Topic
Disjunctivism
About: Disjunctivism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 268 publications have been published within this topic receiving 7009 citations.
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TL;DR: McDowell as discussed by the authors argues that modern philosophy finds it difficult to give a satisfactory picture of the place of minds in the world, and proposes to return to a pre-modern conception of nature but retaining the intellectual advance of modernity that has mistakenly been viewed as dislodging it.
Abstract: Modern philosophy finds it difficult to give a satisfactory picture of the place of minds in the world. In "Mind and World", based on the 1991 John Locke Lectures, John McDowell offers his diagnosis of this difficulty and points to a cure. He illustrates a major problem of modern philosophy - the insidious persistence of dualism - in his discussion of empirical thought. Much as we would like to conceive empirical thought as rationally grounded in experience, pitfalls await anyone who tries to articulate this position, and McDowell exposes these traps by exploiting the work of contemporary philosophers from Wilfrid Sellars to Donald Davidson. These difficulties, he contends, reflect an understandable - but surmountable - failure to see how we might integrate what Sellars calls "the logical space of reasons" into the natural world. What underlies this impasse is a conception of nature that has certain attractions for the modern age, a conception that McDowell proposes to put aside, thus circumventing these philosophical difficulties. By returning to a pre-modern conception of nature but retaining the intellectual advance of modernity that has mistakenly been viewed as dislodging it, he makes room for a fully satisfying conception of experience as a rational openness to independent reality. This approach also overcomes other obstacles that impede a generally satisfying understanding of how we are placed in the world.
1,857 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world.
Abstract: A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I argue that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories. In the first part of the paper I explore the form of explanation that an intentional theory of perception can offer of this fact, and I contrast this with an alternative picture labelled naive realism which can also accommodate and explain the fact of transparency. In the second part of the paper I explore the connection between sensory experience and sensory imagining, arguing that various features of sensory imagining support the hypothesis that in visualising a tree one imagines seeing a tree. In the final part of the paper I argue that the conclusion concerning sensory imagination presents an explanatory challenge for intentional theories of perception which parallels the challenge to sense-datum theories.
518 citations
Book•
04 Feb 2011
TL;DR: Malkovich as mentioned in this paper argued that the strong content view of the rich content view is not the right view for most of the human experience, and he showed that the content view can be found in many aspects of human experience.
Abstract: Introduction: Seeing John Malkovich The Content View Why does it matter whether the Rich Content View is true? How can we decide whether the Rich Content View is true? Part I: Contents Chapter 1: Experiences 1.1 States of seeing and phenomenal states 1.2 Visual perceptual experiences Chapter 2: The Content View 2.1 Contents as accuracy conditions 2.2 The Argument from Accuracy 2.3 A flaw in the Argument from Accuracy 2.4 The Argument from Appearing 2.5 Two objections from 'looks', 'appears' and their cognates 2.6 The significance of the Content View Chapter 3: How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience? 3.1 Introspection 3.2 Naturalistic theories of content 3.3 The method of phenomenal contrast Part II: Properties Chapter 4: Kinds 4.1 The examples 4.2 The premises 4.3 Content externalism Chapter 5: Causation 5.1 The Causal Thesis 5.2 Michotte's results 5.3 Unity in experience 5.4 Non-causal contents 5.5 Raw feels 5.6 Non-sensory experiences Part III: Objects Chapter 6: The Role of Objects in the Contents of Experience 6.1 Strong and Weak Veridicality 6.2 The contents of states of seeing 6.3 The contents of phenomenal states 6.4 Phenomenal states: Internalism vs. Pure Disjunctivism 6.5 Why Internalism? Chapter 7: Subject and Object in the Contents of Experience 7.1 Subject-independence and Perspectival Connectedness 7.2 The Good and the Odd 7.3 Complex contents 7.4 Objections and replies Chapter 8: The Strong Content View revisited
387 citations
TL;DR: The disjunctive theory of perception claims that we should understand statements about how things appear to a perceiver to be equivalent to statements of a disjunction that either one is perceiving such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination).
Abstract: The disjunctive theory of perception claims that we should understand statements about how things appear to a perceiver to be equivalent to statements of a disjunction that either one is perceiving such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination); and that such statements are not to be viewed as introducing a report of a distinctive mental event or state common to these various disjoint situations. When Michael Hinton first introduced the idea, he suggested that the burden of proof or disproof lay with his opponent, that what was needed was to show that our talk of how things look or appear to one to be introduces more than what he later came to call perceptionillusion disjunctions:
374 citations
Book•
01 Jan 2002
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present two arguments against direct realism -one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination, and they propose a direct realism alternative to direct realism based on hallucination.
Abstract: Offers two arguments against direct realism - one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination.
349 citations