Topic
Differential cryptanalysis
About: Differential cryptanalysis is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2131 publications have been published within this topic receiving 54681 citations.
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18 Oct 1998
TL;DR: Using the discrete Fourier transform, this work presents here a quantitative criterion of security against the Davies and Murphy attack.
Abstract: In recent years, three main types of attacks have been developed against Feistel-based ciphers, such as DES[1]; these attacks are linear cryptanalysis[2], differential cryptanalysis[3], and the Davies and Murphy attack[4]. Using the discrete Fourier transform, we present here a quantitative criterion of security against the Davies and Murphy attack. Similar work has been done on linear and differential cryptanalysis[5,11].
9 citations
27 Aug 2007
TL;DR: This analysis consists of two algorithms based on the higher order differential property of the S-box that exceeds the existing attack algorithms against MISTY1 and give new perspectives for the security of MISTy1.
Abstract: We analyze 64-bit block cipher MISTY1 from several standpoints. Our analysis consists of two algorithms based on the higher order differential property of the S-box. The first succeeds in attacking a six round MISTY1 provided 218.9 chosen plaintexts and 280.9 computational cost. The second succeeds in attacking a seven round MISTY1 with no FL functions by controlling the value of the fixed part of the plaintext and using a 2-round elimination method provided 211.9 chosen plaintexts and 2125.1 computational cost. Both algorithms exceeds the existing attack algorithms against MISTY1 and give new perspectives for the security of MISTY1.
9 citations
03 Nov 2015
TL;DR: This paper revisits the differential attack against several S-Box based block ciphers by carefully studying the differential characteristics and provides an improved solution with the aid of several searching strategies, which enable us to find by far the best differential characteristics for the two investigated cipher efficiently.
Abstract: The success probability of differential and linear cryptanalysis against block ciphers heavily depend on finding differential or linear paths with high statistical bias compared with uniform random distribution. For large number of rounds, it is not a trivial task to find such differential or linear paths. Matsui first investigated this problem and proposed a solution based on a branch and bound algorithm in 1994. Since then, the research on finding good concrete differential or linear path did not receive much attention. In this paper, we revisit the differential attack against several S-Box based block ciphers by carefully studying the differential characteristics. Inspired by Matsui's algorithm, we provide an improved solution with the aid of several searching strategies, which enable us to find by far the best differential characteristics for the two investigated ciphers (LBlock, TWINE) efficiently. Furthermore, we provide another way to evaluate the security of ciphers against differential attack by comparing the strength of the ciphers from differential characteristic's point of view, and we also investigate the accuracy when using the active S-Box to evaluate the security margin against differential attack, which is the common method adapted when new ciphers are designed.
9 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: This paper describes an effort to attack S-DES using differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis of a Feistel cipher, a reduced version of the Data Encryption Standard.
Abstract: This paper describes an effort to attack S-DES using differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. S-DES is a reduced version of the Data Encryption Standard (DES). It also includes a discussion on the subject of cryptology and a literature survey of useful papers regarding cryptography and cryptanalysis. This paper is meant as a tutorial on the fundamentals of differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis of a Feistel cipher.
9 citations
13 Jul 2009
TL;DR: It is argued that the proposed technique is very likely to provide the first collision attack on RadioGatun, and a significant improvement over the best previously known cryptanalysis.
Abstract: In this paper we study the security of the RadioGatun family of hash functions, and more precisely the collision resistance of this proposal. We show that it is possible to find differential paths with acceptable probability of success. Then, by using the freedom degrees available from the incoming message words, we provide a significant improvement over the best previously known cryptanalysis. As a proof of concept, we provide a colliding pair of messages for RadioGatun with 2-bit words. We finally argue that, under some light assumption, our technique is very likely to provide the first collision attack on RadioGatun.
9 citations