Showing papers on "Expansionism published in 1983"

French Attitudes to Empire and the Algerian War

Abstract: THIS ARTICLE has two aims, one general and one specific. The first is to throw some more light on French attitudes to Empire, and the second is to examine the proposition that it was the peculiar 'consensus' of such attitudes that more than anything else was responsible for the traumas of decolonization in the 1950s in Indo-China, Morocco, Tunisia but above all in Algeria. French attitudes to Empire during the IIIrd Republic (1871-1940) have been analysed in some detail by Brunschwig, Girardet and Ageron who have presented a clear picture of a strong and disproportionally powerful 'Parti Colonial' exploiting French self-doubts, economic anxieties and the Napoleonic tradition of the 'civilising mission' to create a mood of chauvinistic expansionism which was the dynamic force behind the creation of the French Empire in Africa and Asia. However, the attitudes of the 'Parti Colonial' were by no means representative of the whole of France, leaving some Frenchmen indignant and an even greater number indifferent.' Vichy France, the mauvaise conscience of the twentieth century French experience, has only recently started seriously to emerge from the polite cloud of humbug that denied that it existed at all except as a background to the Resistance. Thus whilst much is known about the role played by the colonies as the only concrete reality of 'Free France' much less is known about the colonies as an expression of Vichy France.2 That the humiliation of 1940 cast a long shadow over the IVth Republic (1946-58) and that the colonies, now constituted as the Union frangaise offered a chink of light in an otherwise sombre view of France's position in the world is difficult to doubt. Yet by 1960 almost all the colonies were either independent or well on their way to becoming so. What then was the nature of the colonial commitment of these years? It was above all the Algerian question that put France's commitment to her colonies to the test. Although severely shaken by the war in Indo-China and the troubles in Morocco and Tunisia, faith in the need to maintain 'Algerie frangaise' was widely shared in 1954. Algeria, after all was the jewel of France's empire. Invaded by the French in 1830, by 1954 its population included over a million settlers of European origin and represented France's

Explaining Washington's Central American Policies

Abstract: Why have the Washington authorities under both Democrat and Republican administrations chosen to devote so much time, money, and political capital to the pursuit of a policy in Central America that most international opinion, and a substantial proportion of domestic US opinion, considers to be unwarranted interference? The standard answers to this question fall into two main groups, each with strong ideological connotations. The official American position, most forcefully expressed in speeches by such prominent figures as ex-Secretary of State Alexander Haig, UN ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and President Ronald Reagan himself, judge events in Central America as yet another example of worldwide Soviet expansionism, in this case channelled through Cuba. On this view, it is not possible for America to stand back from the struggles of this small and apparently unimportant region, for unless the Russian cause is decisively rebuffed there is a real risk of ‘falling dominoes’, to the Panama Canal and beyond in one direction, and even northward into Mexico.

China Goes it Alone

Abstract: Does anyone care to remember how a few years ago the United States elevated the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the status of a strategic U.S. ally in the global struggle against Soviet expansionism? How some enthusiasts termed China the sixteenth member of NATO, by far the most valuable partner in containing the Soviet Union? How President Carter was exploring with Deng Xiaoping certain common and parallel interests and mapping out joint undertakings? Those heady days are now a memory, the enthusiasts are silent, and the Chinese, who even recently were imploring Western leaders to stand up to the Soviets, are now cautiously but determinedly probing the possibility of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union. Stressing that they have no intention of belonging to the "camp" of either superpower, they uphold the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which they see as jeopardized by "imperialism, hegemonism, and colonialism" practiced by both superpowers whose rivalry increases the danger of world war. "Socialist China," says the Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the CCP, Hu Yaobang, "belongs to the third world" and regards it as "her sacred international duty" to struggle against the forces of evil together with other Third World countries. What has caused this shift in China's posture? What is the significance of China's assertion of independence in foreign policy? How far is the SovietChinese rapprochement likely to go? What has this change done to "strategic consensus" which the U.S. had tried to build up under three administrations? What impact are these developments likely to have on foreign and defense policies of the United States?

Bourgeoisie of Chinese Descent and the Solicitude of Chinese Authorities

Abstract: No matter how the Chinese side may justify itself, public opinion at home and abroad is aware that the campaign to slander Vietnam for ostracizing, persecuting, and expelling Chinese residents is aimed at causing difficulties and obstacles to our country's socialist transformation and socialist construction and is part of its scheme of carrying out big-nation hegemonism and big-nation expansionism to oppose Vietnam's sovereignty and independence. The Chinese authorities are seeking ways to help the Hoa bourgeoisie — those it calls victimized Chinese — dodge socialist construction being carried out in the southern part of our country and clamor that the Vietnamese authorities are persecuting and robbing Chinese residents.

Laos in 1982: The Third Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party

Abstract: THE DOMESTIC and foreign affairs of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) in 1982 were dominated by the convening of the Third National Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) from April 27-30. On the domestic front, the Third Congress mapped out a series of pragmatic, gradual steps in the transitional period of building socialism embodied in Laos' First Five Year Plan. New economic policies, originally adopted by the Central Committee in late 1979, known as Resolution 7, were reaffirmed. On the external front, Laos restated its commitment to maintaining "special solidarity with Vietnam and Kampuchea, [and] our solidarity and all-round co-operation with the great Soviet Union and the other socialist countries." Although the Third Congress condemned Chinese expansionism, U.S. imperialism, and "other reactionaries," it was also suggested that relations with the United States and Thailand could improve. China's "reactionary" ruling clique remained, however, "the direct enemy" of the Lao people.