Differential cryptanalysis

About: Differential cryptanalysis is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2131 publications have been published within this topic receiving 54681 citations.

A Block Cipher Generation using Color Substitution

Abstract: most influential and universal approach to countering the threats to network / information security is encryption. Even though it is very authoritative, the cryptanalysts are very intelligent and they were working day and night to break the ciphers. To make a stronger cipher it is recommended that to use: More stronger and complicated encryption algorithms, Keys with more number of bits (Longer keys), larger block size as input to process, use authentication and confidentiality and secure transmission of keys. It is certain that, if we follow all the mentioned principles, can make a very stronger cipher. With this we have the following problems: It is a time consuming process for both encryption and decryption, It is difficult for the crypt analyzer to analyze the problem. Also suffers with the problems in the existing system. The main intention of this paper is to present an innovative cryptographic Substitution method, can generate stronger cipher then the existing substitution algorithms. We are sure that concept is new and the cryptanalysis did on this will prove that the cipher is strong.

Lightweight Block Ciphers: a comparative study

Abstract: Although the AES is an excellent and preferred choice for almost all block cipher applications, it is not suitable for extremely constrained environments such as RFID (Radio-Frequency IDentification) tags and sensor networks. Therefore lightweight cryptography has become very vital and a strong demand in designing secure lightweight cryptographic modules is required. This paper meant to be a reference (for the cryptographic designers) on the lightweight block ciphers. It starts by doing a survey to collect the latest proposed ciphers, then to study them in terms of their algorithms specifications, hardware implementation and attacks. Finally, after the explanation and comparison, this research can be the basement for starting point to improve the lightweight block cipher in many directions like number of clock cycle, size of memory, number of Chosen Plaintext, GE, throughput and attacks. Also, this paper is under our investigation.

New impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round camellia

Abstract: Camellia is one of the widely used block ciphers, which has been selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC. This paper introduces a 7-round impossible differential of Camellia including FL /FL −1 layer. Utilizing impossible differential attack, 10-round Camellia-128 is breakable with 2118.5 chosen plaintexts and 2123.5 10 round encryptions. Moreover, 10-round Camellia-192 and 11-round Camellia-256 can also be analyzed, the time complexity are about 2130.4 and 2194.5, respectively. Comparing with known attacks on reduced round Camellia including FL /FL −1 layer, our results are better than all of them.

Impossible differential cryptanalysis of Piccolo lightweight block cipher

Abstract: This paper analyzes the Piccolo family of lightweight block ciphers against the impossible differential cryptanalysis. A combination of some ploys such as decreasing the S-box computations, finding an appropriate propagation of differentials, utilizing hash tables and using the linearity of the key-schedule as well as disregarding subkeys of two rounds lead to 12-round and 13-round impossible differential attack on Piccolo-80 and 15-round attack on Piccolo-128. The time and data complexity of the attack against Piccolo-80 is 255.18 and 236.34 for 12-round and 269.7 and 243.25 for 13-round, respectively. Moreover, the time and data complexity for 15 rounds cryptanalysis of Piccolo-128 are 2125.4 and 258.7, respectively.

Cryptanalysis of the Bluetooth E0 Cipher Using OBDD's

Abstract: In this paper we analyze the E 0 cipher, which is the cipher used in the Bluetooth specifications We adapted and optimized the Binary Decision Diagram attack of Krause, for the specific details of E 0 Our method requires 128 known bits of the keystream in order to recover the initial value of the four LFSR's in the E 0 system We describe several variants which we built to lower the complexity of the attack We evaluated our attack against the real (non-reduced) E 0 cipher Our best attack can recover the initial value of the four LFSR's, for the first time, with a realistic space complexity of 2 23 (84MB RAM), and with a time complexity of 2 87 This attack can be massively parallelized to lower the overall time complexity Beyond the specifics of E 0 , our work describes practical experience with BDD-based cryptanalysis, which so far has mostly been a theoretical concept