Showing papers on "Directive published in 1981"

Supervision of Instruction: A Developmental Approach

Abstract: Each part ends with 'Conclusion,' and each chapter concludes with 'Exercises,' 'References,' and 'Suggested Readings.' I.INTRODUCTION. 1.Supervision for Successful Schools. Supervisory Glue as a Metaphor for Success. Who Is Responsible for Supervision? Organization of This Book. The Agony of Thought and Feeling. II.KNOWLEDGE. 2.The Norm: Why Schools Are as They Are. The Work Environment or Culture of Schools. The Legacy of the One-Room Schoolhouse. Blaming the Victim and Structural Strain. To Qualify, Summarize, and Propose. 3.The Exception: What Schools Can Be. Background to School Effectiveness Studies. Early Effective School Research. More Recent Effective School Research. Should All Schools Apply Effective Schools Research? The 'How' of Effective Schools. A Cause Beyond Oneself. What to Do with Successful Schools Research: Some Propositions. 4.Adult and Teacher Development within the Context of the School: Clues for Supervisory Practice. Adults as Learners. Adult and Teacher Development. Developmental Theories of Motivation. Development: Ebb and Flow. Considering Teacher Development within the Context of the School. Influences on Teacher Development. Propositions. 5.Reflections on Schools, Teaching, and Supervision. Effective Teaching Research: A Historical Perspective. Cautions Concerning Effective Teaching Research. The Coast of Britain. Effective and Good Schools: The Same? Instructional Improvement and Effective Teaching. Beliefs about Education. Supervision Beliefs. Supervisory Platform as Related to Educational Philosophy. Checking Your Own Educational Philosophy and Supervisory Beliefs. What Does Your Belief Mean in Terms of Supervisor and Teacher Responsibility? The Authors Supervisory Platform. Summary, Conclusions, and Propositions. III.INTERPERSONAL SKILLS. 6.Supervisory Behavior Continuum: Know Thyself. Outcomes of Conference. Your Own Interpersonal Behavior Approach. Valid Assessment of Self. Johari Window. Cognitive Dissonance. Summary, Conclusions, and Preview. 7.Developmental Supervision: An Introduction. Case Study One. Case Study Two. Case Study Three. Case Study Four. Developmental Supervision. Summary and a Look Ahead. 8.Directive Control Behaviors. Directive Control Behaviors with Individuals. Directive Control Behaviors with Groups. A History of Overreliance on Control. Issues in Directive Control. When to Use Directive Control Behaviors. Moving From Directive Control toward Directive Informational Behaviors. 9.Directive Informational Behaviors. Directive Informational Behaviors with Individuals. Directive Informational Behaviors with Groups. Issues in the Directive Informational Approach. When to Use Directive Informational Behaviors. Moving from Directive Informational toward Collaborative Behaviors. 10.Collaborative Behaviors. Collaborative Behaviors with Individuals.

European communities directive relating to the quality of water intended for human consumption

Abstract: A draft directive relating to the quality of water for human consumption was submitted on July 22, 1975, to the Council of Ministers of the European Communities. The submission of this proposition was requested by the Council of Ministers in the Action Programme of the European Communities on the environment, approved by them on November 22, 1973. The objective was the protection of public health by establishing standards to be respected by the Member States. This directive was adopted by the Council of Ministers of the European Communities on June 30, 1980. This report deals with technical aspects of this directive and gives some additional comments.

Do 2½‐year‐olds hint? A study of directive forms in the speech of 2½‐year‐old children to adults∗

Abstract: Transcripts of eleven 2½‐year‐olds’ speech to adults were found to include hints and question directives, the least coercive directive forms in adult speech according to Ervin‐Tripp (1976). However, while these forms occurred, whether the children used them so that they functioned to express politeness is questioned, using several criteria suggested by Ervin‐Tripp (1977). These included the following: 1. Most of the directives contained some reference to a desired action or object. 2. Many of the directives were identifications of problem situations in which adult help was needed, closely resembling statements of need in the social context of adult‐child interaction. 3. Several sentence frames were used frequently enough that they appeared to be routines. In addition, children rarely dropped the issue when adults failed to comply with their hints and question directives. Analyses of sequences of directive forms showed that children were somewhat more likely to harden than to soften the form, but that repe...

Estimating the Information Value of Immediate Disclosure of the FOMC Policy Directive

Abstract: This paper studies the information value of immediate disclosure of the FOMC policy directive. The value of disclosure is measured by its ability to reduce investors' expected uncertainty about futures interest rates where uncertainty is defined as the conditional variance of forecast errors. Analytical relationships between new information and the conditional variance of forecast errors are developed and the relation of the "uncertaintyreducing" value of information to its social value, as defined in recent literature, is indicated. In the empirical work, forward interest rates are treated as reflecting market expectations conditioned on existing information. The empirical tests indicate that information in the undisclosed, prevailing policy directives (1974-79) were able to make only a very marginal improvement in the predictive accuracy of forecasts relying only on the forward rates. Thus, the hypothesis that immediate disclosure has a significant information value to market participants is not supported. IT IS VERY COMMON in public policymaking to assume that disclosing policy intentions which relate to intervention into money, bond, or foreign exchange markets would have undesirable destabilizing effects on these markets. The Federal Open Market Committee recently expressed this view in its appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn a federal district court ruling that the Committee was obliged under the Freedom of Information Act to disclose immediately the prevailing policy directive.1 The destabilizing argument has also been used by some to question the practice of the weekly release of the monetary statistics by the Federal Reserve.2 Presumably reflecting a similar view, intervention in foreign exchange markets by the Federal Reserve and other central banks is generally not disclosed to the public either. Those who have advocated (immediate) * Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System. Helpful comments on an earlier draft by William Conrad, William Melton, Kenneth Kopecky, Robert Shiller, Edward J. Kane and Mark Rubinstein are gratefully acknowledged. Michael Grupe provided help with certain parts of the empirical work. The research assistance of Dan Uslander and Andy Weddig is also appreciated. The views expressed here reflect those of the author and not necessarily others associated with the Federal Reserve. 1 The policy directive gives instructions to the System's account manager for the conduct of open market operations which constitute the FOMC's short-run monetary policy objectives. Currently, the policy directive is disclosed only after a new directive becomes effective. A lower court initially ruled that the directive was subject to the Freedom of Information Act without considering the FOMC's substantive arguments against disclosure. The Supreme Court sent the case back to the lower court to consider the substantive arguments. The lower court ruled against disclosure, referring to a lack of evidence by the plaintiff that immediate disclosure would not harm the Federal Reserve's monetary function or the government's commercial interest in profitably trading government securities. 2 Conrad [2] found no evidence of over-reaction in the Treasury bill market to the weekly release of the monetary statistics. However, a proposal to stop or alter the weekly release procedure is under consideration by the Federal Reserve.