Existentialism

About: Existentialism is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 5314 publications have been published within this topic receiving 69769 citations.

The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy

Abstract: "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, "Husserl's last great work, is important both for its content and for the influence it has had on other philosophers. In this book, which remained unfinished at his death, Husserl attempts to forge a union between phenomenology and existentialism. Husserl provides not only a history of philosophy but a philosophy of history. As he says in Part I, "The genuine spiritual struggles of European humanity as such take the form of struggles between the philosophies, that is, between the skeptical philosophies--or nonphilosophies, which retain the word but not the task--and the actual and still vital philosophies. But the vitality of the latter consists in the fact that they are struggling for their true and genuine meaning and thus for the meaning of a genuine humanity."

Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture

Abstract: PREFACEqLogic is doubtless unshakable, but it cannot withstand a man who wants to live.q Franz Kafka: The TrialThe present book forms a sequel to my theoretical works Intentions in Architecture (1963) and Existence, Space and Architecture (1971). It is also related to my historical study Meaning in Western Architecture (1975). Common to all of them is the view that architecture represents a means to give man an qexistential footholdq. My primary aim is therefore to investigate the psychic implications of architecture rather than its practical side, although I certainly admit that there exists an interrelationship between the two aspects. In Intentions in Architecture the practical, qfunctionalq, dimension was in fact discussed as part of a comprehensive system. At the same time, however, the book stressed that the qenvironment influences human beings, and this implies that the purpose of architecture transcends the definition given by early functionalismq. A thorough discussion of perception and symbolization was therefore included, and it was emphasized that man cannot gain a foothold through scientific understanding alone. He needs symbols, that is, works of art which qrepresent life-situationsq. The conception of the work of art as a qconcretizationq of a life-situation is maintained in the present book. It is one of the basic needs of man to experience his life-situations as meaningful, and the purpose of the work of art is to qkeepq and transmit meanings. The concept of qmeaningq was also introduced in Intentions in Architecture. In general, the early book aimed at understanding architecture in concrete qarchitecturalq terms, an aim which I still consider particularly important. Too much confusion is created today by those who talk about everything else when they discuss architecture! My writings therefore reflect a belief in architecture; I do not accept that architecture, vernacular or monumental, is a luxury or perhapsnsomething which is made qto impress the populaceq (Rapoport). There are not different qkindsq of architecture, but only different situations which require different solutions in order to satisfy man's physical and psychic needs.My general aim and approach has therefore been the same in all the writings mentioned above. As time has passed, however, a certain change in method has become manifest. In Intentions in Architecture art and architecture were analyzed qscientificallyq, that is, by means of methods taken over from natural science. I do not think that this approach is wrong, but today I find other methods more illuminating. When we treat architecture analytically, we miss the concrete environmental character, that is, the very quality which is the object of man's identification, and which may give him a sense of existential foothold. To overcome this lack, I introduced in Existence, Space and Architecture the concept of qexistential spaceq. qExistential spaceq is not a logico-mathematical term, but comprises the basic relationships between man and his environment. The present book continues the search for a concrete understanding of the environment. The concept of existential space is here divided in the complementary terms qspaceq and qcharacterq, in accordance with the basic psychic functions qorientationq and qidentificationq. Space and character are not treated in a purely philosophical way (as has been done by O. F. Bollnow), but are directly related to architecture, following the definition of architecture as a qconcretization of existential spaceq. qConcretizationq is furthermore explained by means of the concepts of qgatheringq and qthingq. The word qthingq originally meant a gathering, and the meaning of anything consists in what it gathers. Thus Heidegger said: qA thing gathers worldq.nThe philosophy of Heidegger has been the catalyst which has made the present book possible and determined its approach. The wish for understanding architecture as a concrete phenomenon, already expressed in Intentions in Architecture, could be satisfied in the present book, thanks to Heidegger's essays on language and aesthetics, which have been collected and admirably translated into English by A. Hofstadter (Poetry, Language, Thought, New York 1971). First of all I owe to Heidegger the concept of dwelling. qExistential footholdq and qdwellingq are synonyms, and qdwellingq, in an existential sense, is the purpose of architecture. Man dwells when he can orientate himself within and identify himself with an environment, or, in short, when he experiences the environment as meaningful. Dwelling therefore implies something more than qshelterq. It implies that the spaces where life occurs are places, in the true sense of the word. A place is a space which has a distinct character. Since ancient times the genius loci, or qspirit of placeq, has been recognized as the concrete reality man has to face and come to terms with in his daily life. Architecture means to visualize the genius loci, and the task of the architect is to create meaningful places, whereby he helps man to dwell.I am well aware of the shortcomings of the present book. Many problems could only be treated in a very sketchy way, and need further elaboration. The book represents, however, a first step towards a qphenomenology of architectureq, that is, a theory which understands architecture in concrete, existential terms.The conquest of the existential dimension is in fact the main purpose of the present book. After decades of abstract, qscientificq theory, it is urgent that we return to a qualitative, phenomenological understanding of architecture.n n n n

An experimental study in existentialism: the psychometric approach to frankl's concept of noogenic neurosis.

Abstract: Fraiikl's^' "• ' ' method of psychotherapeusis, logotherapy, is an application of the principles of existential philosophy to clinical practice. His basic contention is that a new type of neurosis is increasingly seen in the clinics today in contrast to the hysterias and other classical patterns, and that this new syndrome—which he terms noogcnic neurosis, and which supposedly constitutes about 55 per cent of the typical present-day case load^^^ — arises largely as a response to a complete emptiness of purpose in life. The chief dynamic is "existential frustration" created by a vacuum of perceived meaning in personal existence, and manifested by the symptom of boredom. According to Frankl, the essence of human motivation is the "will to meaning" {Der Wille zum Sinn); when meaning is not found, the individual becomes "existentially frustrated." This may or may not lead to psychopathology, depending upon other dynamic factors, but he feels that the incidence of clinical cases thus rooted is of major significance.^ The fact that existentialism accepts intuitive as well as rational and empirical knowledge in arriving at values and meanings has been anathema to American behavioral scientists, who have tended to write it off as a conglomeration of widely divergent speculations with little thread of consistency or operational sense. If, however, one may, by approaching mental illness from this frame of reference, specify a symptomatic condition which is measurable by an instrument constructed from this orientation, but which is not identical with any condition measured from the usual orientations, then there is evidence that we are in truth dealing with a new and different syndrome. Frankl has specified such a condition, but has made only rather informal and loosely quantitative attempts to measure it (as will be shown later). Kotchen^*^ has published a quantitative attack upon the relation of mental illness to existential concepts. He analysed the literature for the traits pertinent to mental health as conceived by the existential writers, found seven characteristics of the kind of life meaning which is supposed to be present in good mental health (such as uniqueness, responsibility, etc.), and then constructed an attitude scale with items representing each of these seven categories. He predicted that the level of mental health operationally defined by the nature of each of five population samples of 30 cases each, from locked-ward patients in a mental hospital to Harvard summer school students, would agree with the scoring level on the (questionnaire. The prediction was affirmed at a generally satisfactory level of statistical significance. His scale, however, had some open-end items which could be quantified only by a rating code, and three items applied only to hospital patients and had to be omitted from the scoring. Further, his samples were composed entirely of males, and this is an area in which there may well be sex differences, as will be seen later.