling with a focus on the class action and actions by associations. The American discussion on the merits of class action is not very encouraging and does not lead to proposing far reaching legal innovations for European countries in this field. It seems however that some of the adverse effects of class action can be avoided by slightly different forms of bundling.

Belief in a Just World and Jury Decisions in a Civil Rape Trial

Abstract: When people's belief in a just world (BJW) is challenged, it can be restored by attributing blame to the victim or alleviating the victim's suffering. In criminal cases, jurors can attribute responsibility to victims, but cannot alleviate suffering. Participants (n= 106) heard a taped civil rape case. The effect of age of plaintiff, gender of participant, and type of participant on mock jurors' reactions to a plaintiff were examined. Participants evaluated responsibility of plaintiff and awarded monetary damages. It was hypothesized that, given this opportunity to compensate the victim, jurors would be less likely to derogate the victim. As hypothesized, women with high and low BJW attributed the same level of responsibility to the plaintiff but those with a high BJW awarded more monetaly damages. Men with high BJW awarded much less in damages than did men with low BJW. The just-world theory appears to explain many of the decisions made by mock jurors.

An evaluation of the use of insurance in managing construction risks

Abstract: One of the major methods of managing construction risks in the Nigerian construction industry is the insurance method. On the basis of data from some selected construction sites in Nigeria, this paper evaluates the effectiveness of the method. Also it identifies, through a questionnaire survey, the various insurable construction risks perceived to be encountered in the Nigerian construction industry and the types of insurance policy employed in managing them. High importance is placed by the construction industry on site security, construction risk, and health and welfare requirements, and the use of an all-risk insurance policy is the most prominent method for managing the identified risks. Finally it is concluded that there is a correlation between insured sum and actual replacement cost when there are losses or damages. However, the insurance claims settled could cater for only 61.1% of the replacement cost of on-going construction works studied.

Precious Little Guidance: Jury Instruction on Damage Awards

Abstract: Jury instructions on damage awards are notoriously vague and ambiguous As a result, awards are sometimes unexpected and seemingly illogical In this article, the authors argue that jury instructions regarding damages are vague because the law of damages itself is purposefully ambiguous--allowing particularized justice across a variety of different circumstances The authors review research on comprehension and application of substantive jury instructions related to damages and on procedural variations at trial (eg, use of preinstruction, bifurcation, blindfolding jurors to various issues, special verdict forms, caps on damages, and instruction revision) that impact the substantive instructions that jurors receive from the judge They comment on attempts at reforming jury instructions regarding damages and conclude that jurors' decision making on this difficult and emotional issue could be made more predictable by careful reforms at the trial level I was under the impression we'd have guidelines I feel we were thrown in a box and had to come out with a number (Anonymous juror quoted by Vidmar, 1995, p 243) A juror serving in a North Carolina medical malpractice case expressed this sentiment She and fellow jurors heard evidence at trial that a 28-year-old plaintiff suffered a peritoneal infection and permanent brain injury after undergoing cesarean surgery, During the trial, the jury was provided with evidence of medical bills resulting from her injury that amounted to several thousands of dollars The defense attorney argued vehemently that the plaintiff's injuries were not caused by the defendant's actions but then said any award to which the plaintiff was entitled should be small because the hospital and doctors had already paid her medical expenses In his charge to the jury on damages, the judge informed the group that they should consider the amount of compensation the plaintiff should have as well as an amount for the husband's claim of loss of consortium He further cautioned them to determine an award based solely on the evidence and instructed them that the amount should be fair, just, and reasonable and not determined by sympathy The jury deliberated for 35 hr, after which they returned a verdict of $850,000 along with strongly worded complaints about the ambiguity involved in their assigned task Several members of the jury apparently felt that doing their duty "was difficult for all of us"

Against Fuller and Perdue

Abstract: The 1936 article by Lon Fuller and William Perdue, "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages," deserves its place as a classic in the history of contract theory. As a piece of substantive contracts scholarship, though, that article is several decades out of date, and (I argue here) is not even very useful as an organizing principle in teaching contract remedies. The first part of my article surveys various normative theories that have been advanced by modern scholars, to show how little any of them employ or depend on Fuller and Perdue's three-way classification between the expectation, restitution, and reliance "interests." The second part surveys the remedies case law, showing that Fuller and Perdue's classification is not even very helpful as a descriptive organizing principle: it obscures important similarities between remedies that nominally protect different "interests," and important differences among remedies that nominally protect the same "interest." I conclude that Fuller and Perdue's three-way classification -- important as it undoubtedly was in the historical development of contract theory -- is no longer a useful analytic tool, and offer some suggestions as to what might replace their classification.

An Economic Analysis of Corporate Directors' Fiduciary Duties

Abstract: This paper studies how the legal liability rules for directors can be optimally designed to provide them with the incentives to fulfill their fiduciary duties and to maximize ex-ante firm value. I present a principal-agent model where the shareholders can obtain a verifiable but costly and imperfect signal on the director's fulfillment of his fiduciary duties by taking legal action against him. This allows the firm to make the director's remuneration contingent not only on performance but also upon the court's decision.The paper shows that, when damages awards are high, the widespread use of liability insurance and limited liability provisions that is observed in the US is optimal because it allows shareholders to credible commit to an optimal suing strategy. The results on the use of liability insurance are maintained when the parties can settle out of court.

Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice

Abstract: For corrective justice, liability is the consequence of the parties' being correlatively situated as the doer and sufferer of an injustice, and the remedy is seen as undoing that injustice to the extent possible. Combining consideration of legal doctrine and private law theory, this article applies the framework of corrective justice to gain-based damages for torts. Within this framework, restitutionary damages ought to be available only insofar as they correspond to a constituent element in the injustice that the defendant has done to the plaintiff. The radical proposal that allows restitutionary damages for any wrongful gain is unsatisfactory because it fails to link the damages that the plaintiff receives to the normative quality of the defendant's wrong. In contrast, dealings in another's property give rise to such damages because the idea of property includes within the owner's entitlement the potential gains from the property's use or alienation. Restitutionary damages should not be seen as serving a deterrent or punitive function; such a function cannot account for why the plaintiff, of all people, is entitled to the defendant's gain. Properly understood, even situations where the plaintiff's wilfulness or calculation increases the damage award fit within the framework of corrective justice. The corrective justice approach thus repudiates the notion that restitutionary damages are occasions for the promotion of social purposes extrinsic to the juridical relationship between the parties.

Compensating Plaintiffs and Punishing Defendants: Is Bifurcation Necessary?

Abstract: Critics of the civil jury have proposed several procedural reforms to address the concern that damage awards are capricious and unpredictable. One such reform is the bifurcation or separation of various phases of a trial that involves multiple claims for damages. The purpose of this study was to assess the effects of bifurcating the compensatory and punitive damages phases of a civil tort trial. We manipulated the wealth of the defendant and the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct (both sets of evidence theoretically related to punitive but not to compensatory damages) across three cases in a jury analog study. We wondered whether jurors would misuse the punitive damages evidence in fixing compensatory damages and whether bifurcation would effectively undo this practice. Our findings indicated that mock jurors did not improperly consider punitive damages evidence in their decisions about compensation. Moreover, bifurcation had the unexpected effect of augmenting punitive damage awards. These findings raise questions about the merits of bifurcation in cases that involve multiple claims for damages.

Natural Disasters: Acts Of God, Nature OrSociety? On The Social Relation To NaturalHazards

Abstract: Natural disasters are characterised by complex relationships and interactions between physical hazards and society. These, as well as local context, cultural aspects, social and political activities, and economic concerns, present difficulties in practical application of mitigation concepts and models. This paper outlines general approaches in natural risk assessment and gives an insight into the contextual dynamics surrounding a hazard event. Since precise measurement of uncertainties and exact prediction of damages is hardly feasible, the incorporation of a hazard of place concept in vulnerability assessment is proposed. Qualities that determine potential damage are identified and characteristics described. It is suggested that, even without assessing risk exactly, vulnerability reduction decreases damages and losses. The chosen perspective illustrates that natural disasters are a result of social decision processes rather than acts of God or nature.

Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases

Abstract: We examine the effect of the "split-award" tort reform (wherein the State takes a share of a punitive damages award) on equilibrium settlements and the incentives to go to trial. Using both signaling and screening models of settlement negotiations, we find that the equilibrium settlement is increasing in the likelihood of the defendant being found liable, in the size of both the compensatory and punitive damages, and in the share of the punitive damages award that the plaintiff may keep. We also find that increases in the same attributes (except for the compensatory damages award) increase the likelihood of a case proceeding to trial. Thus, split-award statutes simultaneously lower settlement amounts and the likelihood of trial, as both parties act to cut out the State (since the statutes only apply to awards at trial). We then develop an analysis of the revenue that split-award statutes could generate, conditioned on the allocation of a punitive damages award between the plaintiff, his lawyer and the State. We construct a symmetric random proposer model (a composite of the signaling and screening models) and find the revenue-maximizing share for each state currently using a split-award statute with a mandated rate. We find that (for all states but one) the predicted state's share is approximately 50% (for the remaining state, the revenue-maximizing share should be approximately 66%). These results are robust to variations in economic parameters and to whether the state's share is gross or net of the plaintiff's attorney's fee. One surprising result is that these statutes do not deter filings and that their use can actually encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to accept and pursue weaker cases than would have been brought absent the statute. Finally, we use our results (along with information about the evidentiary standard employed, the allocation scheme used and the presence or absence of caps imposed on damages awards) to infer the likely motivation for passing a split-award statute for six states of interest. We find that policies in Indiana and Oregon are more consistent with a primary motivation of deterrence reduction while policies in Georgia, Iowa, Utah and Missouri seem to be more consistent with a primary motivation of revenue generation.

The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law

Abstract: This Essay adds to the existing literature on expectation damages. It suggests that this literature is implicitly based on the assumption that, in the event of breach, the breached-against party will readily reveal the information necessary to establish the magnitude of expectation damages. It explores the implications of the opposite assumption, namely that an aggrieved party might often prefer to keep the information necessary to establish the magnitude of expectation damages private. More specifically, it suggests that while the traditional literature on remedies has focused on the aggrieved party's interest in being made whole (her "compensatory interest"), there is another, potentially conflicting interest that needs to be taken into account, namely her desire to keep information private (her "secrecy interest"). When the secrecy interest is sufficiently strong, the cost of revealing the underlying private information may well exceed the aggrieved party's expected recovery at trial. As a consequence, the aggrieved party may not file suit and may therefore receive no compensation. If the existence of a promisee's secrecy interest is known to a promisor who is contemplating breach, the secrecy interest might undermine the credibility of the promisee's threat to sue. Thus, in the presence of a secrecy interest, both the remedial goal of full ex post compensation and the economic goal of efficient breach-or-perform incentives are unlikely to be achieved. The Essay develops the concept of the secrecy interest in more detail and considers how taking it into account might contribute to the debate over the desirability of several of the Code's remedial provisions, the remedial structure of the new proposed Code, and aspects of existing adjudicative procedures. It demonstrates the secrecy violations involved in adjudication under current contract law doctrine. It argues that the Code and the rules of civil procedure should enable aggrieved parties to opt for damage measures and discovery procedures that do not involve information revelation, such as specific performance, liquidated damages and uncapped market difference damages.

Damage Caps, Motivated Anchoring, and Bargaining Impasse

Abstract: This paper reports results from a bargaining experiment testing the effect on settlement rates of a damage cap set much higher than the value of the underlying claim. We furnished 462 student subjects with materials outlining a personal injury lawsuit in which the only unresolved claim was the amount of damages the plaintiff should receive for physical pain and suffering and mental anguish. Subjects were assigned the role of either plaintiff or defendant and paired randomly with an adversary. For half the pairs, damages were capped at $1 million, while for the rest damages were uncapped. Whereas in a prior experiment, a $250,000 cap increased the settlement rate, the instant $1 million cap reduced the settlement rate. We find evidence in the current study for a process termed "motivated anchoring", in which a relatively high damage cap disproportionately anchors the plaintiff's estimate of the likely damage award. The result is a widened disparity in opposing litigants' judgments, and less settlement.

A ‘new’ head of damages: damages for mental distress in the English law of torts

Abstract: This article examines the ability of the claimant to recover damages for mental distress in the English law of torts. This is an area of law which has received little attention and indeed, the general impression is frequently that such damages are not recoverable. This article seeks to establish that this is far from the case and that damages are frequently awarded for mental distress even if they are not always openly recognised. Most lawyers are familiar with the award of damages for ‘suffering’ within the action for personal injury, but damages for distress are awarded generally, particularly as aggravated damages, as recognised by the Law Commission in 1997. It will be argued that much will be gained by appreciating the true nature of these damages and the policy factors which determine when the claimant will be granted such an award. Whilst there is no evidence to support a right to claim such damages in their own right, there is sufficient authority for a separate head of damages us part of the claimant's general compensatory claim. It is therefore submitted that open recognition of this head will be to the benefit of individual claimants and the system as a whole in clarifying this area of damages.

Environmental Justice without Borders: The Need for an International Court of the Environment to Protect Fundamental Environmental Rights

Abstract: I. THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS Over the five decades since the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' the scope of fundamental human rights recognized under international law has evolved, and the traditional scope of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity have gradually expanded to include additional human rights abuses. At the same time, and especially since the publication of Rachel Carson's groundbreaking book, Silent Spring,2 in the 1960s, there has been a growing recognition that we are polluting our planet at an ever-increasing and alarming rate and that the toxins which we have been spreading throughout the natural environment pose a serious threat to global ecosystems and the well-being of countless species, including our own. There are already ominous signs that regional and global ecosystems have become so contaminated and stressed that an irreversible entropy has set in. The Black Sea is so devoid of aquatic life that it could just as well be renamed the Dead Sea. The Mediterranean, with its rich fishing and other resources, also has shown dangerous signs of environmental distress, although it is possible that recent aggressive efforts by Italy and other nations to reduce pollution may prevent the Mediterranean from suffering the same fate as the Black Sea. Reversing the consequences of massive pollution is like trying to turn around a supertanker: both tend to proceed in the same direction for a long time, even after the emergency is recognized-- usually with disastrous consequences. On March 24, 1989 the Exxon Valdez was driven onto Blight Reef in Alaska's Prince William Sound after the captain and crew failed to divert the ship from its dangerous course.3 The lack of any effective emergency response plan coupled with the gross negligence of Exxon personnel resulted in a disaster that could have been prevented or at least greatly abated.4 Much of the eleven million gallons of North Slope crude oil ended up polluting the shores of the Native Alaskan villages that depended on those fisheries for their subsistence.5 Nearly $3.5 billion was spent on cleanup efforts, and an additional $5 billion verdict was awarded by a jury in federal court as punitive damages for the reckless and irresponsible conduct of Exxon and its employees.6 No amount of money, however, could restore the pristine wilderness back to its original, unpolluted state. Nor could the jury's verdict undo the harm caused to the global commons by the evaporation of oil into the atmosphere or the oil that found its way into the open sea. There was no international judicial mechanism, such as an International Environmental Court (IEC), to assess damages outside the national borders of the United States or fashion remedies to redress transborder harm. Similarly, while the world community has finally taken steps to ban CFCs and other environmentally damaging chemicals, the multilateral treaties and instruments recently entered into to control the use, emission, and transport of such chemicals may be too little, too late. The simple fact is that during the twenty years that the debate raged over whether CFCs were really depleting the ozone layer, the hole in this critical layer, which protects us from excessive ultraviolet radiation, grew so large that it is questionable whether it can ever be completely repaired by natural processes. Instead of applying a public health paradigm, which should have led to the implementation of preventative and remedial measures to ban or restrict the use of certain dangerous chemical compounds even before scientific evidence conclusively established their disastrous environmental effects, CFCs and other compounds were freely transported and sold. Similarly, while DDT was banned in the United States in the 1970s,7 even in the United States, application of high levels of DDT to farmlands has resulted in a persistence of DDT in the food chains and continued exports and subsequent application of high levels of DDT in less developed countries has resulted has resulted in a persistence of DDT in the food chain. …