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Showing papers on "Dilemma published in 1994"


Book
04 May 1994
TL;DR: Geddes as mentioned in this paper explores the ways in which political actors deal with these contradictory pressures and asks the question: when will leaders support reforms that increase state capacity and that establish a more meritocratic and technically competent bureaucracy.
Abstract: In Latin America as elsewhere, politicians routinely face a painful dilemma: whether to use state resources for national purposes, especially those that foster economic development, or to channel resources to people and projects that will help insure political survival and reelection. While politicians may believe that a competent state bureaucracy is intrinsic to the national good, political realities invariably tempt leaders to reward powerful clients and constituents, undermining long-term competence. "Politician's Dilemma" explores the ways in which political actors deal with these contradictory pressures and asks the question: when will leaders support reforms that increase state capacity and that establish a more meritocratic and technically competent bureaucracy? Barbara Geddes brings rational choice theory to her study of Brazil between 1930 and 1964 and shows how state agencies are made more effective when they are protected from partisan pressures and operate through merit-based recruitment and promotion strategies. Looking at administrative reform movements in other Latin American democracies, she traces the incentives offered politicians to either help or hinder the process. In its balanced insight, wealth of detail, and analytical rigor, "Politician's Dilemma" provides a powerful key to understanding the conflicts inherent in Latin American politics, and to unlocking possibilities for real political change.

570 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Brand managers have been described as "murderers of valuable brand assets" as discussed by the authors, because such an important function typically has been left in the hands of relatively young, inexperienced managers, overloaded with analytical skills and often very short-term focused.
Abstract: Recent headlines in the popular press (e.g., "What's in a Name? Less and Less," "Brands on the Run," "Private Label Nightmare," "Marlboro Friday," "The Brand Leader's Dilemma") spell out the plight of brand or product management in today's tough competitive environment. Brand managers have been described as "murderers of brand assets" because such an important function typically has been left in the hands of relatively young, inexperienced managers, overloaded with analytical skills and often very short-term focused (Landler, Schiller, and Therrien 1991). The challenges posed by these conditions require a change in mindset as well as actions on the part of brand managers. These managers are challenged not only by the imperatives of the daily crises forced by customer and competitive market activities, but also by a need to think more strategically about the function of brand management itself. The purpose of this introduction, indeed of this special issue, is to examine issues affecting the state of brand management-the challenges as well as the opportunities

570 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The unexpected rise in opposition to the Maastricht Treaty of Lisbon as mentioned in this paper reflected in part an abrupt heightening of awareness about possible trade-offs that the designers and supporters of the Treaty had largely ignored.
Abstract: The unexpected rise in opposition to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 reflected in part an abrupt heightening of awareness about possible trade-offs that the designers and supporters of the treaty had largely ignored. The treaty was intended to create in due time a common currency among the twelve members of the European Union (EU), common policies on defense and foreign affairs, and greater authority for the EU over many of the policies social, economic, and environmental of the member states. (Before Maastricht the EU had been called the European Community.) Increasing references to the democratic deficit in the political arrangements of the EU revealed a concern that whatever other benefits might result from the treaty, they could come at the cost of submerging a national democratic government into a larger and less democratic transnational system. Maastricht presented citizens and leaders (in a country like Denmark, for example) with a fundamental democratic dilemma: They could choose to preserve the authority of a smaller democratic political unit (Denmark) within which they could act more effectively to influence the conduct of their government, even though some important matters

556 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Glenn Ellison1
TL;DR: In this article, the repeated prisoner's dilemma in a large-population random-matching setting where players are unable to recognize their opponents is considered, and it is shown that cooperation is still a sequential equilibrium supported by "contagious" punishments.
Abstract: First version received October 1991; final version accepted February 1994 (Eds.) The paper considers the repeated prisoner's dilemma in a large-population random-matching setting where players are unable to recognize their opponents. Despite the informational restrictions cooperation is still a sequential equilibrium supported by "contagious" punishments. The equilibrium does not require excessive patience, and contrary to previous thought, need not be extraordinarily fragile. It is robust to the introduction of small amounts of noise and remains nearly efficient. Extensions are discussed to models with heterogeneous rates of time preference and without public randomizations.

500 citations




Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors compared the IPD team game with the single-group Prisoners Dilemma (PD) game and found that subjects were almost twice as likely to cooperate in IPD than in the PD game even though the cost of cooperation for the individual group member is identical in the two games, the external benefit to the individual's group resulting from a cooperative choice is also identical, and cooperation in the intergroup dilemma is collectively deficient whereas in the single group dilemma it is collectively optimal.

267 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Brand managers have been described as "murderers of valuable brand assets" as mentioned in this paper, because such an important function typically has been left in the hands of relatively young, inexperienced managers, overloaded with analytical skills and often very short-term focused.
Abstract: Recent headlines in the popular press (e.g., "What's in a Name? Less and Less," "Brands on the Run," "Private Label Nightmare," "Marlboro Friday," "The Brand Leader's Dilemma") spell out the plight of brand or product management in today's tough competitive environment. Brand managers have been described as "murderers of brand assets" because such an important function typically has been left in the hands of relatively young, inexperienced managers, overloaded with analytical skills and often very short-term focused (Landler, Schiller, and Therrien 1991). The challenges posed by these conditions require a change in mindset as well as actions on the part of brand managers. These managers are challenged not only by the imperatives of the daily crises forced by customer and competitive market activities, but also by a need to think more strategically about the function of brand management itself. The purpose of this introduction, indeed of this special issue, is to examine issues affecting the state of brand management-the challenges as well as the opportunities

204 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the evolutionary outcome for the alternating Prisoner's Dilemma can be quite different from the simultaneous case, and the winner of a simultaneous game is frequently a "win-stay, lose-shift" strategy based on the payoff experienced in the last round, whereas in the alternating game the trend leads towards a "Generous Tit For Tat" strategy.

168 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the effect of selective incentives on peasant collective action in the context of the collective action problem and concluded that selective incentives alone alone are ineffective; selective incentives supplemented by ideology can be effective; selective incentive alone are counterproductive.
Abstract: Peasant upheavals are studied from the perspective offered by the selective incentives solution to Olson's collective action problem. This article presents much evidence from three different forms of peasant struggles—everyday forms of peasant resistance, unorganized rural movements, and organized peasant rebellions—that demonstrates the widespread existence of selective incentives. Questions about the causes and consequences of selective incentives are then examined. First, what are the conditions under which peasant struggles emphasize material selective incentives rather than nonmaterial altruistic appeals? The level of selective incentives in any peasant upheaval is a function of demand and supply considerations. Peasants demand selective incentives. The suppliers include one or more dissident peasant organizations, the authorities, and the allies of both. A political struggle ensues as the suppliers compete and attempt to monopolize the market. Second, what are the conditions under which the pursuit of material self-interest hurts rather than helps the peasantry's collective cause? Selective incentives supplemented by ideology can be effective; selective incentives alone are counterproductive.These questions and answers lead to the conclusion that the selective incentives solution reveals much more about peasant upheavals than simply that peasants will often be concerned with their own material self-interest. It is therefore important to study the following three aspects of peasant collective action: the dilemma peasants face, or how peasant resistance is in the interest of all peasants but in the self-interest of none; the paradox peasants face, or that rational peasants do solve their dilemma (for example, with selective incentives) and participate in collective action; and the irony peasants face, or that self-interest is both at the root of their dilemma and at the foundation of a solution to their paradox.

156 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors compare the American and Vietnamese cultures in terms of their emphasis on the collective over the individual and argue that, in fact, these cultures are not as different from the United States with regard to collectivity as they seem.
Abstract: Existing studies of social dilemmas in other cultures report patterns of behavior that are very similar to that of American subjects. This has held even in cultures that are seemingly quite different from the United States in terms of their emphasis on the collective over the individual. We argue that, in fact, these cultures are not as different from the United States with regard to collectivity as they seem. In our study, we contrast the American—the most individualistic of all cultures—with the Vietnamese, an extremely collectivist culture. In the first study, American and South Vietnamese subjects played a number of trials of a public goods or resource dilemma game. The patterns of cooperation among the Americans were typical of most social dilemma studies. The Vietnamese, however, cooperated at an exceptionally high rate. In a second study, subjects were pitted against a variety of preprogrammed strategies that varied as to their toughness. The Americans responded in predictable ways, but the Vietnam...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article showed that females as a category are more trusted to cooperate than males in prisoner's dilemma games than males, and that neither male nor female judges use gender to predict cooperation from particular individuals (trust) or as a criterion for choosing to play (trusting behavior) when they have the option of not playing particular prisoners' dilemma games.
Abstract: While the cooperate vs. defect choice in the prisoner's dilemma is not an appropriate paradigm for the study of trust and trusting behavior, the play vs. not play choiceis. We show that femalesas a category are more trusted to cooperate — by both male and female judges — than males. Yet neither male nor female judges use gender to predict cooperation from particular individuals (trust) or as a criterion for choosing to play (trusting behavior) when they have the option of not playing particular prisoner's dilemma games. Further, in our experimental context, female and male did not differ in their cooperation rates. We speculate (a) that subjects' generalized expectations are a response to gender-based role differences outside the laboratory, (b) that subjects' failure to make individual-by-individual discriminations by gender is a response to the fact that the experimental context made such natural-world roles irrelevant, and (c) that our findings about the irrelevance of genderper se in trusting relationships will be true for other social categoriesper se.


01 Apr 1994
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the empirical evidence available to date concerning the evolving role of the principal and discuss the effects of fundamental reform measures on the work environment of school principals, with a focus on work overload and role ambiguity.
Abstract: This paper analyzes the empirical evidence available to date concerning the evolving role of the principal. First, it briefly describes the effects of fundamental reform measures on the work environment of school principals, with a focus on work overload and role ambiguity. The second section unpacks the available body of empirical research to determine how the principal's role is changing as a result of school-improvement efforts. It draws on research from seven countries--Australia, Belgium, Canada, Great Britain, Israel, the United States, and New Zealand. These role changes are categorized as: leading from the center; enabling and supporting teacher success; managing reform; and extending the school community. Finally, the third section examines the dilemmas confronting educational leaders in their quest to restructure schooling. These dilemmas, or areas in which principals have considerable doubt, are described as the complexity dilemma, the search dilemma, the self dilemma, and the accountability dilemma. Contains 83 references. (IA° *********************************************************************** Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document. ***********************************************************************


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The problem of how presidents maintain control over foreign policy while still delegating authority to other actors in the government to deal with problems and take advantage of opportunities is discussed in this article.
Abstract: As the world grows more complex, interdependent, and filled with uncertainties, presidents face an increasing dilemma in the making of foreign policy. More parts of the government have become involved in the foreign policy-making process and increasing numbers of agencies, organizations, and people have developed some interest in what happens in the international arena. Presidents inevitably are drawn into the "whirlpool of foreign affairs" (Fallows, 1981, p. 147). At issue is how presidents maintain control over foreign policy while still delegating authority to other actors in the government to deal with problems and take advantage of opportunities. Moreover, how do presidents shape the foreign policy agenda when situations are being defined and problems as well as opportunities are being perceived and structured by others in the political system?

Book
01 Aug 1994
TL;DR: The question of how to define accountability for performance in the many programs where government's partners share responsibility for performance is the central dilemma of government reform as mentioned in this paper, and it is the question ensuring that, for future presidents, reinventing government in some form must continue.
Abstract: Reinventing government has often been presented as a revolution in government management. In truth it is less a revolutionary than an evolutionary movement. To its great credit, reinventing government has evolved to the point that it has recognized the central dilemma: redefining accountability for performance in the many programs where government's partners share responsibility for performance. However, reinventing government has yet to develop or implement strategies to solve this problem. For that matter, though, it is a problem bedeviling government reformers around the world. If the answers are as yet unclear, the question at least is the right one. It is the question ensuring that, for future presidents, reinventing government in some form must continue.

BookDOI
01 Jan 1994
TL;DR: In this paper, a review of the experimental literature and some new results for one-shot N-PD games is presented. But the experimental results are limited to the one shot NPD games and do not cover the other types of games, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and the volunteer's dilemma.
Abstract: Social orientation analysis of the common and individual interest problems.- Toward more locomotion in experimental games.- Individual reasoning process in the participation game with period.- The position effect: The role of a player's serial position in a resource dilemma game.- Positive and negative mood effects on solving a resource dilemma.- Fairness judgements in an asymmetric public goods dilemma.- Group size effects in social dilemmas: A review of the experimental literature and some new results for one-shot N-PD games.- Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of different information structures.- Conditional contributions and public good provision.- Convergence in the orange grove: Learning processes in a social dilemma setting.- Leadership and group identity as determinants of resource consumption in a social dilemma.- Prisoner's dilemma networks: Selection strategy versus action strategy.- Choice of strategies in social dilemma supergames.- Social dilemmas exist in space.- Commuting by car or by public transportation? An interdependence theoretical approach.- Evolution of norms without metanorms.- Computer simulations of the relation between individual heuristics and global cooperation in prisoner's dilemmas.- What risk should a selfish partner take in order to save the life of a nonrelative, selfish friend? - A stochastic game approach to the prisoner's dilemma.- Learning models for the prisoner's dilemma game: A review.- Social capital and cooperation: Communication, bounded rationality, and behavioral heuristics.- Cooperation in an asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: Theory and experimental evidence.- Ten rules of bargaining sequences: A boundedly rational model of coalition bargaining in characteristic function games.- Aspiration processing in multilateral bargaining: Experiment, theory and simulation.- Resistance against mass immigration - An evolutionary explanation.- Authors index.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that if members are allowed to make a pledge prior to their actual decision, they can communicate their intentions and hence increase the cooperation rate, while the degree of commitment required in the pledge differentially affects the cooperation.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A 3-year nursing ethnography of a senior citizen center in a poor, inner-city black ghetto is used to analyze the Insider/Outsider dilemma; to highlight the five phases of getting in (impressing, behaving, swapping, belonging, and chillin' out); and to provide strategies to help researchers studying groups different from themselves.
Abstract: "Getting in," the process of gaining, building, and maintaining trust with the group under study, is difficult for any researcher. Differences of ethnicity, age, and class between the researcher, who is considered an Outsider, and the Insiders, members of the group being studied, pose special problems. A 3-year nursing ethnography of a senior citizen center in a poor, inner-city black ghetto is used to analyze the Insider/Outsider dilemma; to highlight the five phases of getting in (impressing, behaving, swapping, belonging, and chillin' out); and to provide strategies to help researchers studying groups different from themselves.

Book
01 Jan 1994
TL;DR: The Sociology of Trade - The Traders' Dilemma as mentioned in this paper is a theory of the social transformation of markets and society, and it has been applied to many aspects of the world economy.
Abstract: Part I. The Sociology of Trade - The Traders' Dilemma: 1.The Traders' Dilemma - A Theory of the Social Transformation of Markets and Society Hans-Dieter Evers 2.The Traders' Dilemma - The Perspective of the "Longue Duree" Tilman Schiel 3.The Discussion of Trade in Social Science Heiko Schrader 4.The Political Economy of Trade Peter Preston. Part II. Solutions to the Traders' Dilemma: 5.Javanese Petty Trade Hans-Dieter Evers 6.The Emergence of Trade in a Peasant Society - Javanese Transmigrants in Kalimantan Hans-Dieter Evers 7.Clove Traders and Peasants in Simeulue/Aceh Wolfgang Clauss 8.The Great Transformation in Minahasa/Indonesia Helmut Buchholt 9.Trade Routes, Trust and Tactics - Chinese Traders in Singapore Thomas Menkoff 10.Chinese Trading Firms in Transition Wolfgang Jamann 11.Chinese Rice Traders in Thailand Pannee Auansakul 12. A Himalayan Trading Community in Southeast Asia Heiko Schrader 13.The Creation of an Outsiders' Myth - The Mudalali of Sri Lanka Sarah Southwold-Llewwllyn 14.The Chettiar Moneylenders in Singapore Hans-Dieter Evers, Jayarani Pavadarayan and Heiko Schrader. Part III. The Traders' Dilemma in City and Nation: 15. Traders in the City - Power and Social Creativity Rudiger Korff 16.Trade and Conflict in the Third World Ulrich Mai and Helmut Buchholt 17.Trade, Market Expansion and Political Pluralism - Southeast Asia and Europe Compared Hans-Dieter Evers.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The proliferation of emergency food programs in the United States over the past decade and a half has created a dilemma for advocates and others who approach issues of social provision from the standpoint of a commitment to social justice as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The proliferation of emergency food programs in the United States over the past decade and a half has created a dilemma for advocates and others who approach issues of social provision from the standpoint of a commitment to social justice. While the soup kitchens, food pantries, food banks, and food rescue programs that comprise the emergency food system may be able to meet some of the urgent, immediate needs of poor people, they do so in ways that may further undermine rights and entitlements and erode the cultural basis of support for the welfare state. Should advocates of distributive justice work to improve such emergency programs, ignore them, or call for their abolition? This paper explores the history of advocates' involvement with emergency food, assesses the strengths and weaknesses of emergency food programs from a social justice standpoint, and offers some guidelines for action.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article examined interindividual-intergroup discontinuity in the context of three different generalizations of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) and found that interindividual intension is correlated with group discontinuity.
Abstract: The present research involved an examination of interindividual-intergroup discontinuity in the context of three different generalizations of the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG). (Interindividual-int...

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a detailed and comprehensive method to establish similarities and dissimilarities in a systematic and at all stages transparent way is proposed for the analysis of the conditions of survival or breakdown of democratic systems in the inter-war period in Europe.
Abstract: Comparative political analysis at the macro-level of political systems can reduce the inevitably high complexity of such comparisons by the systematic matching or contrasting of cases, depending on the particular problem. Such 'most similar systems' or 'most different systems' designs, in Przeworski & Teune's terminology, thus constitute one of the major ways out of the usual 'small N - many variables' dilemma. This paper proposes a detailed and comprehensive method to establish such similarities and dissimilarities in a systematic and at all stages transparent way. The examples chosen refer to an analysis of the conditions of survival or breakdown of democratic systems in the inter-war period in Europe.


Book
01 Nov 1994
TL;DR: Cohen as mentioned in this paper argued that structural conditions in Latin American countries did not necessarily preclude the implementation of social and economic reforms within a democratic framework, and argued that what thwarted democratic reforms in Latin America was a classic case of "prisoner's dilemma".
Abstract: Latin American democracies of the 1960s and 1970s, most theories hold, collapsed because they had become incompatible with the structural requirements of capitalist development. In this application of game theory to political phenomena, Cohen argues that structural conditions in Latin American countries did not necessarily preclude the implementation of social and economic reforms within a democratic framework. Focusing on the experiences of Chile and Brazil, Cohen argues that what thwarted democratic reforms in Latin America was a classic case of "prisoner's dilemma". Moderates on the Left and the Right knew the benefits of coming to a mutual agreement of socioeconomic reforms. Yet each feared that, if it co-operated, the other side could gain by colluding with the radicals. Unwilling to take this risk, moderate groups in both countries splintered and joined the extremists. The resulting disorder opened the way for military control. Cohen further argues that, in general, structural explanations of political phenomena are inherantly flawed; they incorrectly assume that beliefs, preferences and actions are caused by social, political and economic structures. One cannot explain political outcomes, Cohen argues, without treating beliefs and preferences as partly independent from structures, and as having a causal force in their own right.

Posted Content
01 Jan 1994
TL;DR: The concept of transaction costs are the costs of measuring what is being exchanged and enforcing agreements over time as mentioned in this paper, and they are all the costs involved in human interaction over time in the larger context of societal evolution.
Abstract: An economic definition of transaction costs are the costs of measuring what is being exchanged and enforcing agreements. In the larger context of societal evolution they are all the costs involved in human interaction over time. It is this larger context that I wish to explore in this essay. The concept is a close kin to the notion of social capital advanced by James Coleman (1990) and applied imaginatively to studying the differential patterns of Italian regional development by Robert Putnam in Making Democracy Work (1993). This essay, therefore, is a study in economic history which focuses on the costs of human coordination and cooperation through time which I regard as the key dilemma of societies past, present and future.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the "cultural dilemma" that women managers present from organizational, managerial and personal perspectives, and suggest that women can assist their situation by altering their mode of operation from a "victim" mentality to a "power" mentality.
Abstract: There is growing evidence in Australia that cultural factors are the final impediment to women′s progress into senior management. Examines the “cultural dilemma” that women managers present from organizational, managerial and personal perspectives. It is felt that women can assist their situation by altering their mode of operation from a “victim” mentality to one of a “power” mentality: by making up their minds whether they want to “share” power or get the male managerial culture to “yield” power; by making a concerted effort to close the nexus on the economic front; by educating chief executive officers as to imperative for cultural change; and by both using and supporting various government agencies and Equal Employment Opportunity Officers.