Dilemma

About: Dilemma is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 16202 publications have been published within this topic receiving 250251 citations. The topic is also known as: Dilemna.

Formal Models of Dilemmas in Social Decision-Making

Abstract: : Social dilemmas occur whenever each individual is better off choosing an anti-social course of action than a pro-social one, yet all individuals would be better off if all were to choose the pro-social course than if all were to choose the anti-social course. Interest in social dilemmas has increased because problems such as overpopulation, pollution, and selfish use of energy appear to be the result of such dilemmas. A simple game has been developed according to the principle that benefit for anti-social behavior accrues directly to the individual whereas loss is spread out among all the players. Such a game results in a true social dilemma -- one which becomes worse the more players there are. The present paper discusses the dilemma.

The prisoner's dilemma and dynamical systems associated to non-cooperative games1

Abstract: A new way of looking at repeated games is introduced which incorporates a bounded memory and rationality. In these terms, a resolution of the prisoner's dilemma is given. THE GOAL HERE is to give a natural way of introducing dynamics into game theory, or at least for non-cooperative games. Perhaps the main idea in this treatment of dynamics is the way the past is taken into account. We suppose for both mathematical and model theoretic considerations that the agents only keep some kind of summary or average of the past outcomes (or payoffs) in their memory. Decisions are based on this summary. This kind of modeling reflects the fact that there exist substantive bounds to the storing and organizing of information. We give an axiomatization of bounded memory and rationality, with both institutions and people in mind. On the other hand, the hypothesis used in this treatment leads to a tractable mathematics. Differential equations on function spaces which contain little geometry are replaced by a dynamics on a finite dimensional space. And yet dynamics takes the past into account as a kind of substitute for the theory of delay equations. The perspective in this paper is that of no finite horizon and no discounting of the future. There is always a tomorrow in our plans, and it is as important as today. Also there is a history, a beginning of history, but no end. Decisions are based on the effect of past actions of agents, not on promises or binding agreements. However communication is certainly not precluded. Solutions in our games are asymptotic solutions. To be important for us, they must meet the criteria of stability. This criterion is well-defined by virtue of the dynamical foundations of the models. The first section deals with an example, the repeated prisoner's dilemma, in the language of an arms race. Here a class of strategies, "good strategies," is given where the solution is Pareto optimal, stable, and a Nash equilibrium. Thus at least asymptotically, we have a rather robust resolution of the prisoner's dilemma. We show how good strategies with optimal solutions might bifurcate into strategies with the worst solutions.

What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary? Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action

Abstract: Peasant upheavals are studied from the perspective offered by the selective incentives solution to Olson's collective action problem. This article presents much evidence from three different forms of peasant struggles—everyday forms of peasant resistance, unorganized rural movements, and organized peasant rebellions—that demonstrates the widespread existence of selective incentives. Questions about the causes and consequences of selective incentives are then examined. First, what are the conditions under which peasant struggles emphasize material selective incentives rather than nonmaterial altruistic appeals? The level of selective incentives in any peasant upheaval is a function of demand and supply considerations. Peasants demand selective incentives. The suppliers include one or more dissident peasant organizations, the authorities, and the allies of both. A political struggle ensues as the suppliers compete and attempt to monopolize the market. Second, what are the conditions under which the pursuit of material self-interest hurts rather than helps the peasantry's collective cause? Selective incentives supplemented by ideology can be effective; selective incentives alone are counterproductive.These questions and answers lead to the conclusion that the selective incentives solution reveals much more about peasant upheavals than simply that peasants will often be concerned with their own material self-interest. It is therefore important to study the following three aspects of peasant collective action: the dilemma peasants face, or how peasant resistance is in the interest of all peasants but in the self-interest of none; the paradox peasants face, or that rational peasants do solve their dilemma (for example, with selective incentives) and participate in collective action; and the irony peasants face, or that self-interest is both at the root of their dilemma and at the foundation of a solution to their paradox.

One best way? : trajectories and industrial models of the world's automobile producers

Abstract: PART I. ONLY ONE MODEL IN JAPAN? PART II. THREE DISTINCT TRAJECTORIES AT NORTH AMERICA'S BIG THREE PART III. EUROPE'S DILEMMA: THE ORIGINAL CONDITIONS OF INDUSTRIAL MODEL'S VIABILITY