Topic
Equity (finance)
About: Equity (finance) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 30909 publications have been published within this topic receiving 793688 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
More filters
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.
Abstract: We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means’s image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash f low rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.
8,270 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that standard errors of more than 3.0% per year are typical for both the CAPM and the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), and these large standard errors are the result of uncertainty about true factor risk premiums and imprecise estimates of the loadings of industries on the risk factors.
6,064 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and suggest that the principal agency problem in large corporations around the world is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders.
Abstract: We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely-held, in contrast to the Berle and Means image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions or other widely-held corporations is less common. The controlling shareholders typically have the power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management. The results suggest that the principal agency problem in large corporations around the world is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders, rather than that of restricting empire building by professional managers unaccountable to shareholders.
4,764 citations
TL;DR: The authors investigated the relation between Tobin's Q and the structure of equity ownership for a sample of 1,173 firms for 1976 and 1,093 firms for 1986 and found a significant curvilinear relation between Q and common stock owned by corporate insiders.
4,567 citations
Book•
01 Jan 1984
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied 43 successful American companies to discover the secrets of the art of American management, including a bias for action-preferring to do something, anything, rather than performing endless analyses and convening committees, staying close to the customer learning and catering to the client's preferences, autonomy and entrepreneurship, productivity through people, making all employees aware that best efforts are vital and that they will have part of the rewards of the firm's success, hands-on, value driven, and stick to the knitting.
Abstract: The authors studied 43 successful American companies to discover the secrets of the art of American management. The firms were in various categories, including high-technology companies, consumer goods companies, general industrial goods companies of interest, service companies, project management companies, and resource-based companies. To choose the companies, six measures of long-term superiority (three are measures of growth and long-term wealth creation over a 20-year period, and three are measures of return on capital and sales) were selected and imposed: compound asset growth, compound equity growth, average ratio of market value to book value, average return on equity, and average return on sales. The superior companies had eight attributes characterizing their distinction. Each attribute is discussed in detail, with examples and anecdotes from the firms involved. The attributes are: (1) a bias for action-preferring to do something, anything, rather than performing endless analyses and convening committees; (2) staying close to the customer-learning and catering to the client's preferences; (3) autonomy and entrepreneurship--dividing the corporation into companies and encouraging independent and competitive thought within them; (4) productivity through people--making all employees aware that best efforts are vital and that they will have part of the rewards of the firm's success; (5) hands-on, value driven--insisting that higher-ups keep in contact with the company's essential business; (6) stick to the knitting--staying with the business the firm knows best; (7) simple form, lean staff-administrative layers are few, with few staff members at the top; and (8) simultaneous loose-tight properties--a climate combining dedication to the firm's central values along with tolerance for all employees who accept those values. The rational model of management is discussed, along with its history and implications in corporate functioning. A chapter on human motivation discusses some of the contradictions of human nature that are relevant to management and describes how they can be dealt with to everyone's benefit.
4,117 citations