Eidetic reduction

About: Eidetic reduction is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 47 publications have been published within this topic receiving 759 citations.

A Dance Between the Reduction and Reflexivity: Explicating the "Phenomenological Psychological Attitude"

Abstract: This article explores the nature of "the phenomenological attitude," which is understood as the process of retaining a wonder and openness to the world while reflexively restraining pre-understandings, as it applies to psychological research A brief history identifies key philosphical ideas outlining Husserl's formulation of the reductions and subsequent existential-hermeneutic elaborations, and how these have been applied in empirical psychological research Then three concrete descriptions of engaging the phenomenological attitude are offered, highlighting the way the epoche of the natural sciences, the psychological phenomenological reduction and the eidetic reduction can be applied during research interviews Reflections on the impact and value of the researcher's stance show that these reductions can be intertwined with reflexivity and that, in this process, something of a dance occurs—a tango in which the researcher twists and glides through a series of improvised steps In a context of tension and contradictory motions, the researcher slides between striving for reductive focus and reflexive self-awareness; between bracketing pre-understandings and exploiting them as a source of insight Caught up in the dance, researchers must wage a continuous, iterative struggle to become aware of, and then manage, pre-understandings and habitualities that inevitably linger Persistance will reward the researcher with special, if fleeting, moments of disclosure in which the phenomenon reveals something of itself in a fresh way

The Development of Husserl’s Thought

Abstract: One Philosophy as Descriptive Psychology- I Acts, Contents and the Relations between Them- Section 1 The Intentional Relation to the Object- 1 The Distinction between Act and Content- 2 Acts of a Higher Order- 3 Symbolic or Non-genuine Presentations- I In Philosophie der Arithmetik- II In "Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik"- Section 2 Contents- 1 The Immanence of Contents- I In Brentano's Thought- II In Philosophie der Arithmetik- III In "Psychologische Studien zur elementaren Logik"- 2 The Division of Contents - Abstract and Concrete Contents- 3 Formal or Categorial Properties - Objects of a Higher Order?- Section 3 The Relation between Act and Content- 1 Are Acts Creative?- 2 The Correlation between Act and Object- 3 Perception and Evidence- 4 The Relation to the "Real" Object and the "Intentional" Object- I Brentano- II Husserl- Summary of Chapter I- II Genetic and Descriptive Psychology- 1 Genetic and Descriptive Psychology in Brentano's Thought- I Genetic Psychology- II Descriptive Psychology- 2 Genetic and Descriptive Psychology in the Thought of the Early Husserl- III Philosophy as Analysis of Origins- 1 The Analysis of Origins in Arithmetic- 2 What is Analysis of Origins?- 3 The Basis for Abstraction - the Origin- 4 The General Concept- 5 Abstraction- IV The A Priori Sciences and the Problem of their Founding- 1 Brentano's Theory of the A Priori Sciences- 2 Husserl's Theory of the A Priori Sciences- 3 Logic and Psychology- V Brentano and Husserl- 1 Husserl's Student Years - the Encounter with Brentano- 2 Brentano's Development- I The Positivistic Period- II Phenomenological Tendencies- III Some Problems- VI Preliminary Conclusions- 1 Philosophy as Descriptive Psychology - Forms of Psychologism- 2Some Critical Observations- Two Philosophy as Descriptive Eidetic Psychology- I Acts, Objects and the Relations between Them- Section 1 Acts- 1 Introduction - the Natural and Phenomenological Thougt-Stances- 2 Significative Acts- 3 "Imaginal" or Imaginative Acts- 4 Perceptual Acts- 5 More Analysis of Acts- I The Essential Elements of Acts - Quality and Matter- II The Non-essential Elements of Acts - the Sensations- III The Connection between the Acts - Knowledge- 6 Categorial Acts- 7 General Presentations or Acts of Ideation- 8 The Natural and Phenomenological Attitudes - a Provisional Summary- Section 2 The Transcendent Object- Section 3 The Relations between Acts and Contents- 1 The Concept of Constitution- 2 The Correlation between the Act and the Object- 3 The Theory of Perception- I Adequate and Non-adequate Perception- II The Phenomenological Point of Departure - "Presupposition-lessness"- III The Suspension of the Question of Existence (Epoche)- 4 Theory of Knowledge as a "Psychology of Reason"- I Two Questions- II A First Answer- III The Possibility of a Second Answer- IV A Second Answer- 5 The Intentional Object and the "Real" Object- I Husserl and the Scholastic Schema- II The "Real" Object and the Physical Object- 6 The Natural and Phenomenological Attitudes in LU - Conclusion- II Genetic and Descriptive Psychology- 1 Genetic Psychology- 2 Descriptive Psychology- 3 The Two Functions of Descriptive Psychology- 4 Husserl's Criticism of Explanatory Psychology- 5 Two Kinds of Methods (Ontologies) - Naturalistic and Phenomenological- 6 Conclusions of Chapters I and II- III The New Theory of Abstraction- 1 Recapitulation of the Problem- 2 General Presentation: Meaning and Intuiting- 3 Comparison: Identity and Similarity- 4 Attention and the Intuition of Essences- 5 "Grounded Purely in Concepts" - Evidence- 6 The Eidetic Reduction- 7 Two Kinds of Abstraction- 8 Two Kinds of Categorial Abstraction - Two Kinds of Logic- 9 Eidos and Fact- I The Identity of the Eidos- II The Universality of the Eidos- III Application- IV The Extent of the Realm of Ideas- 10 Husserl's "Platonism" or "Realism"- IV Logic and Psychology- 1 Statement of the Problem- 2 The Psychological Concept and the Logical Concept- 3 The Laws of Logic- V Philosophy as Analysis of Origins- Section 1 The Philosophical Clarification of Arithmetic- Section 2 The Philosophical Clarification of Pure Logic- 1 The Philosophy of Pure Logic- 2 The Origin of the Fundamental Concepts of Logic- 3The Problem of the Relation between the Prolegomena and the Six Investigations- I The Problem- II Pure Logic and Descriptive Psychology- III Some Critical Observations- VI Conclusions- 1 Phenomenology as Descriptive Eidetic Psychology- 2 Forms of Psychologism- Intermezzo from Descriptive Psychology to Transcendental Phenomenology- I The Negative Aspect of the Reduction - The Epoche- 1 The Suspension of all Transcendencies- 2 The Implications of this Suspension- 3 Conclusions- II The Positive Aspect of the Reduction - The Residue- 1 Consciousness - Real Immanence- 2 Essences - Pure Immanence- 3 The Givenness of the Noema- I The Second Extension of the Phenomenological Sphere- II The Correlativity Theme and the Problem of Transcendence- III From Descriptive Psychology to Transcendental Phenomenology- Three Philosophy as Transcendental Phenomenology- I An Analysis of the Phenomenological Fundamental Consideration- 1 The Introduction of the Transcendental Epoche- 2 Phenomenological Meditation - Its Problem, Goal and Method- 3 The First Phase - Consciousness as a Monadological Unity- 4 Intermezzo - Transition to the Second Phase- 5 The Second Phase - The Presumptive Being of the Thing and the Absolute Being of Consciousness- 6 The Experiment of World-Annihilation- 7 The Meaning of the Terms "Absolute" and "Relative"- I The Concepts "Absolute" and "Relative" in LU- II The Concepts "Absolute" and "Relative" in Ideen I- III Provisional Conclusions- 8 Eidetic and Factual Necessity- 9 Consciousnesss as the Necessary Condition and Sufficient Reason of the World- 10 The World as Presumptive- 11 Conclusion of the Second Phase- 12 Interpreting the Transcendental Epoche- I The Introduction of the Epoche- II The Interpretation of the Epoche- 13 The Problem of the "Ways" to Transcendental Phenomenology- 14 Two Interpretations - Stumpf and Ricoeur- I Stumpf- II Ricoeur- 15 Two Assumptions- 16 The Meaning of the Fundamental Consideration as Fundamental Ontology- I The Naturalistic World-Picture- II The Phenomenological View- 17 The Naturalistic Attitude and the Personalistic Attitude in Ideen II- II Psychological and Transcendental Epistemology- 1 Husserl's Transcendental Idealism- I No "Thing in Itself"- II The Traditional Problem of Knowledge- III Husserl's Solution- IV Comparison with Logische Untersuchungen- V The Concept of Constitution- 2 The Thing in Itself and Natural Science- I The Thing of Physics in Ideen I- IIComparison with Logische UntersuchungenandKrisis- 3The Psychological and Transcendental Concepts of the Noema- I The Introduction of the Concept of the Noema- II Intermezzo - The Psychological Epoche and the Transcendental Epoche- III The Way from Psychology- 4 Noetic-Noematic Parallelism and the Phenomenology of Reason- I Noetic-Noematic Parallelism- II Phenomenology of Reason- III Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology- Section I Transcendental Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology- 1 The Agreement between Descriptive Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology- 2 The Difference between Descriptive Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenology- 3 The Relation between Psychological Consciousness and Transcendental Consciousness (Ego)- Section II Transcendental Phenomenology and Empirical Psychology- 1 The Limits and Possibilities of Empirical Psychology- 2 Empirical Psychology and Phenomenological Philosophy- IV Transcendental Phenomenology and the A Priori Sciences- 1 Mundane Eidetics and Transcendental Phenomenological Eidetics- 2 Philosophy of Pure Logic- V Conclusion- 1 Husserl's Defense of the Ideal- 2 The Turn to Transcendental Idealism- Translation Table- Name Index

Husserl: A Guide for the Perplexed

Abstract: Chapter 1: Introduction: Approaching Husserl Part I: The phenomenological attitude Chapter 2: The idea of phenomenology Chapter 3: Unravelling the reductions Chapter 4: Transcendental reduction Chapter 5: Eidetic reduction. Part II: Consciousness Chapter 6: The structure of intentionality Chapter 7: Noema and object Chapter 8: Intuition, evidence and truth Chapter 9: Constitution of objectivities Chapter 10: Time-consciousness Part III: Philosophical topics Chapter 11: The critique of psychologism Chapter 12: Intersubjectivity Chapter 13: The lifeworld Chapter 14: The crisis of the sciences Chapter 15: Conclusion: Mastering Husserl.

From Decisions to Passions: Merleau-Ponty’s Interpretation of Husserl’s Reduction

Abstract: This paper focuses on Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of Husserl’s philosophical method. It argues against interpretations that claim that Merleau-Ponty abandons Husserl’s reductions: the phenomenological-transcendental reduction, the eidetic reduction, or both. The paper shows that Merleau-Ponty’s critical comments are not directed against Husserl’s methodic ideas but against intellectualist interpretations of them. For Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenological reduction is not an intellectual operation effected by will or by decision. It is a specific form of passivity: something invites us to depart from our natural and habitual ways of responding to the world and allows us to notice these relations.

A Phenomenological Approach to the Study of Social Systems

Abstract: Systems thinking comprises one of the greatest revolutions of the 20th century. The core of such approach embodies crucial epistemological questions, which refer to the need to formulate methods suitable to their premises. As the theoretical reflexive space cannot be neglected within the scientific process, not only the construction of empirical methods, but also the methodologies for building theoretical hypotheses to describe and explain complex phenomena must be appropriate to the perspectives of the ideals of such complexity. Thus, the present research effort aims at proposing a structured methodological approach, based on the philosophical principles of the general systems theory and Husserl’s phenomenology, which can be used as an alternative to describe and explain complex systems phenomena. As a solution to the problem at stake, we present a research framework based on a hybrid procedure, which applies analogue processes and also eidetic reduction in order to build theoretical descriptions capable of synthesising complex dynamics in a structured manner. Despite some challenges inherent to its nature, the proposed method shows robustness in philosophical terms, to organise the formulation of theoretical hypotheses in an action research environment.