Topic
Eauction
About: Eauction is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 1452 publications have been published within this topic receiving 50088 citations.
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TL;DR: Optimal auctions are derived for a wide class of auction design problems when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object.
Abstract: This paper considers the problem faced by a seller who has a single object to sell to one of several possible buyers, when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object. The seller's problem is to design an auction game which has a Nash equilibrium giving him the highest possible expected utility. Optimal auctions are derived in this paper for a wide class of auction design problems.
6,003 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a new general auction model was proposed, and the properties of affiliated random variables were investigated, and various theorems were presented in Section 4-8 and Section 9.
Abstract: : In Section 2, we review some important results of the received auction theory, introduce a new general auction model, and summarize the results of our analysis. Section 3 contains a formal statement of our model, and develops the properties of affiliated random variables. The various theorems are presented in Sections 4-8. In Section 9, we offer our views on the current state of auction theory. Following Section 9 is a technical appendix dealing with affiliated random variables.
3,857 citations
Posted Content•
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TL;DR: Hayek as mentioned in this paper argued that the problem of rational economic order is determined by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.
Abstract: ONE PARTY TO AN EXCHANGE often knows something relevant to the transaction that the other party does not know. Such asymmetries of information are pervasive in economic activity: for example, in the relationship between employer and employee when the employee's effort cannot be monitored perfectly; between the stockholders and the manager of a firm; between insurer and insured; between a regulated firm and the regulatory agency; between the supplier and the consumers of a public good; between a socialist firm and the central planner; or (as is the subject of this paper) between buyer and seller when the value of the item is uncertain. Forty years ago, F. A. Hayek criticized theories that purport to describe the price system but start from the assumption that individuals have symmetric information: The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate "given" resources-if "given" is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these "data." It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality. (Hayek 1945, p. 519)
2,518 citations
Patent•
19 Mar 1997
TL;DR: In this paper, a system and method for conducting a multi-person interactive auction, in a variety of formats, without using a human auctioneer to conduct the auction is presented.
Abstract: A system and method for conducting a multi-person, interactive auction, in a variety of formats, without using a human auctioneer to conduct the auction. The system is preferably implemented in software. The system allows a group of bidders to interactively place bids over a computer or communications network. Those bids are recorded by the system and the bidders are updated with the current auction status information. When appropriate, the system closes the auction from further bidding and notifies the winning bidders and losers as to the auction outcome.
1,170 citations
Book•
28 Mar 2004TL;DR: A non-technical introduction to auction theory and its practical application in auction design, including many examples, is given in this article, which can be used for a graduate course on auction theory or - by picking selectively - an advanced undergraduate or MBA course on auctions and auction design.
Abstract: This book is a non-technical introduction to auction theory; its practical application in auction design (including many examples); and its uses in other parts of economics. It can be used for a graduate course on auction theory, or - by picking selectively - an advanced undergraduate or MBA course on auctions and auction design. Part A introduces the basic theory. Part B shows how modern auction-theoretic tools illuminate a range of mainstream economic questions that are superficially unconnected with auctions. Part C discusses practical auction design. Part D describes the one-hundred-billion dollar 3G mobile-phone license auctions. None of the writing is technical, except in the Appendices. The material was presented as the inaugural (2003) Toulouse Lectures in Economics and is forthcoming at Princeton University Press. This document contains the Contents, Preface and Introduction to the book. A draft of the FULL BOOK is available.
708 citations