Showing papers on "Economic Justice published in 1974"

Fairness and Envy

Abstract: Standard neoclassical economic analysis is typically concerned with individual utility maximization In this paper we shall consider a problem of constrained social welfare maximization Our criterion of social welfare is "fairness," and we shall discuss how this may be maximized by a move from an initial allocation to a final fairer allocation, subject to the constraint that no one be made worse off by the move We think the goal of fairness maximization characterizes, albeit in a simplistic way, the goals pursued by "enlightened" governments in their redistributional policies We shall also discuss a concept of complete fairness and illustrate some of its weaknesses The fairness problem is ancient and dates back at least to classical Greece It has been treated recently by mathematicians who typically are concerned with the existence of a "fair division" of a nonuniform object among n persons; that is, a division with the property that each party thinks he is getting at least t/nth of the value of the object (See, for example, Lester Dubins and Edwin Spanier, Harold Kuhn, and Hugo Steinhaus) This is not the approach we will take, since we will assume a world of homogeneous infinitely divisible goods in which the mathematical fair division problem becomes trivial The concept of fairness has also been treated extensively by philosophers The most recent philosophical approach is that of John Rawls, who argues at length for a social contract theory of justice: a society which maximizes the welfare of its worst off members is most just and that is the sort of society people will, from an initial position of ignorance about their endowments and interests, contract to enter Rawls' approach has been extended to a theory of taxation by Edmund Phelps Again, Rawlsian fairness, or "justice," is not the fairness we are interested in; we do not assume a precontractual state of ignorance, we do assume that knowledge of wealth and tastes is given In fact, knowledge about one's own and others' bundles of goods is crucial in our discussion What then is our notion of fairness? It is fairness in the sense of non-envy A completely fair social state is one in which no citizen would prefer what another has to what he himself has; a relatively fair social state is one in which few citizens would prefer what others have to what they themselves have; a totally unfair state is one in which every citizen finds his position to be inferior to that of everyone else This concept of fairness is appealing because it only depends, like other economic concepts, on individual tastes and endowments Fairness in the non-envy sense has been discussed in several recent papers by economists Serge Christophe Kolm considers allocative fairness, and shows that there exist allocations which are both completely fair and efficient' David Schmeidler and Karl Vind define fair trades as

Reply to Alexander and Musgrave

Abstract: I. The notion of a well-ordered society, 633. — II. The role of the original position, 637. — III. The first pair-wise comparison: two principles of justice vs. the principle of utility, 639. — IV. Alexander on the conflation problem: choice of parameter presupposes underlying conception, 643. — V. Second pair-wise comparison: interpretation of maximin, and risk aversion as a consequence, not as an assumption, 646. — VI. The contract condition and the strains of commitment, 650. — VII. Musgrave on leisure trade-off: maximin not merely second best, 653.

A Show of Justice: Racial 'Amalgamation' in Nineteenth Century New Zealand

Abstract: First published in 1974, A Show of Justice remains the essential and definitive text on official policies towards the Maori people in the nineteenth century. Professor Ward shows how an understanding of the past explains why Maori today, formally equal under the law, continue having to demand rights assured under the Treaty of Waitangi and why major issues have yet to be recognised and addressed. A Show of Justice also has a glossary of Maori terms, a full index and notes.

Social Equity, Justice, and the Equitable Administrator

Abstract: It is now necessary for the proponents of social equity to develop a succinct definition of the term. It is not enough to assume that the public administrator will intuitively know what social equity means and realize that the cause is just. But the notion of social equity demands greater substantive ethical content-more than honorable, but vague, admonitions for a more humane public administration. Thus, social equity has not received the serious attention the idea merits from

Education, Moral Development and Faith

Abstract: The Natural Law perspective holds that there are universal principles of justice acknowledged everywhere. Justice is a continuing preoccupation of the child. The development of the notion of justice in children has been found to follow six stages, the order of which is constant across different societies. The different stages have been found to be associated with different kinds of behaviour in moral situations. Moral education must be based upon an understanding of this development. There is evidence that the development of religious faith follows a parallel sequence of stages and it is important to understand the relationship between the two. 1An edited version of an address to the National Catholic Education Association, Cleveland, April 18, 1974

A Philosophical Justification For Children's Rights

Abstract: The author discusses the status of children's rights according to various philosophical conceptions of social justice. He describes three traditional paternalist views of children and concludes that, on the whole, they are discouraging in their implications for children. After analyzing some of the difficulties of previous philosophical attempts to create systems of justice ensuring children's rights, Worsfold sets forth three criteria which any adequate justification for children's rights must fulfill. He argues that these criteria are best met within the theory of justice proposed by John Rawls which, while still paternalistic, presents a more adequate framework for securing children's rights to fair treatment.

Humanity before Justice

Abstract: Advocates of the welfare state often appeal to social justice as the moral basis of their claim that distribution of scarce resources ought to be made in proportion to the needs of potential recipients, at least to a certain minimum level of satisfaction. More generally, it is commonly assumed that need is certainly one and perhaps the main factor which ought to determine any just distribution of benefits and burdens. Thus, when the Labour Government abolished medical prescription charges under the National Health Service in 1964 the then Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, defended this step in the House of Commons by saying that it was ‘unjust’ to put such ‘burdens on the old and sick’ and he went on to cite the principle ‘from each according to his means, to each according to his needs’.

The effect of labeling upon youths in the juvenile justice system: a review of the evidence

Abstract: AUTHOR'S NOTE: This essay is drawn from work prepared for the Institute of Judicial Administration American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Standards Project. The Project is supported by funds from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the American Bar Endowment, the Vincent Astor Foundation and the Herman Goldman Foundation. The latter, in particular, provided support for social science input into the Project.

Punishment as retribution

Abstract: The article is concerned with punishment as retribution. A number of reasonable assumptions concerning the punishment of criminals as well as the punishment of innocent individuals are made. These assumptions are consistent and from them a comprehensive ‘justice map’ is drawn. Several implications concerning justice are derived and there is an analysis as to where slack in the pursuit of justice is most likely to occur. It is then shown that all of the assumptions and consequently all the results can be derived from a simple utility maximization model. Throughout the paper, behavior consistent with the concept of retribution is presented and there is some comparison to other theories of punishment. More generally, the article can be seen as a building of a social welfare function. In contrast to other work on social welfare functions which begin with just methods of aggregating preferences, this article begins with just preferences.

Defining and Measuring Structural Variations in Interorganizational Arrangements

Abstract: 1 Committee for Economic Development, Reducing Crime and Assuring Justice (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1972), pp. 30-31. 2 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington, D.C.: Superintendent of Documents, 1967); J. L. McCausland, "Crime in the Suburbs," in Charles Haar (ed.), The End of Innocence: A Suburban Reader (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1972), pp. 61-64; Daniel L. Skoler and June M. Hetler, "Governmental Restructuring and Criminal Administration: The Challenge of Consolidation," in Crisis in Urban Government: A Symposium: Restructuring Metropolitan Area Government (Silver Spring, MD.. Thomas Jefferson Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 53-75.

Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the International Court of Justice

Abstract: The final preambular paragraph of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties affirms “that the rules of customary internationallaw will continue to govern questions not regulated by the provisions of the present Convention;” and Article 4 of the Convention, establishing the nonretroactivity of the Convention by providing that it “applies only totreaties which are concluded by States, after the entry into force of the present Convention with regard to such States,” stipulates that this nonretroactivity is “ [w]ithout prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present Convention to which treaties would be subject under international law independently of the Convention.”

Class Oppression: the Functions of Juvenile Justice

Abstract: Department of Youth Services (DYS), closed down the Lyman School for Boys, the oldest state institution for juvenile delinquents in the U. S. (founded in 1847). In the following months he went on to close down all the other large correctional institutions for delinquents (except for detention facilities for accused delinquents awaiting trial) . The local a.nd national press, and many professionals in the field, heralded the

The utilitarian contract: A generalization of Rawls' theory of justice

Abstract: In a series of major papers culminating in A Theory of Justice,1 John Rawls constructs an alternative to utilitarianism by developing a social contract theory of moral and political philosophy. Unfortunately, Rawls formulates the two basic principles upon which the theory rests in such a way as to restrict (unduly) the contract theory's applicability (see Section I). In this paper we present a more general discussion of the theory of justice that avoids the problems of Rawls' formulation and yet retains the important idea of justice as fairness and the contractarian approach (Section II). Later it is argued that this more general theory constitutes a bridge between the pure utilitarian theories and the social contract doctrines (Sections V and VI). The theory's advantages are demonstrated by applying it to a problem discussed by Rawls, intergenerational equity, and comparing the two solutions (Section III). Further comparisons are made and inferences drawn in the concluding three sections.

Great Expectations: The Search for Order in Bituminous Coal, 1890-1917

Abstract: C Arguing that the American bituminous coal industry suffered from "excessive competition," this study traces the industry's repeated failures to control output or prices, whether by various kinds of trade associations, mergers, or by attempts to secure government sanctions for cooperation. Although an over-zealous Department of Justice must bear some responsibility for the industry's "sick" condition, Professor Graebner concludes, the fundamental problem lay in the basic economic conditions in the industry. Between 1890 and 1917 the American bituminous coal in

The Quality in Pleasures

Abstract: Almost from the beginning, J. S. Mill's introduction of the 'quality in pleasures' was regarded as a forking of principle, as a clear case of inconsistency to be rejected without much further philosophy. Several writers recently have attempted to provide readings more in keeping with Mill's acumen.1 Whatever one does, it takes reconstruction on the site, for disaster seems to leap from the page. The suggestion I wish to make ties Mill's analysis of 'quality' judgments in chapter 2 of Utilitarianism to his now well-known Remarks on Bentham's Moral Philosophy2 and models the argument overall on analogy with his attempted reconciliation of justice and utility in the final chapter. It seems to me that one must appreciate that much of chapter 2 is written in placation; one finds there that the philosophy of utility is neither godless and unchristian nor unfeeling and impracticable. But Mill especially was reassuring reflective readers that there is nothing in this philosophy to damage their sense of human dignity, nothing to make pigs of them in principle. In doing this, he tried to speak as he thought men would when expressing their preferences among the sources of life's pleasure-a manoeuvre which he probably thought would blunt the 'inveterate dislike' he felt his principle faced. Unfortunately this representation is bent to his hedonism (really who has ever spoken of 'high and low quality pleasures'?) and it is grievously snared in the cliche of 'quality v. quantity'. Yet it seems to me that by none of this was Mill, either inadvertently or surreptitiously, surrendering the (quantitative) principle of utility. He was introducing an improvement into the calculation (not a new dimension) which corrects, he specifically observed, the all-too-common utilitarian assessment of our mental faculties exclusively in terms of their 'greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc. . . ' (p. 37). As Mill chose to express himself in chapter 2, the exclusive concern with such facts about the mental pleasures is the very same thing as judging them only by their quantity. Now Bentham, Mill maintained in his Remarks, is at

Contractarianism and the Scope of Justice

Abstract: In his illuminating and important work, A Theory of Justice,I John Rawls provides an explication of our sense of justice in the form of an intricate defense of two principles and their order of ranking: the principle of greatest equal liberty and the difference principle which requires that inequalities of wealth and power be arranged so as to maximize the benefits of the least advantaged. The two principles are ranked lexically such that the second is considered only after the first is satisfied. I shall address myself to a single, though fundamental, point of the theory: the striking contention that the two principles and their priority relationship define a conception of justice from an eternal point of view (p. 587).2 I shall not be concerned with either the first principle or the priority relationship. Instead, I shall attempt to show that the difference principle is not the favored distributive principle at all temporal perspectives. Since the conception of justice is jointly defined by the two principles, if the difference principle lacks invariance the conception as a whole fails to capture an eternal perspective. The attraction of contractarianism for social theory stems, in part, from the claim to eternality; I hope to show that this source of the doctrine's attraction is illusory. Beginning with Rawls's own reasons for thinking that the difference principle applies at all times, I shall suggest that the proposed arguments are not altogether convincing and then go on to urge that an important reason for the failure of the eternality claim is that, at certain stages of material civilization, our choice of a distributive principle depends on the consideration given to social values other than justice. In this connection, I shall have something to say about the value of meaningful work. This basis for the rejection of the

Intergenerational justice and the social discount rate

Abstract: This paper applies the Harsanyi social welfare function to the problem of determining the social discount rate. It thus views the social discount question as one of justice between generations under conditions of individual uncertainty over position, rather than as one generation's paternalism or altruism for the next generation. Whether there is an accumulation of capital for future generations is shown to depend on the form of the individual (or collective) utility function. More importantly, the approach lends some insight into the kind of institutional structure which should be used to determine the social discount rate.