Topic
Delegation
About: Delegation is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 8081 publications have been published within this topic receiving 176451 citations.
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Papers
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01 Jan 1991
TL;DR: In this article, the economy of language exchange and its relation to political power is discussed. But the authors focus on the production and reproduction of Legitimate language and do not address its application in the theory of political power.
Abstract: Preface Editor's Introduction General Introduction Part I The Economy of Linguistic Exchanges Introduction 1. The Production and Reproduction of Legitimate Language 2. Price Formation and the Anticipation of Profits Appendix: Did You Say 'Popular'? Part II The Social Institution of Symbolic Power Introduction 3. Authorized Language: The Social Conditions for the Effectiveness of Ritual Discourse 4. Rites of Institution 5. Description and Prescription: The Conditions of Possibility and the Limits of Political Effectiveness 6. Censorship and the Imposition of Form Part III Symbolic Power and the Political Field 7. On Symbolic Power 8. Political Representation: Elements for a Theory of the Political Field 9. Delegation and Political Fetishism 10. Identity and Representation: Elements for a Critical Reflection on the Idea of Region 11. Social Space and the Genesis of 'Classes' Note Index
9,970 citations
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01 Jan 2000
TL;DR: The authors combine the best of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science, and propose a unified approach to the field of political economics, and identify the main outstanding problems.
Abstract: What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis. Combining the best of three separate traditions -- the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science -- Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.
3,654 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a theory of the allocation of formal authority and real authority within organizations, and illustrated how a formally integrated structure can accommodate various degrees of "real" integration.
Abstract: This paper develops a theory of the allocation of formal authority (the right to decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions) within organizations, and it illustrates how a formally integrated structure can accommodate various degrees of "real" integration. Real authority is determined by the structure of information, which in turn depends on the allocation of formal authority. An increase in an agent's real authority promotes initiative but results in a loss of control for the principal. After spelling out (some of) the main determinants of the delegation of formal authority within organizations, the paper examines a number of factors that increase the subordinates' real authority in a formally integrated structure: overload, lenient rules, urgency of decision, reputation, performance measurement, and multiplicity of superiors. Finally, the amount of communication in an organization is shown to depend on the allocation of formal authority.
2,959 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine why international actors, including states, firms, and activists, create different types of legalized arrangements to solve political and substantive problems and show how particular forms of legalization provide superior institutional solutions in different circumstances.
Abstract: We examine why international actors -- including states, firms, and activists -- create different types of legalized arrangements to solve political and substantive problems. We show how particular forms of legalization provide superior institutional solutions in different circumstances. We begin by examining the baseline advantages of "hard" legalization (that is, precise, legally binding obligations with appropriate third-party delegation). We emphasize, however, that actors often prefer softer forms of legalization (that is, various combinations of reduced precision, less stringent obligation, and weaker delegation). Soft legalization has a number of significant advantages: it is easier to achieve, provides strategies for dealing with uncertainty, infringes less on sovereignty, and facilitates compromise among differentiated actors. Although our approach is largely interest-based, we explicitly incorporate the normative elements that are central in law and in recent international relations theorizing. We also consider the important role of nonstate actors who, along with states, are central participants in contemporary international legalization. We illustrate the advantages of various forms of international legal arrangements with examples drawn from articles in this special issue and elsewhere.
1,623 citations
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13 Mar 1998
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a survey on the conditions for persuasion in information, persuasion and choice, and a survey of the institutions of knowledge and the foundation of democracy in the US.
Abstract: List of tables and figures Series editors' preface Acknowledgements 1. Knowledge and the foundation of democracy Part I. Theory: 2. How people learn 3. How people learn from others 4. What people learn from others 5. Delegation and democracy Part II. Experiments: 6. Theory, predictions and the scientific method 7. Laboratory experiments on information, persuasion and choice 8. Laboratory experiments on delegation 9. A survey on the conditions for persuasion Part III. Implications for Institutional Design: 10. The institutions of knowledge Afterword Appendices References Author index Subject index.
1,475 citations