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Showing papers on "East Asia published in 1978"


BookDOI
31 Jan 1978

57 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Among the numerous border and territorial disputes between China and its neighbors, the Paracel-Spratly case is the most serious to date as mentioned in this paper, which concerns the ownership of some 200 midocean islets in the South China Sea, most of which are coral outcroppings without much value in themselves.
Abstract: Among the numerous border and territorial disputes between China and its neighbors, the Paracel‐Spratly case is the most serious to date. Primarily, the dispute concerns the ownership of some 200 midocean islets in the South China Sea, most of which are coral outcroppings without much value in themselves. But the issue is complicated by the expectation that the owner(s) will, be entitled to whatever natural resources may be developed from the offshore waters of the islets. Since the two‐day clash of arms between China and the former Republic of Vietnam (South) in January 1974, the Paracels have been firmly in Chinese control, while the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam are each holding a part of the Spratlies. The sea lane between the two archipelagoes is the only major route that links East Asia with Africa and Europe, a fact that accounts for the deep interest of the major powers in the South China Sea. Since the fall of Saigon to Hanoi in April 1975, China has to argue the same issue against it...

33 citations




01 Jul 1978

17 citations



Book ChapterDOI
04 Nov 1978

14 citations




Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the case of China, U.S. policy makers, according to conventional wisdom, withdrew commitments to Chiang Kai-shek because, in their view, China had become only a peripheral concern of the United States.
Abstract: AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORIANS have tended to assay the nation's interests in two categories: vital, or those interests sufficiently important to warrant support with military power; and peripheral, or those interests in support of which the United States could not contemplate using military force. Scholars who have evaluated American policy in Eastern Asia in the late 1940s have generally utilized these same two categories and have concluded that U.S. officials placed China, Taiwan, and Korea in the latter category, though Korea obviously creates something of a problem.' In the case of China, U.S. policy makers, according to conventional wisdom, withdrew commitments to Chiang Kai-shek because, in their view, China had become only a "peripheral" concern of the United States. Once the Generalissimo fled to Taiwan, however, public pressure forced policy makers, against their better judgment and counter to their perception of its value to the nation, to recommend defending the island. As for Korea, the




Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The U.S. defense commitments underlying the Mutual Defense Treaties with Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and the Philippines and the long-standing multilateral security arrangements comprising the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Australian-New Zealand-U.S., Tripartite agreement (ANZUS) have been subject to American domestic reappraisals as to their usefulness.
Abstract: FOR OVER A decade, American foreign policy towards the East Asian/Pacific region has been in a constant state of transition.1 With the advent of the post-Vietnam era, U.S. defense commitments underlying the Mutual Defense Treaties with Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and the Philippines and the long-standing multilateral security arrangements comprising the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Australian-New Zealand-U.S. Tripartite agreement (ANZUS) have been subject to American domestic reappraisals as to their usefulness and in one case (SEATO) have been discontinued. Currently, traditional Western military predominance in the Indian and Pacific Oceans is confronted with a growing Soviet and potential Chinese strategic presence. Until recently, America's "containment policy" in the Asian/ Pacific had been an expression of its overall interest in checking Communist military power. During the era of "detente," U.S. domestic preoccupations have precluded any Asian/Pacific policy geared to match Soviet or Chinese land and naval power now being deployed there. As one analyst recently observed, the United States is taking a calculated risk of selling to the American public and to our Asian/ Pacific allies the credibility of a "less ambitious and less expensive' U.S. military role in that area.2 Yet, what has occurred has been an

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The withdrawal decision by the Carter Administration represented both a challenge and an opportunity for South Korea to free itself from a perennial dependence on the American ally and to seek self-reliance as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: SOUTH KOREA WILL remember 1977 as the year when the process of American military disengagement from Korea began. President Carter's decision to withdraw all U.S. ground forces from Korea by 1982 confirmed what the South Korean government had already suspected for some time: that the Korean peninsula was gradually losing its military importance in the American global strategic thinking; and that South Korea's near-blind faith in the United States as a guarantor of its security should be radically reappraised. The withdrawal decision by the Carter Administration represented both a challenge and an opportunity for South Korea to free itself from a perennial dependence on the American ally and to seek selfreliance. As on many previous occasions, President Park Chung-hee managed to turn a foreign policy setback into a domestic political opportunity. In the aftermath of the "withdrawal shock," President Park was credited with having demonstrated a strong and confident leadership and having bargained forcefully and skillfully with the United States. The Park government found an additional rationale for the postponement of political liberalization in the presumed necessity of burying internal differences in order to overcome present adversity and to prepare for a self-reliant defense. In the meantime, the continuing expansion of the economy and growth in industrial capacity gave a measure of credence to the theme of self-reliance.

Book ChapterDOI
31 Jan 1978



01 May 1978
TL;DR: The course of the Chinese economy since 1949 has been characterised by marked cycles superimposed on a growth trend respectable but not outstanding by contemporary East Asian standards as discussed by the authors, and these economic cycles have been generated largely by political movements although these, in turn, have of course been influenced by economic circumstances.
Abstract: The course of the Chinese economy since 1949 has been characterised by marked cycles superimposed on a growth trend respectable but not outstanding by contemporary East Asian standards. These economic cycles have been generated largely by political movements although these, in turn, have of course been influenced by economic circumstances. The high technology projects which are becoming more significant in the modern sector of the Chinese economy require a predictable and orderly economic and political framework if the huge investments entailed are not to be wasted. Thus China can no longer afford cyclical upheavals every few years.



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The year 1977 was designated as the "year of readjustment" (wanch'ung uV hae) for the second consecutive time by Kim Il Sung of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: IN HIS NEW Year message, President Kim Il Sung of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced that the year 1977 had been designated as the "year of readjustment" (wanch'ung uV hae) for the second consecutive time. The main tasks of the year, he said, would be to ease "temporary strains" in the North Korean economy and to pave the way for a new long-term economic plan.' As it turned out, North Korea eagerly but vainly sought to "readjust" a crucial dimension of its foreign relations as well-namely, its relations with the United States.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors compare two or more Communist political systems and illuminate the nature and potentials of communism as a practical ideology, and find that there are significant variations not only in the intensity and nuances of their ideological pronouncements but also in the manner in which ideology guides their actual operations and policy outputs.
Abstract: COMMUNIST POLITICAL SYSTEMS share the common denominator of an unequivocal and officially sustained commitment to an explicitly articulated political ideology. Yet there are significant variations not only in the intensity and nuances of their ideological pronouncements but also in the manner in which ideology guides their actual operations and policy outputs. Hence a comparative study of two or more Communist political systems may both deepen our understanding of the units being compared and illuminate the nature and potentials of communism as practical ideology. The Communist systems of China and North Korea present themselves as ideal candidates for comparison for a number of reasons. First and foremost, China and Korea share a common cultural heritage. As members of the Sinitic cultural zone, their traditional cultural patterns were heavily influenced by Confucianism. Centuries of close interactions with its giant neighbor have left an indelible mark on Korean culture. Second, although markedly different in scale, the economies of the two countries were in a roughly comparable stage at the time of their respective Communist takeovers. Third, the two countries have developed singularly close ties with each other-ties "sealed in blood" thanks to the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Finally, they share not only a common racial bond but also a tenacious quest for autonomy and the categorical rejection of the concept of monolithicparticularly Moscow-centered and dominated-communism.




01 Jun 1978
TL;DR: In this paper, the US role in maintaining a stable environment in Northeast Asia is examined, in terms of new perspectives incorporating the relationship between strategic stability and political-economic stability, the role of US role and the relationship among the United States, Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.
Abstract: : This study examines, in terms of new perspectives incorporating the relationship between strategic stability and political-economic stability, the US role in maintaining a stable environment in Northeast Asia In addition to analysis of the Japan-Korea focal point, particular attention is given to the triangular set of relationships among the United States, Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China as they may be affected by changes in US policies and/or military postures in South Korea and the Northeast Asia region (Author)