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Electronic voting

About: Electronic voting is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 2793 publications have been published within this topic receiving 36191 citations.


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Book ChapterDOI
13 Dec 1992
TL;DR: This paper proposes a practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections that ensures the privacy of the voters even if both the administrator and the counter conspire, and realizes voting fairness, i.e., no one can know even intermediate result of the voting.
Abstract: This paper proposes a practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections. The participants of the scheme are voters, an administrator, and a counter. The scheme ensures the privacy of the voters even if both the administrator and the counter conspire, and realizes voting fairness, i.e., no one can know even intermediate result of the voting. Furthermore fraud by either the voter or the administrator is prohibited.

925 citations

BookDOI
01 Sep 2000
TL;DR: In this paper, Brand proposes cryptographic building blocks for the design of digital certificates that preserve privacy without sacrificing security, such certificates function in much the same way as cinema tickets or subway tokens: anyone can establish their validity and the data they specify, but no more than that.
Abstract: From the Publisher: As paper-based communication and transaction mechanisms are replaced by automated ones, traditional forms of security such as photographs and handwritten signatures are becoming outdated. Most security experts believe that digital certificates offer the best technology for safeguarding electronic communications. They are already widely used for authenticating and encrypting email and software, and eventually will be built into any device or piece of software that must be able to communicate securely. There is a serious problem, however, with this unavoidable trend: unless drastic measures are taken, everyone will be forced to communicate via what will be the most pervasive electronic surveillance tool ever built. There will also be abundant opportunity for misuse of digital certificates by hackers, unscrupulous employees, government agencies, financial institutions, insurance companies, and so on. In this book Stefan Brands proposes cryptographic building blocks for the design of digital certificates that preserve privacy without sacrificing security. Such certificates function in much the same way as cinema tickets or subway tokens: anyone can establish their validity and the data they specify, but no more than that. Furthermore, different actions by the same person cannot be linked. Certificate holders have control over what information is disclosed, and to whom. Subsets of the proposed cryptographic building blocks can be used in combination, allowing a cookbook approach to the design of public key infrastructures. Potential applications include electronic cash, electronic postage, digital rights management, pseudonyms for online chat rooms, health care information storage, electronic voting, and even electronic gambling.

637 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
05 Nov 2001
TL;DR: A mathematical construct which provides a cryptographic protocol to verifiably shuffle a sequence of k modular integers is presented, and its application to secure, universally verifiable, multi-authority election schemes is discussed and shown to be honest-verifier zeroknowledge in a special case and in general.
Abstract: We present a mathematical construct which provides a cryptographic protocol to verifiably shuffle a sequence of k modular integers, and discuss its application to secure, universally verifiable, multi-authority election schemes. The output of the shuffle operation is another sequence of k modular integers, each of which is the same secret power of a corresponding input element, but the order of elements in the output is kept secret. Though it is a trivial matter for the "shuffler" (who chooses the permutation of the elements to be applied) to compute the output from the input, the construction is important because it provides a linear size proof of correctness for the output sequence (i.e. a proof that it is of the form claimed) that can be checked by an arbitrary verifiers. The complexity of the protocol improves on that of Furukawa-Sako[16] both measured by number of exponentiations and by overall size.The protocol is shown to be honest-verifier zeroknowledge in a special case, and is computational zeroknowledge in general. On the way to the final result, we also construct a generalization of the well known Chaum-Pedersen protocol for knowledge of discrete logarithm equality [10], [7]. In fact, the generalization specializes exactly to the Chaum-Pedersen protocol in the case k = 2. This result may be of interest on its own.An application to electronic voting is given that matches the features of the best current protocols with significant efficiency improvements. An alternative application to electronic voting is also given that introduces an entirely new paradigm for achieving Universally Verifiable elections.

599 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: An overview of the experience of the opening two years of an institution-wide project in introducing electronic voting equipment for lectures is presented, and various empirical indications support the theoretical view that learning benefits depend upon putting the pedagogy at the focus of attention in each use.
Abstract: An overview of the experience of the opening two years of an institution-wide project in introducing electronic voting equipment for lectures is presented. Eight different departments and a wide range of group size (up to 300) saw some use. An important aspect of this is the organizational one of addressing the whole institution, rather than a narrower disciplinary base. The mobility of the equipment, the generality of the educational analysis, and the technical support provided contributed to this. Evaluations of each use identified (formatively) the weakest spots and the most common benefits, and also (summatively) showed that learners almost always saw this as providing a net benefit to them. Various empirical indications support the theoretical view that learning benefits depend upon putting the pedagogy (not the technology) at the focus of attention in each use. Perceived benefits tended to increase as lecturers became more experienced in exploiting the approach. The most promising pedagogical approaches appear to be Interactive Engagement (launching peer discussions), and Contingent Teaching ‐ designing sessions not as fixed scripts but to zero in on using diagnostic questions on the points that the particular audience most needs on this occasion.

563 citations

Proceedings ArticleDOI
09 May 2004
TL;DR: It is shown that voters, without any insider privileges, can cast unlimited votes without being detected by any mechanisms within the voting terminal software, and that any paperless electronic voting system might suffer similar flaws, despite any certification it could have otherwise received.
Abstract: With significant U.S. federal funds now available to replace outdated punch-card and mechanical voting systems, municipalities and states throughout the U.S. are adopting paperless electronic voting systems from a number of different vendors. We present a security analysis of the source code to one such machine used in a significant share of the market. Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts. We identify several problems including unauthorized privilege escalation, incorrect use of cryptography, vulnerabilities to network threats, and poor software development processes. We show that voters, without any insider privileges, can cast unlimited votes without being detected by any mechanisms within the voting terminal software. Furthermore, we show that even the most serious of our outsider attacks could have been discovered and executed without access to the source code. In the face of such attacks, the usual worries about insider threats are not the only concerns; outsiders can do the damage. That said, we demonstrate that the insider threat is also quite considerable, showing that not only can an insider, such as a poll worker, modify the votes, but that insiders can also violate voter privacy and match votes with the voters who cast them. We conclude that this voting system is unsuitable for use in a general election. Any paperless electronic voting system might suffer similar flaws, despite any certification it could have otherwise received. We suggest that the best solutions are voting systems having a voter-verifiable audit trail, where a computerized voting system might print a paper ballot that can be read and verified by the voter.

549 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
2023112
2022271
2021126
2020183
2019203
2018183