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Showing papers on "Economic Justice published in 1987"


Journal ArticleDOI
John Rawls1
TL;DR: The idea of an over-approaching consensus view was introduced in this paper, where a political conception of justice is regarded not as a consequence of a comprehensive doctrine but as in itself sufficient to express values that normally outweigh whatever other values oppose them, at least under the reasonably favourable conditions that make a constitutional democracy possible.
Abstract: Thus, when justice as fairness begins from the fundamental intuitive idea of society as a fair system of cooperation and proceeds to elaborate that idea, the resulting conception of political justice may be said to be abstract. It is abstract in the same way that the conception of a perfectly competitive market, or of general economic equilibrium, is abstract: that is, it singles out, or focuses on, certain aspects of society as especially significant from the standpoint of political justice and leaves others aside. But whether the conception that results itself is general and comprehensive, as I have used those terms, is a separate question. I believe the conflicts implicit in the fact of pluralism force political philosophy to present conceptions of justice that are abstract, if it is to achieve its aims; but the same conflicts prevent those conceptions from being general and comprehensive. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.186 on Sun, 09 Oct 2016 04:21:46 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms x6 THE IDEA OF AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS view in our model case: namely, a political conception of justice regarded not as a consequence of a comprehensive doctrine but as in itself sufficient to express values that normally outweigh whatever other values oppose them, at least under the reasonably favourable conditions that make a constitutional democracy possible. Here the criterion of a just regime is specified by that political conception; and the values in question are seen from its principles and standards, and from its account of the cooperative virtues of political justice, and the like. Those who hold this conception have, of course, other views as well, views that specify values and virtues belonging to other parts of life; they differ from citizens holding the two other views in our example of an overlapping consensus in having no fully (as opposed to partially)25 comprehensive doctrine within which they see all values and virtues as being ordered. They don't say such a doctrine is impossible, but rather practically speaking unnecessary. Their conviction is that, within the scope allowed by the basic liberties and the other provisions of a just constitution, all citizens can pursue their way of life on fair terms and properly respect its (non-public) values. So long as those constitutional guarantees are secure, they think no conflict of values is likely to arise that would justify their opposing the political conception as a whole, or on such fundamental matters as liberty of conscience, or equal political liberties, or basic civil rights, and the like. Those holding this partially comprehensive view might explain it as follows. We should not assume that there exist reasonable and generally acceptable answers for all or even for many questions of political justice that might be asked. Rather, we must be prepared to accept the fact that only a few such questions can be satisfactorily resolved. Political wisdom consists in identifying those few, and among them the most urgent. That done, we must frame the institutions of the basic structure so that intractable conflicts are unlikely to arise; we must also accept the need for clear and simple principles, the general form and content of which we hope can be publicly understood. A political conception is at best but a guiding framework of deliberation and reflection which helps us reach political agreement on at least the constitutional essentials. If it seems to have cleared our view and made our considered convictions more coherent; if it has narrowed the gap between the conscientious convictions of those who accept the basic ideas of a constitutional regime, then it has served its practical political purpose. And this remains true even though we can't fully explain our agreement: we know only that citizens who affirm the political conception, and who have been raised in and are familiar with-the fundamental ideas of the public political culture, find that, when they adopt its framework of deliberation, their judgments converge sufficiently so that political cooperation on the basis of mutual respect can be maintained. They view the political conception as itself normally sufficient and may not expect, or think they need, greater political understanding than that. 25 For the distinction between a doctrine's being fully vs partially comprehensive, see footnote 23 in Sec IV. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.186 on Sun, 09 Oct 2016 04:21:46 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

772 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Gilligan as discussed by the authors was one of the first women to use the Scholar's Incentive Award from the City University of New York and with the aid of the research facilities office of the Library of Congress.
Abstract: The research for this paper was conducted with support from a Scholar's Incentive Award from the City University of New York and with the aid of the research facilities office of the Library of Congress. I am grateful to these institutions for their support. Earlier drafts of this paper were read at the University of Minnesota in May 1985, at Hunter College in October 1985, and at the seminar on "Feminist Ways of Knowing" held at Douglass College in October 1985. I wish to thank the many listeners who raised questions on these occasions. Special thanks are due Mary Dietz and Annmarie Levins, who commented on earlier drafts of this paper. See Carol Gilligan, "In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of Self and of Morality," Harvard Educational Review 47, no. 4 (November 1977): 481-517, "Woman's Place in Man's Life Cycle," Harvard Educational Review 49, no. 4 (November 1979): 431-46, "Justice and Responsibility: Thinking about Real Dilemmas of Moral Conflict and Choice," in Toward Moral and Religious Maturity: The First International Conference on Moral and Religious Development (Morristown, N.J.: Silver Burdett Co., 1980), In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), "Do the Social Sciences Have an Adequate Theory of Moral Development?" in Social Science as Moral Inquiry, ed. Norma Haan, Robert N. Bellah, Paul Rabinow, and William M. Sullivan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 33-51, and "Reply" in "On In a Different Voice: An Interdisciplinary Forum," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and

451 citations


Book
01 Jan 1987
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors describe the variety of institutional arrangements through which collective decisions can be achieved and make special reference to decision-making on ecology, and assesses those means in connection with various forms of rationality used to make decisions and to act.
Abstract: The book describes the variety of institutional arrangements through which collective decisions can be achieved and makes special reference to decision-making on ecology. According to the author, the means employed by societies to make collective choices have far-reaching ramifications for the kind of world which exists or develops. He assesses those means in connection with various forms of rationality used to make decisions and to act: markets, bureaucracies, and polyarchies are among the institutional arrangements evaluated. He examines their capacity for intelligent decision-making, based on notions of justice, individual liberty or economic efficiency, and measures these against the yardstick of environmental concerns, a pressing set of problems which transcend particular political and institutional arrangements. The analysis extends beyond the realm of environmental choice to elucidate more fully the characteristics of the world's social choice mechanisms and proposes innovations for improving these forms.

424 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the ethical propriety and practical efficacy of a range of policy undertakings which, in the last twenty years, has come to be referred to as "affirmative action" have been discussed.
Abstract: This essay is about the ethical propriety and practical efficacy of a range of policy undertakings which, in the last twenty years, has come to be referred to as “affirmative action.” These policies have been contentious and problematic, and a variety of arguments have been advanced in their support. Here I try to close a gap, as I see it, in this “literature of justification” which has grown up around the practice of preferential treatment. My principal argument along these lines is offered in the next section. I then consider how some forms of argument in support of preferential treatment, distinctly different from that offered here, not only fail to justify the practice but, even worse, work to undermine the basis for cooperation among different ethnic groups in the American democracy. Finally, I observe that as a practical matter the use of group preference can, under circumstances detailed in the sequel, produce results far different from the egalitarian objectives which most often motivate their adoption. It may seem fatuous in the extreme to raise as a serious matter, in the contemporary United States, the question “Why should we care about group inequality?” Is not the historical and moral imperative of such concern self-evident? Must not those who value the pursuit of justice be intensely concerned about economic disparities among groups of persons? The most obvious answer to the title question would seem, then, to be: “We should care because such inequality is the external manifestation of the oppression of individuals on the basis of their group identity.”

268 citations




Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: "Prediction and Classification: Criminal Justice Decision Making" as mentioned in this paper, a collection of essays by distinguished international scholars, is the 9th volume in the Crime and Justice series, and is essential reading for scholars and researchers seeking a unified source of knowledge about crime.
Abstract: "Prediction and Classification: Criminal Justice Decision Making," a collection of commissioned essays by distinguished international scholars, is the ninth volume in the Crime and Justice series. Like its predecessors, "Prediction and Classification" is essential reading for scholars and researchers seeking a unified source of knowledge about crime, its causes, and its cure.

200 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors analyse des interviews au telephone de 248 employes a plein temps renseigne sur les determinants de la satisfaction vis-a-vis du salaire, i.e.
Abstract: L'analyse des interviews au telephone de 248 employes a plein temps renseigne sur les determinants de la satisfaction vis-a-vis du salaire

177 citations


01 Jan 1987
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the relative influence of two aspects of fairness, procedural and distributive justice, on two employee attitudes: organizational commitment and satisfaction with pay, and found that these perceptions have a strong impact on the level of commitment.
Abstract: This study investigated the relative influence of two aspects of fairness, procedural and distributive justice, on two employee attitudes: organizational commitment and satisfaction with pay. Hierarchical regression analysis of data from 36 employees from one organization indicated that the variance in organizational commitment was uniquely associated with procedural factors, whereas the variance in satisfaction with pay was uniquely associated with distributive factors. Thibaut and Walker's (1975) pioneering studies of procedural justice examined the alternative dispute-resolution models used most frequently in legal settings. A number of their investigations concerned the objective functioning of these competing models of the legal process; that is, an examination of how actual decisions varied as a result of using different procedures. At the same time, they also noted the importance of other considerations. However, this kind of information about what actually happens can provide, in our opinion, only a partial basis for selecting a dispute-resolution model to serve a particular purpose. It is also necessary to know how each of the possible procedural choices is perceived and evaluated by persons subject to the process and by other persons who may at some future time have their rights decided in a similar setting. This subjective measure is crucial because one of the major aims of the legal process is to resolve conflicts in such a way as to bind up the social fabric and encourage the continuation of productive exchange between individuals. (p. 67) This passage emphasizes that favorable subjective evaluations of dispute-resolution methods - perceptions of procedural fairness are central to the operation of the legal system. l.ndeed, such evaluations areessential to theallegiance, commitment, and loyalty of citizens necessary for a society grounded in law. Continued support for the legal system hinges on the perceived fairness of the Procedures used to make judgments. The present study addresses an analogous situation in business organizations. Many decisions in such organizations (e.g., promotions, raises) involve judging people, a process typicaliy called Performance appraisai. We are interested in the perceived procedural justice of performance appraisals. We suggest that these Perceptions have a strong impact on the level of commitment

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, experimental methods involving imperfect information are used to generate group choices of principles of distributive justice, and the results indicate that individuals reach consensus, strongly reject the minimax principle, and largely choose what Rawls has called an "intuitionistic" principle.
Abstract: Experimental methods involving imperfect information are used to generate group choices of principles of distributive justice. Conditions approximating John Rawls's "original position" in A Theory of Justice serve as the starting point, and his conjectures are contrasted with those of John Harsanyi. Three "predictions" implicit in the Rawlsian argument are tested: (1) individuals choosing a principle of economic distribution would be able to reach unanimous agreement; (2) they would always choose the same principle; and (3) they would always choose to maximize the welfare of the worst-off individual. Our results indicate that individuals reach consensus, strongly reject the minimax principle, and largely choose what Rawls has called an "intuitionistic" principle. Overwhelmingly, the chosen principle is maximizing the average income with a floor constraint: a principle which is a compromise between those proposed by Rawls and Harsanyi. It takes into account not only the position of the worst-off individual but also the potential expected gain for the rest of society.

Book
01 Jan 1987
TL;DR: The European Council: Looking Back to Look Forward as mentioned in this paper has a long history in the European Parliament and the Council of the European Council, and the role of the Presidency of the Council has been discussed extensively.
Abstract: PART I: THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL: OVERVIEW AND HISTORY 1. Introduction: The Many Faces of the European Council 2. Multiple Approaches for Understanding a Contested Institution: Three Models 3. Pre-History: the Birth of Institutionalised Summitry 4. History: Generations of Leaders and the Institutional Trajectory PART II: THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL WITHIN THE EU ARCHITECTURE 5. Political and Procedural Leadership: General Functions and Specific Powers 6. Towards a New Institutional Balance? Trends in Inter-Institutional Relations PART III: INSIDE THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL: THE DYNAMICS OF DECISION MAKING 7. The Presidency: Charismatic Master or Facilitating Manager? 8. Rules for Organisation: the Search for an Optimal Institutional Arrangement 9. Decision-Making: The Ways to Consensus Formation 10. Decision-Making: The Power Dimension PART IV: ACTIVITIES, AGREEMENTS AND ACTS 11. Deepening: The Constitutional Architect 12. Widening: The Master of Enlargement 13. Economic Governance: Towards a 'gouvernement economique'? 14. External Action: In Search of a Coherent and Effective Global Role 15. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Pre-Constitutional and Pre-Legislative Functions PART V: CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES: A KEY INSTITUTION'S RISE AND DECLINE? 16. The European Council: Looking Back to Look Forward

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A review of the literature on correctional officers can be found in this article, with a focus on the role of the "thy brother's keeper" as a role model for correctional officers.
Abstract: (1987) Thy brother's keeper: A review of the literature on correctional officers Justice Quarterly: Vol 4, No 1, pp 9-37

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The behavioral underpinnings of the notion of distributive justice are tested in experimental contexts by as mentioned in this paper, showing that individuals are capable of reaching consensus but that they choose an "intuitionistic" principle which attempts to take into account not only the position of the worst-off individual but the potential expected gain for the rest of society.
Abstract: The behavioural underpinnings of Rawls's notion of distributive justice as outlined in A Theory of Justice are tested in experimental contexts. Under conditions approximating Rawls's ‘original position’ (including the appropriate agenda, a ‘veil of ignorance’ and a choice rule designed to capture his main theoretical constraints), we test his ‘predictions’ that individuals would reach a unanimous consensus on a principle of distributive justice and would select the difference principle: a principle that maximizes the welfare of the worst-off individual in the society. This view is contrasted with our belief, that any general concern for fairness (or distributive justice) will take a different form: one that both attempts to take into account several values and pays attention to cardinal rather than ordinal measures of utility. Our results strongly indicate that individuals are capable of reaching consensus but that they choose what Rawls has called an ‘intuitionistic’ principle which attempts to take into account not only the position of the worst-off individual but the potential expected gain for the rest of society. The overwhelmingly preferred principle is maximizing the average income with a floor constraint.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the present decade, however, the challenge to Rawlsian liberalism has taken on a new guise as discussed by the authors, one which it is the purpose of this paper to explore and explore.
Abstract: The publication of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice in 1972 inaugurated a new era in Anglo-American political theory by providing a sophisticated and complex paradigm of liberal political diagnosis of and prescription for contemporary society; it resulted in a flood of detailed analyses and discussions of Rawls' proposals in the large and in the small, and also brought forth (in the form of Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia) a counterblast from the libertarian Right which was of commensurate scope and vigour. In the present decade, however, the challenge to Rawlsian liberalism has taken on a new guise—one which it is the purpose of this paper to explore.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: A special issue of the Ecological Modeling devoted to ecological economics is described in this article. But it does not cover the important theoretical issues involved in the synthesis of ecology and economics that could lead to better management of renewable and non-renewable natural resources.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that negative sanctions are not retributive, since they are not punishments exacted due to norms-and-rules being violated, and this in turn reinforces the validity of the norms and rules.
Abstract: suffering so that the offender pays his "debt", and this in turn reinforces the validity of the norms-and-rules. Social justice is thus restored. Retribution has been defined as social sanction, but "social sanction" is far from being identical with retribution. There are a great number of negative sanctions which are not retributive, since they are not punishments exacted due to norms-and-rules being infringed. Dismissal from a job for being a "security risk" is undeniably a sanction, but not a retributive one. Likewise, a person may be quarantined as a health risk. Preventive sanctions are by defini? tion not retributive, irrespective of whether their aim is to prevent crime or to safeguard against some other harm. They rest on the principle of utility, and have absolutely nothing to do with justice, even when applied justly (to every person who belongs to the same cluster e.g. the cluster constituting a "security risk"). Social sanctions instigated because of lack in excellence (a particular kind of excellence) are in most cases neither preventive nor retributive. They are not preventive because the sanction is a response to a failure to properly follow par? ticular rules. They are not retributive because no wrong requiring "restoration" has been com? mitted. The ethico-political concept of justice has always dealt with sanctions, negative sanctions included, and with the specific problem of retribution. However, there is no trace in it of

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In an attempt to set out some of the foundations for an ecological economics, the authors interprets the objective of a sustainable society as one in which a Rawls-style concept of distributive justice is applied in an intergenerational context.

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Apr 1987-Ethics
TL;DR: The distinction between justice and charity is thought to be fundamental in ethical theory as discussed by the authors. Yet remarkably little has been done to develop the distinction systematically or to articulate the role it is to play in ethical theories.
Abstract: The distinction between justice and charity is thought to be fundamental in ethical theory. Yet remarkably little has been done to develop the distinction systematically or to articulate the role it is to play in ethical theory. Four theses about the difference between justice and charity are widely held and rarely argued for: (1) Duties ofjustice (with the exception of those which correspond to special rights generated by promising or special relationships or reciprocal group undertakings that generate obligations of fair play) are exclusively negative duties (duties to refrain from certain actions); duties of charity are generally positive duties (duties to render aid). (2) Duties of justice may be enforced; duties of charity may not. (3) Duties of justice are perfect duties; duties of charity are imperfect. (Perfect duties are determinate both with regard to the content of what is required and with regard to the identity of the individual who is the object of the duty; duties of charity are indeterminate in both senses: the kind and amount of aid, as well as the choice of a recipient are left to the discretion of the benefactor.) (4) Justice is a matter of rights; charity is not (duties of justice have correlative rights; duties of charity do not), and what is one's right is owed to one, the lack of which gives one justified grounds for complaint that one has been wronged. It is far from clear how claims 1-4 are supposed to be related to one another. Although all four purport to characterize differences between justice and charity, we shall see that not all are equally plausible candidates for answering the question, What makes something a duty of charity rather than a duty of justice, and vice versa? Moreover, it will become clear that some of these claims are thought to be derivable from the others, although the connecting assumptions are often either not made explicit or not argued for. By analyzing theses 1-4 and by articulating and assessing the grounds for asserting them, I shall explore the distinction between justice and

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that allowing wealthy individuals to influence the outcome of their trials through the purchase of legal services can be consistent with the optimal penalty literature, and they review some of the advantages and disadvantages of varying the length of jail terms versus varying the probability of conviction.
Abstract: This paper shows that allowing wealthy individuals to influence the outcome of their trials through the purchase of legal services can be consistent with the optimal penalty literature. Using this analysis, the author reviews some of the advantages and disadvantages of varying the length of jail terms versus varying the probability of conviction. Finally, implications for the bail, prosecutorial, and plea bargaining systems are examined. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines are rooted in the standard oligopoly theory developed by Chamberlin (1933), Fellner (1949), and Stigler (1964).
Abstract: A ny antitrust policy that tries to put some restrictions on mergers must have a conceptual basis. One such framework might be a populist approach in which only absolute or relative size of the merger partners and/or the resulting entity would be the criterion. Political rhetoric often embodies this approach. An alternative approach-the one that underlies the 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines-concerns itself with the possible exercise of market power.1 I believe this second approach is more consistent with the language of Section 7 of the Clayton Act itself, which instructs the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to prevent those mergers the effects of which "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." This market power approach also places merger policy in a realm that is susceptible to economic analysis; for this reason as well, this approach appeals to me. The Merger Guidelines are firmly rooted in the standard oligopoly theory developed by Chamberlin (1933), Fellner (1949), and Stigler (1964), and strengthened


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This bicentennial year has revived an old vision of the meaning of American constitutional history as discussed by the authors, a vision of a polity defined by the perspicacity of the framers of the United States Constitution, those powerful and brilliant men who in 1787 imposed their vision on us.
Abstract: This bicentennial year has revived an old vision of the meaning of American constitutional history. Our significance as a people and as a nation, we are told, derives from the perspicacity of our Framers, those powerful and brilliant men who in 1787 imposed their vision of a polity on us. They made us what we are because they drafted a text, which became the United States Constitution. Because of them, "we find ourselves," as the young Abraham Lincoln wrote in 1838, "under the government of a system of political institutions, conducing more essentially to the ends of civil and religious liberty, than any of which the history of former times tells us. . . . Theirs was the task (and nobly they performed it) to possess themselves, and through themselves us, of this goodly land; and to uprear upon its hills and its valleys, a political edifice of liberty and equal rights." If theirs was the task of creation, ours (and here the first person plural includes all Americans since the Framers) is conservation. To quote Lincoln again, "We, when mounting the stage of existence, found ourselves the legal inheritors of these fundamental blessings. We toiled not in the acquirement or establishment of them they are a legacy bequeathed us, by a once hardy, brave, and patriotic, but now lamented and departed race of ancestors." And thus, it remains to us to "transmit" our inheritance "undecayed by the lapse of time, and untorn by usurpation to the latest generation that fate shall permit the world to know," a task we assume because of "gratitude to our fathers," as well as "justice to ourselves, duty to posterity, and love for our species in general."1 It is hard to imagine a clearer or more eloquent statement of important features of the celebratory mainstream perspective against which the essays in this symposium were written. To Lincoln, the drafting of the 1787 federal Constitution was the pivotal event in our national history, the event that constituted our national identity. Lincoln regarded the constitutional text as a closed repository of permanent constitutional meaning. This symposium describes some of the intense struggles

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a number of hypotheses concerning the relationship between legal and non-legal social control in the juvenile justice system were tested using a multivariate modeling technique and the results indicated that the quantity of law afforded to offenders at three juvenile justice processing points is dependent, in part, on the amount of non legal social control they are already subject to.
Abstract: Taking its cue from Black's The Behavior of Law, this article tests a number of hypotheses concerning the relationship between legal and nonlegal social control in the juvenile justice system. Data collected on a cohort of youth, randomly sampled from eight California counties, is analyzed using a multivariate modeling technique. The results indicate that the quantity of law afforded to offenders at three juvenile justice processing points is dependent, in part, on the amount of nonlegal social control they are already subject to.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Most knowledgeable economists seem now to agree that the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and the courts were excessively hostile to horizontal mergers in the 1960s as mentioned in this paper, and that the United States government should have been more tolerant.
Abstract: Most knowledgeable economists seem now to agree that the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and the courts were excessively hostile to horizontal mergers in the 1960s. Th...

Book
01 Jan 1987
TL;DR: In this article, a limited approach to justice, crime and social control differential sentencing is proposed, based on the magistrate's court pleas of mitigation social inquiry reports and the summary justice and familial ideology research appendix.
Abstract: Justice, crime and social control differential sentencing - a limited approach the magistrate's court pleas of mitigation social inquiry reports magistrates' talk summary justice and familial ideology research appendix.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that Weber actually identified formal justice and guaranteed rights as the features of modern law that directly facilitated the rise of capitalism, and also challenge Habermas's claim that Weber ignored the normative dimension of modern Law and argued that he considered the "rightness" of law to be an important factor in the success of capitalism but found that this normative dimension has weakened.
Abstract: A number of contemporary scholars have argued that Max Weber sought to establish a positive relationship between the highest form of rationality in legal thought-logically formal rationality, and the most advanced type of economic rationality, that embodied in capitalism. Since capitalism actually developed first in England, where no such logically formal legal system existed, these scholars conclude that Weber's sociology of law suffers from various contradictions that are frequently referred to as the "England problem." This paper rejects the idea of the "England problem" and argues that Weber actually identified formal justice and guaranteed rights, rather than logically formal legal thought, as the features of modern law that directly facilitated the rise of capitalism. It also challenges Habermas's claim that Weber ignored the normative dimension of modern law and argues that he considered the "rightness" of law to be an important factor in the rise of capitalism but found that with the disenchantment of law this normative dimension has weakened.

Journal ArticleDOI
M. Kay Harris1
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that conventional approaches to addressing such questions provide little promise for a significantly better future and offer a fundamentally different way of framing the issues, and explore what the next century might look like if a feminist orientation toward justice were embraced.
Abstract: *The author is an associate professor in the Department of Criminal Justice, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The terms of reference for this volume ask that authors address the following: &dquo;Given the political and social necessities of the criminal justice system, the probability of a continuing crime problem in the future, and the range of sanctions available, in what direction should the criminal justice system move in the next few decades? What do you think criminal justice should look like in the year 2012?&dquo; This article argues that conventional approaches to addressing such questions provide little promise for a significantly better future and offers a fundamentally different way of framing the issues. It explores what the next century might look like if a feminist orientation toward justice were embraced.