Damages

About: Damages is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 9365 publications have been published within this topic receiving 89750 citations. The topic is also known as: compensation award.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: A Discussion of Three Provisions

Abstract: The passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Reform Act) is intended to restore predictability to the litigation process under federal securities law, and therefore to reduce litigation risk for accountants and publicly traded firms. The purpose of this commentary is to explore potential implications of three provisions of the Reform Act. The first provision that we examine is the "fair share" proportionate liability rule that the Reform Act requires for allocating damages among parties who are potential wrongdoers. We summarize conditions that trigger joint and several liability and present an example highlighting some of the allocation issues under the new proportionate rule. The second provision is the deployment of damage caps. We illustrate how caps may limit damages that liable parties must pay to the plaintiffs based on the average market price over the 90 days following the correcting disclosures. The third provision relates to the requirement for fraud detection and disclosure by independent public accountants. We conclude with a discussion of some issues that may influence how the actual implementation of the Reform Act might change accountants' liability.

Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?

Abstract: This Article will show that antitrust violations do not actually give rise to "treble" damages. When viewed correctly, antitrust damages awards are approximately equal to, or are in fact less than, the actual damages caused by antitrust violations.The article demonstrates this by analyzing the relatively quantifiable harms from antitrust violations, modeling the issues under both deterrence and compensation frameworks. It calculates rough estimates of those factors that affect the magnitude of the antitrust damages multiplier actually awarded. These adjustments to the "treble" damages multiplier arise from: (1) the lack of prejudgment interest; (2) the effects of the statute of limitations; (3) plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs; (4) other costs to plaintiffs pursuing cases; (5) costs to the judicial system in handling antitrust cases; (6) "umbrella" effects of market power; (7) allocative inefficiency effects of market power; and (8) tax effects.The article then combines these adjustments using both deterrence and compensation frameworks. It compares the sum of the damages caused by antitrust violations to the typical amounts awarded to successful plaintiffs to determine, on average, the true effective ratio of recovery to damages. This analysis show that when all the appropriate adjustments are considered together, awarded damages are, at most, probably at the single level. From either a deterrence or compensation perspective, the Article concludes by discussing some implications of this finding in light of the consensus that antitrust damages should be substantially higher than singlefold to account for detection problems, proof problems, and risk aversion. For these reasons the Article urges that antitrust damages levels be raised by, for example, awarding prejudgment interest.

Determining damages: The influence of expert testimony on jurors' decision making.

Abstract: How do jurors accomplish the task of awarding damages in a civil lawsuit? To what extent are they influenced by expert testimony? These questions were addressed in a mock juror simulation in which jurors from El Paso County (Colorado) read one of three versions of a trial manuscript involving an age discrimination claim in which liability was already determined. They awarded damages and answered follow-up questions. In one version, there was no expert testimony; in a second version, they received plaintiff expert testimony on lost future wages and other economic matters; and in the third version, they received both plaintiff and defense expert testimony. Monetary awards were significantly higher when expert(s) testified. Moreover, jurors were strongly influenced by the expert testimony: Nearly half of them selected a damage award that exactly matched the amounts suggested. Finally, jurors infrequently considered exponential calculations in assessing damages.

Policymaking for Posterity

Abstract: Policymaking for posterity involves current decisions with distant consequences. Contrary to conventional prescriptions, we conclude that the greater wealth of future generations may strengthen the case for preserving environmental amenities; lower discount rates should be applied to the far future, and special effort should be made to avoid actions that impose costs on future generations. Posterity brings great uncertainties. Even massive losses, such as human extinction, however, do not merit infinite negative utility. Given learning, greater uncertainties about damages could increase or decrease the optimal level of current mitigation activities. Policies for posterity should anticipate effects on: alternative investments, both public and private; the actions of other nations; and the behaviors of future generations. Such effects may surprise. This analysis blends traditional public finance and behavioral economics with a number of hypothetical choice problems.