Topic
Economic Justice
About: Economic Justice is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 41600 publications have been published within this topic receiving 661535 citations.
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01 Feb 2005
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that standard liberal accounts underestimate the scope of this obligation because they fail to properly understand various threats to autonomy and the reason these vulnerabilities have been underestimated is because autonomy has generally been understood in an essentially individualistic fashion.
Abstract: One of liberalism’s core commitments is to safeguarding individuals’ autonomy.
And a central aspect of liberal social justice is the commitment
to protecting the vulnerable. Taken together, and combined with an understanding
of autonomy as an acquired set of capacities to lead one’s
own life, these commitments suggest that liberal societies should be especially
concerned to address vulnerabilities of individuals regarding the
development and maintenance of their autonomy. In this chapter, we
develop an account of what it would mean for a society to take seriously
the obligation to reduce individuals’ autonomy-related vulnerabilities to
an acceptable minimum. In particular, we argue that standard liberal accounts
underestimate the scope of this obligation because they fail to
appreciate various threats to autonomy.
The reason these vulnerabilities have been underestimated, we believe,
is because autonomy has generally been understood in an essentially individualistic
fashion. The alternative account of autonomy we sketch here
highlights the ways in which individuals’ autonomy can be diminished or
impaired through damage to the social relations that support autonomy.
By articulating a conception of autonomy in terms of, more specifically,
a theory of mutual recognition, we aim to pinpoint the individualistic
bias in liberal accounts and the concomitant underestimation of our dependence
on relationships of respect, care, and esteem. We conclude
by anticipating some broader implications of this for how proceduralist
accounts of social justice ought to be revised.
320 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1996TL;DR: Parchman State Penitentiary as discussed by the authors was the grandfather of them all, a hellhole where conditions were brutal and there were chains, shotguns, and bloodhounds in the prison.
Abstract: Prisons in the deep South, with chain gangs, shotguns, and bloodhounds, have been immortalized in movies, blues music, and fiction. Mississippi's Parchman State Penitentiary was the grandfather of them all, a hellhole where conditions were brutal. This epic history fills the gap between slavery and the civil rights era, showing how Parchman and Jim Crow justice proved that there could be something worse than slavery. of photos.
317 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the main and interactive effects of distributive justice and procedural justice accounted for significant, unique variance in employees' psychological distress, consistent with predictions derived from a framework that integrates stress and coping theory with justice theory.
316 citations
TL;DR: 5 studies tested the prediction that status and power would have opposing effects on justice enacted toward others and showed consistent evidence that status is positively associated withJustice toward others, while power is negatively associated with justice toward others.
Abstract: Few empirical efforts have been devoted to differentiating status and power, and thus significant questions remain about differences in how status and power impact social encounters. We conducted 5 studies to address this gap. In particular, these studies tested the prediction that status and power would have opposing effects on justice enacted toward others. In the first 3 studies, we directly compared the effects of status and power on people’s enactment of distributive (Study 1) and procedural (Studies 2 and 3) justice. In the last 2 studies, we orthogonally manipulated status and power and examined their main and interactive effects on people’s enactment of distributive (Study 4) and procedural (Study 5) justice. As predicted, all 5 studies showed consistent evidence that status is positively associated with justice toward others, while power is negatively associated with justice toward others. The effects of power are moderated, however, by an individual’s other orientation (Studies 2, 3, 4, and 5), and the effects of status are moderated by an individual’s dispositional concern about status (Study 5). Furthermore, Studies 4 and 5 also demonstrated that status and power interact, such that the positive effect of status on justice emerges when power is low and not when power is high, providing further evidence for differential effects between power and status. Theoretical implications for the literatures on status, power, and distributive/procedural justice are discussed.
314 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors defend the cosmopolitan notion that equality is a demand of justice only among citizens (and indeed, indeed, among all human beings), and demonstrate that this discrepancy is not in fact arbitrary, and to do so without violating any of cosmopolitan premises with which we began.
Abstract: All cosmopolitans hold at least this set of beliefs: (1) Human beings are ultimate units of moral concern. Families, tribes, nations, cultures, and so on can become units of concern only indirectly. (2) The status as an ultimate unit of moral concern extends to all human beings equally. (3) Human beings should be treated as ultimate units of concern by everyone. Accepting these cosmopolitan premises, as I do, poses a challenge for anyone who believes that fundamentally different principles of distributive justice apply to the global order, on one hand, and to the main social and political institutions of the modern state, on the other. “This discrepancy in moral assessment,” Pogge avers, “looks arbitrary. Why should our moral duties, constraining what economic order we may impose upon one another, be so different in the two cases?” The aim of this article is to demonstrate that this discrepancy is not in fact arbitrary, and to do so without violating any of the cosmopolitan premises with which we began. More specifically, I will defend the idea that equality is a demand of justice only among citizens (and, indeed,
313 citations