Doctrine

About: Doctrine is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 21901 publications have been published within this topic receiving 204282 citations.

The contemporary law of superior responsibility

Abstract: In the bloody aftermath of World War I it became apparent that those in military or civilian authority provided a cornerstone for the good conduct of those under their command, and hence should carry some liability for their actions. A Commission established by the allies after World War I to assess the responsibility of German officers rightly assumed that a combination of power to intervene, knowledge of crimes and subsequent failure to act should render those concerned liable for the crimes of their subordinates. Despite United States and Japanese dissent, die latter arguing that highranking officials could not be held personally accountable under international law in accordance with the abstention theory of responsibility, trials instituted at the German Supreme Court in Leipzig recognized the existence of concrete duties pertaining to military commanders. Undoubtedly, two precursors to the Leipzig proceedings, the Hague Conventions IV (1907) and X (1907) created affirmative command duties in relation to the conduct of subordinate persons, establishing the doctrine of “command responsibility.”

Responsible Government and Ministerial Responsibility: Every Reform Is Its Own Problem

Abstract: The article defends the classical version of ministerial responsibility against recent initiatives to implement a form of direct accountability for administrators. Constitutional convention and ministerial resignations from active cabinets in the Canadian federal government and in Britain are described: in neither country do ministers resign for maladministration by their officials, nor does doctrine suggest they should. Rather, the pattern of resignations indicates the importance of collective responsibility, as well as the relative unimportance of ministerial misbehaviour. The conclusion sets out the negative implications for democratic government of substituting a kind of direct “accountability” of officials, extracted in political forums, for the responsibility of ministers.

Australia's regional security

Abstract: Australia's regional security doctrine - old assumptions, new challenges, Greg Fry. Part 1 General perspectives: a general response, J.D.B. Miller of voices, visions and texts, Nancy Viviani "the shock of the new" and the habits of the past, Richard Leaver multidimensional security - a contribution to the conceptual debate, Joanne Crawford. Part 2 The regional security environment: the Southeast Asia dimension, David Jenkins the regional security environment - South Pacific, Edward Wolfers. Part 3 The policy response: the military dimensions of Australia's regional security posture, Graeme Cheeseman Australia's regional security - old wine in new bottles, Joseph Camilleri. Part 4 Regional security doctrine: comprehensive engagement and Australia's regional security interests in Southeast Asia, Andrew MacIntyre constructive commitment with the South Pacific - Monroe Doctrine or new partnership?, Greg Fry. Part 5 Ministerial response, Gareth Evans. Part 6 Concluding reflections, Hugh Collins.

Getting Gerasimov Right

Abstract: On 26 February 2013, chief of the Russian General Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov published "The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations" in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier (VPK) (Military-Industrial Courier). In this article, Gerasimov lays out his perspective-and the prevalent view in Russian security circles-of the recent past, present, and expected future of warfare. This article was published about a year before the Maidan protests that set in motion the events leading to the eventual annexation of Crimea and Russian-sponsored insurrection in eastern Ukraine.1 The chain of events that followed the Maidan protests could in no way be foreseen by Gerasimov, but his article is often cited in the West as "Gerasimov's Doctrine" for the way Russian forces conducted its operations.In this vein of Western thinking, Gerasimov's article is often interpreted as proposing a new Russian way of warfare that blends conventional and unconventional warfare with aspects of national power, often referred to as "hybrid warfare." This article will attempt to put Gerasimov's article, which was written for a Russian audience, in context for U.S. readers to explain some allusions that are sometimes missed or misunderstood.The Russian Chief of General StaffFor background, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff is often equated with the Russian General Staff, but this is a great understatement of the Russian General Staff's importance. The Russian chief of the General Staff has far more authority than any flag grade officer in the U.S. military. He is responsible for long-term planning duties equivalent to both the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense and the unified combatant commanders. In addition, he has oversight of strategic transportation equivalent to that of U.S. Transportation Command, force doctrinal and capabilities development, and equipment procurement for all branches of the Ministry of Defense. He even has an inspector-general-like function for ensuring that General Staff standards and regulations are adhered to.Also, although the chief of the General Staff does not have operational control of the force, he does have day-to-day control (in peacetime) of the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye (Main Intelligence Directorate, commonly known as GRU), which is a directorate of the General Staff, and several strategic assets including the Russian airborne, which functions as a strategic reserve.In the hierarchy of the Russian government, there are uniformed officers serving in positions technically above the chief of the General Staff, but arguably none of these assignments are as prestigious.Elaboration on Strategic ForesightIn general, it is a duty of the Russian general staff to use foresight to develop the theory and practice of future war. This is the context in which Gerasimov's article is written. The use of the term "foresight" in the article's title is not coincidental, and the term has a specific military definition in the Russian lexicon:Foresight (military) is the process of cognition regarding possible changes in military affairs, the determination of the perspectives of its future development. The basis of the science of foresight is knowledge of the objective laws of war, the dialectical-materialist analysis of events transpiring in a given concrete-historical context.2In Russian military thought, foresight is directly linked to military science, with military science being the science of future war.3The General Staff takes a rather academic approach to the endeavor of military science, including the use of a peer-review-like process that functions by opening debates on ideas through the publication of articles in various outlets, including professional journals. There are several often-used outlets for the military's academic discussion and debate, most notably the journal Voyennaya Mysl (VM) (Military Thought), which is published by the General Staff. …