Showing papers on "Data Corruption published in 1993"

The risk of data corruption in microprocessor-based systems

Abstract: Most microprocessor-based systems provide little or no checking for failures of the microprocessor itself. These systems rely on the high reliability of VLSI and the inherent run-time checks (e.g., virtual memory protection and illegal instruction exceptions) to ensure data integrity. The authors present a model for analyzing the vulnerability of systems to undetected data corruptions. The model estimates expected corruption rates based on commercial reliability studies, field experience with fault-tolerant systems, and academic fault-injection studies. They find that without lockstep, an undetected data corruption may occur nearly once per month in a population of 10,000 processors. Given the available data, however, it is difficult to provide tight bounds for the frequency of data integrity violations and the authors' current estimates of the data corruption rate vary by more than two orders of magnitude. Further study on transient failures and the impact of faults is required to narrow the range of the predictions and reduce the overall risk of undetected data corruptions.

Validating the safety of embedded real-time control systems using FMEA

Abstract: Traditional failure modes and effects analysis techniques have been adapted and extended to include assessment of software failures. The resulting technique is used to assess the safety of embedded real-time control systems designed for use in automotive applications. The use of FMEA techniques in assessing the software safety of those controllers has allowed analysis of the effects of a more comprehensive set of potential failures, including data corruption, than is practical using other software safety analysis techniques. The ability to assess the results of data corruption has proven to be crucial in providing feedback to design teams about the potential safety risks of the designs analyzed. >

The Risk of Data Corruption in Microprocessor

Abstract: Most microprocessor-based systems provide little or no checking for failures of the microprocessor itseIf. These systems rely on the high reliability of VLSI and the inherent run-time checks (e.g., virtual memory protection and illegal instruction exceptions) to ensure data integrity. In this paper we present a model for analyzing the vulnerability of systems to undetected data corruptions. The model estimates expected corruption rates based on commercial reliability studies, jield experience with fault-tolerant systems and academic fault-injection studies. We jind that without lockstep, an undetected data corruption may occur nearly once per month in a population of 10,OOO processors. Given the available data, however, it is dificult to provide tight bounds for the ftequency of data integrity violations and our current estimates of the data corruption rate vary by more than two orders of magnitude. Further study on transient failures and the impact of faults is required to narrow the range of our predictions and reduce the overall risk of undetected data corruptions.