scispace - formally typeset
Search or ask a question
Topic

Damages

About: Damages is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 9365 publications have been published within this topic receiving 89750 citations. The topic is also known as: compensation award.


Papers
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine why different mechanisms of control, such as legal liability, regulation, and reputation, failed to deter a behavior that was inefficient from a social point of view.
Abstract: DuPont, one of the most respectable U.S. companies, caused environmental damage that ended up costing the company around a billion dollars. By using internal company documents disclosed in trials we rule out the possibilities that this bad outcome was due to ignorance, an unexpected realization, or a problem of bad governance. The documents rather suggest that the polluting was a rational decision: under reasonable probabilities of detection, polluting was ex-ante optimal from the company’s perspective, even if the cost of preventing pollution was lower than the cost of the health damages produced. We then examine why different mechanisms of control – legal liability, regulation, and reputation – all failed to deter a behavior that was inefficient from a social point of view. One common reason for the failures of deterrence mechanisms is that the company controls most of the information and its release. We then sketch potential ways to mitigate this problem.

45 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined how lobbying spending on the Waxman-Markey bill, the most prominent and promising United States climate regulation so far, altered its likelihood of being implemented.
Abstract: Domestic political processes shape climate policy. In particular, there is increasing concern about the role of political lobbying over climate policy. This paper examines how lobbying spending on the Waxman–Markey bill, the most prominent and promising United States climate regulation so far, altered its likelihood of being implemented. We combine data from comprehensive United States lobbying records with an empirical method for forecasting the policy’s effect on the value of publicly listed firms. Our statistical analysis suggests that lobbying by firms expecting losses from the policy was more effective than lobbying by firms expecting gains. Interpreting this finding through a game-theoretic model, we calculate that lobbying lowered the probability of enacting the Waxman–Markey bill by 13 percentage points, representing an expected social cost of US$60 billion (in 2018 US dollars). Our findings also suggest how future climate policy proposals can be designed to be more robust to political opposition. Political interests play a key role in the passage of climate policy. This study quantifies that political lobbying reduced the probability of enacting the Waxman–Markey bill in the United States by 13 percentage points, representing US$60 billion in expected climate damages.

45 citations

Posted Content
TL;DR: In this paper, private damage claims against cartels may have negative effects on leniency: whereas whistleblowers obtain full immunity regarding the public cartel fines, they have no or only restricted protection against private third-party damage claims.
Abstract: Private damage claims against cartels may have negative effects on leniency: whereas whistleblowers obtain full immunity regarding the public cartel fines, they have no or only restricted protection against private third-party damage claims. This may stabilize cartels. We run an experiment to study this issue. Firms choose whether to join a cartel, may apply for leniency afterwards, and then potentially face private damages. We find that the implementation of private damage claims reduces cartel formation but makes cartels indeed more stable. The negative effect of damages is avoided in a novel setting where the whistleblower is also protected from damages.

45 citations

01 Dec 2001
TL;DR: The CSIRO Land and Water (including its employees and consultants) excludes all liability to any person for any consequences, including but not limited to all losses, damages, costs, expenses and any other compensation, arising directly or indirectly from using this publication (in part or in whole) and any information or material contained in it as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: 2 COPYRIGHT © 2001 CSIRO Land and Water. To the extent permitted by law, all rights are reserved and no part of this publication covered by copyright may be reproduced or copied in any form or by any means except with the written permission of CSIRO Land and Water. IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER To the extent permitted by law, CSIRO Land and Water (including its employees and consultants) excludes all liability to any person for any consequences, including but not limited to all losses, damages, costs, expenses and any other compensation, arising directly or indirectly from using this publication (in part or in whole) and any information or material contained in it.

45 citations

Journal Article
TL;DR: Is a colleague's success eating away at you?
Abstract: Is a colleague's success eating away at you? Beware: This deadly sin damages relationships, disrupts teams, and undermines organizational success. Most of all, it harms your own performance.

45 citations


Network Information
Related Topics (5)
Government
141K papers, 1.9M citations
77% related
Public policy
76.7K papers, 1.6M citations
76% related
Risk assessment
43K papers, 1.1M citations
75% related
Environmental pollution
100.4K papers, 1.1M citations
74% related
Sustainable development
101.4K papers, 1.5M citations
74% related
Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20242
2023929
20221,943
2021234
2020340
2019324