Topic

# Differential fault analysis

About: Differential fault analysis is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 452 publications have been published within this topic receiving 14207 citations. The topic is also known as: DFA.

##### Papers published on a yearly basis

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TL;DR: This work states that this attack is applicable only to public key cryptosystems such as RSA, and not to secret key algorithms such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES).

Abstract: In September 1996 Boneh, Demillo, and Lipton from Bellcore announced a new type of cryptanalytic attack which exploits computational errors to find cryptographic keys. Their attack is based on algebraic properties of modular arithmetic, and thus it is applicable only to public key cryptosystems such as RSA, and not to secret key algorithms such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES).

1,535 citations

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TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a theoretical model for breaking various cryptographic schemes by taking advantage of random hardware faults, including RSA and Rabin signatures, and also show how various authentication protocols, such as Fiat-Shamir and Schnorr, can be broken using hardware faults.

Abstract: We present a theoretical model for breaking various cryptographic schemes by taking advantage of random hardware faults. We show how to attack certain implementations of RSA and Rabin signatures. We also show how various authentication protocols, such as Fiat-Shamir and Schnorr, can be broken using hardware faults.

1,264 citations

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TL;DR: A technology to block a new class of attacks on secure microcontrollers and smartcards whereby a logical 1 or 0 is not encoded by a high or low voltage on a single line, but by (HL or (LH) on a pair of lines.

Abstract: We describe a new class of attacks on secure microcontrollers and smartcards. Illumination of a target transistor causes it to conduct, thereby inducing a transient fault. Such attacks are practical; they do not even require expensive laser equipment. We have carried them out using a flashgun bought second-hand from a camera store for $30 and with an $8 laser pointer. As an illustration of the power of this attack, we developed techniques to set or reset any individual bit of SRAM in a microcontroller. Unless suitable countermeasures are taken, optical probing may also be used to induce errors in cryptographic computations or protocols, and to disrupt the processor's control flow. It thus provides a powerful extension of existing glitching and fault analysis techniques. This vulnerability may pose a big problem for the industry, similar to those resulting from probing attacks in the mid-1990s and power analysis attacks in the late 1990s.We have therefore developed a technology to block these attacks. We use self-timed dual-rail circuit design techniques whereby a logical 1 or 0 is not encoded by a high or low voltage on a single line, but by (HL) or (LH) on a pair of lines. The combination (HH) signals an alarm, which will typically reset the processor. Circuits can be designed so that single-transistor failures do not lead to security failure. This technology may also make power analysis attacks very much harder too.

784 citations

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TL;DR: The differential fault attack technique is able to break the AES-128 with only 2 faulty ciphertexts, assuming the fault occurs between the antepenultimate and the penultimate MixColumn; this is better than the previous fault attacks against AES.

Abstract: In this paper we describe a differential fault attack technique working against Substitution-Permutation Networks, and requiring very few faulty ciphertexts. The fault model used is realistic, as we consider random faults affecting bytes (faults affecting one only bit are much harder to induce). We implemented our attack on a PC for both the AES and KHAZAD. We are able to break the AES-128 with only 2 faulty ciphertexts, assuming the fault occurs between the antepenultimate and the penultimate MixColumn; this is better than the previous fault attacks against AES(6,10,11). Under similar hypothesis, KHAZAD is breakable with 3 faulty ciphertexts.

589 citations

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TL;DR: A model for attacking various cryptographic schemes by taking advantage of random hardware faults shows that for many digital signature and identification schemes these incorrect outputs completely expose the secrets stored in the box.

Abstract: We present a model for attacking various cryptographic schemes by taking advantage of random hardware faults. The model consists of a black-box containing some cryptographic secret. The box interacts with the outside world by following a cryptographic protocol. The model supposes that from time to time the box is affected by a random hardware fault causing it to output incorrect values. For example, the hardware fault flips an internal register bit at some point during the computation. We show that for many digital signature and identification schemes these incorrect outputs completely expose the secrets stored in the box. We present the following results: (1) The secret signing key used in an implementation of RSA based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is completely exposed from a single erroneous RSA signature, (2) for non-CRT implementations of RSA the secret key is exposed given a large number (e.g. 1000) of erroneous signatures, (3) the secret key used in Fiat--Shamir identification is exposed after a small number (e.g. 10) of faulty executions of the protocol, and (4) the secret key used in Schnorr's identification protocol is exposed after a much larger number (e.g. 10,000) of faulty executions. Our estimates for the number of necessary faults are based on standard security parameters such as a 1024-bit modulus, and a 2-40 identification error probability. Our results demonstrate the importance of preventing errors in cryptographic computations. We conclude the paper with various methods for preventing these attacks.

506 citations