Showing papers on "Damages published in 2010"

Implications of incorporating air-quality co-benefits into climate change policymaking

Abstract: We present an analysis of the barriers and opportunities for incorporating air quality co-benefits into climate policy assessments. It is well known that many strategies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions also decrease emissions of health-damaging air pollutants and precursor species, including particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur dioxide. In a survey of previous studies we found a range of estimates for the air quality co-benefits of climate change mitigation of $2- 196/tCO2 with a mean of $49/tCO2, and the highest co-benefits found in developing countries. These values, although of a similar order of magnitude to abatement cost estimates, are only rarely included in integrated assessments of climate policy. Full inclusion of these co-benefits would have pervasive implications for climate policy in areas including: optimal policy stringency, overall costs, distributional effects, robustness to discount rates, incentives for international cooperation, and the value of adaptation, forests, and climate engineering relative to mitigation. Under-valuation results in part from uncertainty in climatic damages, valuation inconsistency, and institutional barriers. Because policy debates are framed in terms of cost minimization, policy makers are unlikely to fully value air quality co-benefits unless they can be compared on an equivalent basis with the benefits of avoided climatic damages. While air quality co-benefits have been prominently portrayed as a hedge against uncertainty in the benefits of climate change abatement, this assessment finds that full inclusion of co-benefits depends on—rather than substitutes for—better valuation of climate damages.

GHG Targets as Insurance Against Catastrophic Climate Damages

Abstract: A critical issue in climate change economics is the specification of the so-called “damages function†and its interaction with the unknown uncertainty of catastrophic outcomes. This paper asks how much we might be misled by our economic assessment of climate change when we employ a conventional quadratic damages function and/or a thin-tailed probability distribution for extreme temperatures. The paper gives some numerical examples of the indirect value of various greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration targets as insurance against catastrophic climate change temperatures and damages. These numerical exercises suggest that we might be underestimating considerably the welfare losses from uncertainty by using a quadratic damages function and/or a thin-tailed temperature distribution. In these examples, the primary reason for keeping GHG levels down is to insure against high-temperature catastrophic climate risks.

The Social Cost of Carbon

Abstract: • The social cost of carbon (SCC), the estimated price of the damages caused by each additional ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) released into the atmosphere, determines the strength of climate legislation; the higher the SCC is set, the more stringent the regulatory standards. • Current national estimates of the SCC are grossly underestimated due to a reliance on deeply flawed economic models and a disregard of important alternative estimates and ethical issues. • Ethical considerations such as unmonetized climate impacts and the rate of discounting future impacts cannot be disregarded; nor can the risk of catastrophic climate damages.

What is the "damages function" for global warming — and what difference might it make?

Abstract: The existing literature on climate change offers little guidance on why one specification or another of a "damages function" has been selected. Ideally, one wants a functional form that captures reality adequately, yet is analytically sufficiently tractable to yield useful results. This paper gives two plausible risk aversion axioms that a reduced form utility function of temperature change and the capacity to produce consumption might reasonably be required to satisfy. These axioms indicate that the standard-practice multiplicative specification of disutility damages from global warming, as well as its additive analogue, are special cases of this paper's theoretically derived utility function. Empirically, the paper gives some numerical examples demonstrating the surprisingly strong implications for economic policy of the distinction between additive and multiplicative disutility damages.

Estimating the Direct Economic Damages of the Earthquake in Haiti

Abstract: This paper uses simple regression techniques to make an initial assessment of the monetary damages caused by the January 12, 2010 earthquake that struck Haiti. Damages are estimated for a disaster with both 200,000 and 250,000 total dead and missing (i.e., the range of mortality that the earthquake is estimated to have caused) using Haitis economic and demographic data. The base estimate is US$8.1bn for a death toll of 250,000, but for several reasons this may be a lower- bound estimate. An estimate of US$13.9bn for the same death toll is within statistical error. While the results are subject to many caveats, the implications of such an estimate are significant. Raising such a figure will require many donorsbilateral, multilateral and private. Hence excellent coordination of funding and execution will be the key to ensuring the efficient use of funds.

Analysis of Environmental and Economic Damages from British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

Abstract: This study examines the environmental and economic damages caused by British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the spring and summer of 2010. The process of oil exploration and production is extremely challenging, offering significant rewards that are offset by equally significant risks. The world’s demand for energy is constantly growing, thereby leading to extraordinary efforts and gigantic investments by energy companies to find new supplies of oil. The $365 million Deepwater Horizon was an offshore drilling unit designed to operate in waters as deep as 8,000 feet and to drill down 30,000 feet. The Horizon was drilling an exploratory well about 41 miles off the coast of Louisiana, when on April 20 an explosion killed 11 workers and began the release of massive amounts of oil into the Gulf. The well was eventually capped on July 15. Total damages to BP, the environment, and the US gulf coast economy are estimated to be $36.9 billion. The damages are attributed to three major factors: (1) human error and equipment failure at BP’s Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling unit, (2) failure of the US government to assign, and in some cases to permit, resources to assist with the containment of the oil spill, and (3) misinformation disseminated by the news media regarding the amount and location of oil pollution in the water and on the beaches of the Gulf of Mexico.

Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues

Abstract: Investor-state arbitration is a relatively new dispute settlement mechanism that allows foreign investors the opportunity to seek redress for damages arising out of breaches of investment-related treaty obligations by the governments of host countries. Claims are submitted to independent, international arbitration tribunals, which are called upon to interpret the treaty at hand. Because of the public interest involved in these cases, the awards of these tribunals are subject to much scrutiny and debate. Thus, it has already generated hundreds of cases and created new legal disciplines, inspiring a continuous string of legal writings. This book describes the process of investor-state arbitration in all of its phases, and provides the reader with comprehensive insight into investor-state arbitration. Arbitration Under International Investment Agreements: A Guide to the Key Issues includes contributions from many of the leading experts in the field, from private practitioners and academics to government and NGO officials. In this way, the book differs from other books on this topic because it includes contributions from all actors involved, providing more credibility in an area in which one of the main criticisms is bias against governments. This book provides pragmatic and reliable analysis of all aspects of this evolving topic.

GHG Targets as Insurance Against Catastrophic Climate Damages

Abstract: A critical issue in climate-change economics is the specification of the so-called "damages function" and its interaction with the unknown uncertainty of catastrophic outcomes. This paper asks how much we might be misled by our economic assessment of climate change when we employ a conventional quadratic damages function and/or a thin-tailed probability distribution for extreme temperatures. The paper gives some numerical examples of the indirect value of various GHG concentration targets as insurance against catastrophic climate-change temperatures and damages. These numerical examples suggest that we might be underestimating considerably the welfare losses from uncertainty by using a quadratic damages function and/or a thin-tailed temperature distribution. In these examples, the primary reason for keeping GHG levels down is to insure against high-temperature catastrophic climate risks.

Assessment of lightning-related damage and disruption in Canada

Abstract: This article assesses the extent and costs of lightning-related damage and disruption in Canada. Lightning routinely damages property and disrupts economic and social activities. Affected sectors include health; property and casualty insurance; forestry; electricity generation, transmission, and distribution; agriculture; telecommunications; transportation; and tourism and recreation—the first four sectors are the most important in terms of contributing to overall impacts and costs. Secondary data and extrapolations from U.S. studies were used to develop cost estimates for the health, property, forestry, and electricity sectors. Aggregated, annual lightning-related damage and disruption costs in Canada range from CA$600 million to CA$1 billion. Forestry and electricity damages accounted for over 85% of the total. The estimates are both preliminary and conservative. In terms of continued research, additional or more refined studies using Canadian empirical data are warranted for the insurance and electricity sectors. Detailed insurance claim or outage data would permit analysis at the storm level and potentially discern finer-scaled risk patterns. Further effort is also required to evaluate risk or damage prevention measures, particularly those that relate to expanded or enriched use of the Canadian Lightning Detection Network data by both public and private sector clients. Both the degree of adoption and efficacy or cost-effectiveness should be investigated.

Envy at work.

Abstract: Is a colleague's success eating away at you? Beware: This deadly sin damages relationships, disrupts teams, and undermines organizational success. Most of all, it harms your own performance.

Estimating the Direct Economic Damage of the Earthquake in Haiti

Abstract: This paper uses simple regression techniques to make an initial assessment of the monetary damages caused by the January 12, 2010 earthquake that struck Haiti. Damages are estimated for a disaster with both 200,000 and 250,000 total dead and missing (i. e. , the range of mortality that the earthquake is estimated to have caused) using Haiti’s economic and demographic data. The base estimate is US$8. 1bn for a death toll of 250,000, but for several reasons this may be a lower- bound estimate. An estimate of US$13. 9bn for the same death toll is within statistical error. While the results are subject to many caveats, the implications of such an estimate are significant. Raising such a figure will require many donors—bilateral, multilateral and private. Hence excellent coordination of funding and execution will be the key to ensuring the efficient use of funds.

Quantification of Harm in Damages Actions for Antitrust Infringements: Insights from German Cartel Cases

Abstract: This paper argues that empirical economic analysis in court proceedings is subject to important economic and legal restrictions, culminating in a fundamental trade-off between accuracy and practicality. We draw lessons from two influential German court cases - the paper wholesaler cartel decision of 2007 and the cement cartel decision of 2009. We characterise the trade-offs arguing that they need to be well understood, made transparent, and that decisions on how to proceed in light of these trade-offs have to be taken upfront by the court. In this respect, we believe that the three-step procedure (design, application, and robustness checks) followed by the German court in the cement case is well suited to meet the appropriate legal standard and requirements, both with respect to accuracy and practicality.

Patent Hold Up and Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation

Abstract: Licensing technology essential to a standard can present a hold-up problem. After designing new products incorporating a standard, a manufacturer could be confronted by an innovator asserting patent rights to essential technology. A damages remedy provided by antitrust or some other body of law solves this hold-up problem, inducing the socially optimal level of investment by the manufacturer, but it can reduce the innovator's licensing revenue and thereby retard innovation. The availability of an ex post damages remedy similarly alters the licensing terms in ex ante bargaining, with the result that fewer socially beneficial R\&D projects are undertaken.

Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents

Abstract: Many advocates for using compulsory licensing (“CL”) for pharmaceutical patents in developing countries like Thailand rest their case in part on the purported use of CL in the United States. In this paper we take issue with that proposition on several grounds. As a theoretical matter, we argue that the basic presumption in favor of voluntary licenses for IP should apply in the international arena, in addition to the domestic one. In the international context, voluntary licenses are of special importance because they strengthen the supply chain for distributing pharmaceuticals and ease the government enforcement of safety standards. Next, this paper analyzes several of the key illustrations of purported CL for drug patents in the United States and shows that the use of CL elsewhere deviates in material ways from the standard U.S. practices. These are the compulsory copyright licenses for music; the award of damages instead of injunctions after eBay v. MercExchange, and the use of compulsory licenses in antitrust settlements. Whatever the ultimate desirability of these American doctrines, none of them seeks to reduce the payment on licenses to the marginal cost of the licensed goods. Any need to help poor people gain access should not rely on CL, but instead should rely on tools precisely aimed at that purpose, including direct government purchases of patented drugs from their manufacturers at negotiated prices.

Including adaptation costs and climate change damages in evaluating post-2012 burden-sharing regimes

Abstract: Many studies have been published to evaluate the consequences of different post-2012 emission allocation regimes on regional mitigation costs. This paper goes one step further and evaluates not only mitigation costs, but also adaptation costs and climate change damages. Three post-2012 emission allocation regimes (Contraction & Convergence, Multistage and Common but differentiated convergence) and two climate targets (2°C and 3°C above the pre-industrial level) are considered. This explorative analysis shows that including these other cost categories could lead to different perspectives on the outcomes of allocation regimes. Up to 2050, the poorest regions have negative mitigation costs under all allocation regimes considered, as they benefit from emission trading. However, these regions also suffer from the most severe climate impacts. As such, the financial flows due to emission trading from developed to developing countries created under these allocation regimes could also be interpreted as compensation of climate change damages and adaptation costs. In the longer run, the sum of climate change damages, adaptation costs and mitigation costs are the highest in the poorest regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, for both climate targets and practically all emission allocation regimes.

The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform

Abstract: This Article analyzes the secondary market for patent rights. It defines a patent troll as a participant in this market that does not contribute to the social goal the patent system was meant to serve: technological innovation. The legitimate secondary market, in which patent rights are bought and sold in ways that compensate real innovators (and also often involve the transfer of information and/or technology, in addition to the legal right), is distinguished from the more questionable market for the settlement of lawsuits involving weak, outdated or irrelevant patents. The presence of willing buyers and willing sellers does not necessarily imply that social welfare is being served; at times, the legal system must shut down markets when the things being exchanged have no social value — as in the case of blackmail. The Article reviews the prospects for corrective policies to reign in some activities in the current patent system. Political economy considerations make Congress a long shot to fix the problem, which leaves the courts, and in particular the Federal Circuit. Recent caselaw on damages is presented as a case study of a desirable Federal Circuit course correction involving the secondary market for patents. Economically rational valuation techniques applied to the question of appropriate damages for patent infringement can help to undermine the incentives to litigate, and hence the market for, patents on minor features that can be used strategically to demand large damage awards under some readings of damages doctrine.

Group Litigation in European Competition Law: A Law and Economics Perspective

Abstract: textIn this thesis, insights of the law and economics literature were collected in order to develop the features of an optimal group litigation concerning the deterrence of European Competition Law violation and these were then compared to the proposals of the European Commission in the White Paper on damages actions. Chapter 1 and 2 provide the basis for the analysis conducted in remainder of this thesis. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the enforcement of European Competition law including the rationale of European Competition Law, the debate about private versus public enforcement in general, and the discussed legal changes to enhance private enforcement. Chapter 2 provides the economic and legal framework used to analyse the efficiency of group litigation mechanisms with regard to deterrence of competition law infringements. This structure is mainly based on economic insights and knowledge developed in the Law and Economics literature. Such an economics based approach entails a choice as to the goal to be pursued by private enforcement to be that of deterrence of unlawful conduct, in this specific case, the (inefficient) breach of competition law and the focus on total welfare. Therefore the insights of the theories on optimal deterrence are applied to the setting of private enforcement of competition law. Using the economic framework laid out in Chapters 1 and 2, in Chapter 3 turns to two necessarily slightly abstract forms of existing group litigation mechanisms, i.e.. collective actions and representative actions. These different actions were analysed with regard to their potential to achieve deterrence. Outcomes resulting from an initial analysis showed that the optimal group litigation mechanisms from the point of view of society at large (total welfare approach), would be a stand-alone action brought in the form of a mandatory group litigation, including all losses caused to society at large. The main arguments for that outcome are that to reach optimal deterrence, the penalty imposed on the infringer, in the form of damages to be paid, should be based on total harm caused to society, and therefore include all losses caused to all different members of society. This leads to the conclusion that the optimal group litigation should incorporate all individual losses in one proceeding, to be (cost-) efficient. Therefore, and because free riding problems can be eliminated, the optimal system would be a mandatory one, rather than opt-in or opt-out mechanism. It is shown that stand alone actions are to be preferred over follow-on actions from an efficient deterrence perspective, as only the former increase the rate of detection. This is important as it is increased detection that decreases the amount of the optimal sanction, which otherwise may be prohibitively large, and also when the availability bias leads to a greater value of the risk of detection compared to an increase in the damage awards, i.e. the imposed monetary penalties. Follow-on actions merely contribute to the amount of sanction faced by the infringer when public fines are too low to deter. However, it would be more (cost) efficient in such cases, where the public fine is too low, that the public fine be instead raised sufficiently. Therefore, the analysis continued focusing on mandatory stand-alone group actions. In the analysis of the two abstract forms of existing group litigation systems of collective and representative actions, problems and obstacles to private litigation for damages specific to certain types of breaches of European Competition Law were taken into account. The analysis suggests that neither collective nor representative actions will be the optimal group litigation mechanism in the sense of the best group litigation to reach the goal of efficient deterrence, unless the existing systems were to be substantially altered. Problems specific to collective actions, such as the necessity of one of the victims (lead plaintiff) to become active on behalf of himself and other victims of the infringement, render that particular system of bundling similar claims into one procedure less efficient. This is especially so in those cases where the information asymmetry on the side of the victims is large. One way to reduce such problems would be to motivate the lawyer representing the group of victims to become the actual driving force and the active party. However, as the analysis shows, problems and large inefficiencies occur when the collective action is not adequately and explicitly designed to have a lead lawyer, rather than a lead plaintiff. Similar outcomes result in the analysis of representative actions brought by associations on behalf of the victims. One particular necessity crystallised out of this analysis: the incentives given to the acting agent need to be adequately taken into account and designed in any form of group litigation. In cases where typically individual victims (such as end consumers) will not be the acting agent themselves, this insight has large implications for other goals which one may pursue, such as complete compensation of individual losses of these victims. This important insight is the corner stone of the idea of a market based approach to private enforcement, where agents compete with each other for detection and litigation of competition law infringements. As has been shown, such a market may heal many of the problems and inefficiencies that would remain in the two stylised forms of existing mechanisms described before. Such a market with competing enforcement agents would, however, face similar problems as those unearthed in the discussion of the economic analysis of competition in research and development. Both are characterised by large upfront investments that are necessary in order to gain profits that are highly uncertain. Therefore, under a first-come, first-served mechanism, there will be many resources wasted in the competitive process. Solutions to these market failures presented included the use of auctions for the right to litigate after detection of a certain infringement has taken place. This solution would not only increase the efficiency of the market idea in general, but also those of other systems of collective actions or representative actions when characterised by strong competition and races to the courts. After the features of the theoretical optimal system of group litigation with regard to deterrence were determined, the insights gained are used in Chapter 4 to compare and discuss the efficiency of the Commission’s proposal against this benchmark. The analysis shows that the proposed mechanisms do not reach the potential efficiency of the theoretical optimal solution developed in the previous Chapter. This result was no surprise, as the starting point or goal to be achieved though private enforcement in the Commission’s point of view, is presumably not deterrence - at least not the dominating one. Moreover, while the theoretical analysis in Chapter 3 focuses on stand-alone actions, the Commission wants to encourage follow-on actions in addition to stand-alone actions. The examination nevertheless highlights the inefficiencies, necessary trade-offs, and some of the costs imposed on society should those particular mechanisms suggested by the Commission be chosen. These considerations are also relevant for follow-on actions and for achieving other goals. A discussion of the goals other than deterrence also shows that even these goals may not be achieved to the highest degree possible. After all, the choices made by the Commission can be interpreted to stem from compromises made in the issues (e.g. the goals) themselves and in the political arena (e.g. taking harmonisation and implementation costs into account). The fifth Chapter illustrates the basic features of three selected legal systems, i.e., the group litigation mechanisms as developed in the US, UK and Germany. These are then compared to the features of the theoretical optimal solution developed in Chapter 3. As these existing mechanisms deviate substantially from the theoretical benchmark, they are unlikely to achieve the optimal deterrence results the optimal group litigation mechanisms are argued to achieve. However, the stark differences between the developed systems and their experienced effectiveness and difficulties provide some partial support to the insights gained in the theoretical part of Chapter 3. In very broad terms, it seems that less attention was paid to the question of who would actually have incentives to become active under the current systems, and which problems might occur and what possible regulative remedies to these might be enacted, the less effective the systems turned out to be. This outcome would also hold, if the goal to be achieved would be anything other than deterrence, for example corrective justice as compensation of individual victims. If the incentives structures that the economic analysis highlights are neglected neither deterrence not compensation can be achieved in any efficient or even just effective way.

Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure

Abstract: Court costs in American civil procedure are allocated to the loser Closer pays") as elsewhere in the civilized world. As Theodor Sedgwick, America's first expert on damages opined, it is matter of inherent justice that the party found in the wrong should indemnify the party in the right for the expenses of litigation. Yet attorneys' fees are not allocated this way in the United States: they are allowed to fall on the party that incurs them (the "American rule," better, the Ameri can practice). According to Albert Ehrenzweig, Austrian judge, ?migr? and then prominent American law professor, the American practice is "a festering cancer in the body of our law." This Article surveys Ameri can cost and fee allocation practices. The author hopes that the Article will serve as a prolegomenon from an American perspective for more encompassing comparative studies, including eventually of empirical studies. Preparing this Article has led the author to believe that the impact of fee allocation systems has been underappreciated in evalua tion of how well nations in fact deliver civil justice.

Cartel laws undermined: Corruption, social norms and collectivist business cultures

Abstract: The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in United States Antitrust Law. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these ‘conventional’ enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. This paper identifies three issues which may undermine the universal efficacy of these cartel laws: (i) corruption and organized crime; (ii) social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (iii) collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.

Torts as Wrongs

Abstract: I. Introduction All of the standard substantive first-year law courses seem to address a basic legal category. All, that is, save one. Property is about the relationship of persons to things that can be owned and alienated - land, chattels, and patents, for example. Criminal Law, at its core, concerns rules so important that their violation elicits from the state its harshest action: punishment. Contract Law introduces students to the ways in which law can empower individuals to enter into mutually advantageous transactions. Civil Procedure provides students with an overview of the litigation process. Constitutional Law is about guarding the guardians. Each of these subjects stands out for being ancestral, essential, or both. The odd man out, it seems, is Torts. As it tends to be taught today, Torts is "accident-law-plus." Its most noted chestnuts involve claims for negligence or strict liability.1 Accidents - in the sense of unintended outcomes - are even at the center of the most commonly taught intentional tort cases.2 The "plus" comes from decisions that serve as a platform for discussions of economic or moral theory.3 In sum, Torts seems often to be conceived as a course that teaches students how common law allocates the costs of accidents, while also providing some instruction on law and economics, or law and philosophy. So defined, the course seems ad hoc and esoteric, not basic. Somehow law professors have lost their grip on its subject matter. The goal of this Article is to put us back on track, not just pedagogically but theoretically. Tort is indeed a basic category of law. To see this, however, one must abandon the notion, now deeply entrenched, that tort law is law for allocating the costs of accidents. As its name indicates, tort law is about wrongs.4 The law of torts is a law of wrongs and recourse - what Blackstone called "private wrongs."5 Of course tort law is in many ways public. It sets generally applicable standards of conduct.6 It is developed and applied by officials who may have in mind various policy concerns as they render judgments in particular cases. And its operation can advance or interfere with the operation of other public institutions. But tort is private in two basic senses. It defines duties to refrain from injuring (or to protect from injury) that are owed by certain persons to others: duties that, when breached, constitute wrongs to those others, as opposed to wrongs to the world.7 Second, precisely because torts are private wrongs, they provide the basis for a private response.8 For a wrong to be a tort it must in principle generate for its victim a private right of action: a right to seek recourse through official channels against the wrongdoer. As the law of private and privately redressable wrongs, tort law is rightly treated as a cornerstone of legal education along with criminal law (the law of public and publicly redressable wrongs) and contract law (the law of consensually defined duties). Looked at through the lens of litigation, Torts is about the wrongs that a private litigant must establish to entitle her to a court's assistance in obtaining a remedy and the remedies that will be made available to her. Looked at through the lens of daily life, Torts is about which duties of noninjury owed to others are counted as legal duties and what sorts of remedial obligations one will incur for failing to conduct oneself in accordance with those duties.9 In turn, the places to look for contemporary extensions of tort law are not the compensation systems with which tort law is frequently coupled.10 Rather, they are found in the rules governing 10b-5 suits, civil RICO actions, Title VII claims for workplace discrimination, constitutional tort claims, and intellectual-propertyinfringement actions. To study torts is to learn what sort of conduct our legal system defines as wrongfully injurious toward another such that, when committed, the victim is entitled to exact something from the wrongdoer. …

Cases, Materials and Text on Consumer Law

Abstract: Setting the scene : consumer law - who is the consumer? - basic models of consumer law in the EU - legal techniques of consumer protection at the community level - consumers, horizontal effect and state liability for infringement of European consumer law; Commercial practices and adertisong : scope of European unfair commercial practices law - notion of fairness - misleading practices - misleading omission - language in commercial practises - comparative advertising - aggressive practices and sales promotion ; Consumer contract law : consumer protection and the evolution of European contract law - formation of contract - information duties ; Rights of withdrawal and standard terms : right of withdrawal - standard terms ; Sale of goods : EU legislation on consumer sales - contracts of sale - what are consumer goods? - goods must be in confirmity with the contract - burden of proof - persons liable - remedies under directive 99/44/EC - termination of the contract and claims for damages - consumer guaranties ; Financial services : financial services and consumer protection - consumer protection in the field of credit services - of investment services - of banking and payment services ; Product liability : origins and justifications of harmonisation - continued existence of national product liability regimes - products - liable persons - supply and putting into circulation - defect - damages ; Litigation, redress and enforcement : administrative enforcement and self-regulation - traditional individual redress - arbitration and mediation - collective redress - criminal law sanctions - state liability - individual cross-border enforcement

The Measure of Injury: Race, Gender, and Tort Law

Abstract: Acknowledgments Introduction 1 Theoretical Frames 2 Historical Frames 3 Intentional Torts 4 Negligence 5 Causation 6 Damages Conclusion Notes Index About the Authors

Least-Cost Design of Water Distribution Networks Including Fire Damages

Abstract: The implicit goal of water network design is to provide acceptable service during normal and peak demands and to limit damages to property and people during fires. Despite this, fire damages are seldom explicitly included in network design. This paper presents a single-objective particle swarm optimization program that incorporates a new measure of expected conditional fire damages to size local water distribution mains for fire flow protection in residential service areas. The optimization approach generates trade-off information to help utilities determine the cost effectiveness of adding new pipe capacity to reduce the risk of fire damages in water networks. The optimization program was applied to an 8-pipe network and a 34-pipe network to generate trade-off curves for pipe cost and fire damages. A sensitivity analysis indicated that the level of uncertainty in fire flow had a little impact on pipe sizing and cost in the eight-pipe network. Optimization results in the 34-pipe network supported the indu...

Review of civil litigation costs

Abstract: In January 2009, the then Master of the Rolls, Sir Anthony Clarke, appointed Lord Justice Jackson to lead a fundamental review of the rules and principles governing the costs of civil litigation and to make recommendations in order to promote access to justice at proportionate costs This Final Report presents the findings and supporting evidence of the civil litigation costs review It outlines the final proposals on the costs of civil litigation, informed by the period of public consultation that followed "The Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Preliminary Report" Lord Justice Jackson was asked to review the rules and principles governing the costs of civil litigation and to make recommendations in order to: promote access to justice at proportionate cost; review case management procedures; have regard to research into costs and funding; consult widely; compare our costs regime with those of other jurisdictions; and, prepare a report setting out recommendations with supporting evidence by 31 December 2009 "The Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Preliminary Report" is also available to order, either separately or as part of a pack with the Final Report (see below) Please note that the Final Report contains extensive cross-references to the Preliminary Report and the one cannot be read without the other Major recommendations cover: conditional fee agreements, of which 'no win, no fee' agreements are the most common species, and which have been the major contributor to disproportionate costs Success fees and ATE (after-the-event) insurance premiums should cease to be recoverable from unsuccessful opponents in civil litigation Success fees should come out of the damages awarded to the client; awards of general damages should be increased by 10 per cent, and the maximum amount of damages that lawyers may deduct for success fees be capped at 25 per cent of damages Lawyers should not be permitted to pay referral fees in respect of personal injury cases It also covers: qualified one way costs shifting, taking away the need for ATE insurance; fixed costs in fast track litigation; and, establishment of a Costs Council Other sections of the report deal with: other funding issues; personal injuries litigation; some specific types of litigation; and, controlling the costs - including pre-action protocols, greater use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), disclosure, case and costs management by the judiciary