Topic
Dilemma
About: Dilemma is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 16202 publications have been published within this topic receiving 250251 citations. The topic is also known as: Dilemna.
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TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that relative gains do impede cooperation in the two-actor case and provide an important justification for treating international anarchy as a prisoner's dilemma problem; but if the initial absolute gains situation is not a prisoner' dilemma, relative gains seeking is much less consequential.
Abstract: Many political situations involve competitions where winning is more important than doing well. In international politics, this relative gains problem is widely argued to be a major impediment to cooperation under anarchy. After discussing why states might seek relative gains, I demonstrate that the hypothesis holds very different implications from those usually presumed. Relative gains do impede cooperation in the two-actor case and provide an important justification for treating international anarchy as a prisoner's dilemma problem; but if the initial absolute gains situation is not a prisoner's dilemma, relative gains seeking is much less consequential. Its significance is even more attenuated with more than two competitors. Relative gains cannot prop up the realist critique of international cooperation theory, but may affect the pattern of cooperation when a small number of states are the most central international actors.
402 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the implicit similarities between entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationships and the Prisoner's Dilemma frame-work and use this paradigm to develop a conceptual model of entrepreneurs' and venture capitalists' decisions to cooperate.
Abstract: New business startups with venture capital backing depend on mutual cooperation between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, but little is known about what makes these relationships work. The present article considers the implicit similarities between entrepreneur-venture capitalist relationships and the Prisoner's Dilemma frame-work. using this paradigm to develop a conceptual model of entrepreneurs' and venture capitalists' decisions to cooperate. The model is used to generate a number of testable propositions concerning long-term cooperation between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Implications of the model for researchers, entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists are discussed, and the paper concludes by examining Implications of the entrepreneur-venture capitalist context for the traditional Prisoner's Dilemma framework.
401 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the economic approach to Bargaining and the economic approaches to bargaining have been discussed in the context of coalitional research, including simple games, prisoner's dilemma, public goods, and resource dilemma.
Abstract: CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 184 BARGAINING 185 The Economic Approach to Bargaining 185 Ultimatum Bargaining 185 Disagreements 186 COALITION FORMATION 187 Simple Games 188 Types of Coalition Theories 188 Critique of Coalition Research ........ ........ 189 SOCIAL DILEMMAS 190 Prisoner's Dilemma 191 Public Goods 192 Resource Dilemmas 195 Other Factors in Cooperation 197 Intergroup Relations 198 CRITIQUE OF MIXED-MOTIVE RESEARCH 199 SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS 200 A Final Comment 200
398 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an assessment of naturalistic research in the context of philosophy and the human sciences in the nineteenth century, and against the trend: Blumer's critique of quantitative method.
Abstract: 1. Philosophy and the human sciences in the nineteenth century 2. Pragmatism 3. Chicago sociology 4. Case study versus statistics: the rise of sociological positivism 5. Against the trend: Blumer's critique of quantitative method 6. Blumer's concept of science 7. Blumer's alternative: naturalistic research 8. An assessment of naturalistic research.
384 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the problem of collective action to produce a group collective good is analyzed as the game of Individual vs. Collective and then as an n-person game to show that, under the constraints of Mancur Olson's analysis, it is an nprisoners' dilemma in the cases of latent and intermediate groups.
Abstract: The problem of collective action to produce a group collective good is analyzed as the game of Individual vs. Collective and then as an n-person game to show that, under the constraints of Mancur Olson's analysis, it is an n-prisoners' dilemma in the cases of latent and intermediate groups. The usual analysis according to which noncooperation is considered the rational strategy for classical 2-prisoners' dilemma is logically similar to Olson's analysis, which suggests that rational members of a latent group should not contribute toward the purchase of the group collective good. However, in the game analysis it is clear that the latent and intermediate groups are not logically different, but rather are distinguishable only statistically. Some prisoners' dilemma experimental results are used to suggest how the difference might arise and how the vast prisoners' dilemma literature can be related to the problem of collective action.
The game of collective action is then analyzed not from the view of strategies but of outcomes. There is presented a theorem which states that the outcome in which all player-members of a group pay and all benefit is a Condorcet choice from the set of realizable outcomes for the game. Hence the cooperative outcome in such a game would prevail in election against all other outcomes.
375 citations