Topic
Fare evasion
About: Fare evasion is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 145 publications have been published within this topic receiving 1800 citations.
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TL;DR: A distinction must be made between crimes facilitated by overcrowding and by lack of supervision as discussed by the authors, which are the result of financial constraints, plaguing all forms of public transport, which result in too little space for passengers at busy periods and not enough staff to supervise vehicles and facilities at other times.
Abstract: Crime in public transport covers a bewildering variety of offenses committed in forms of transport including trams, buses, subways, commuter trains, taxis, and jitneys. The targets of crime can be the system itself (as in vandalism or fare evasion), employees (as in assaults on ticket collectors), or passengers (as in pickpocketing or overcharging). A distinction must be made between crimes facilitated by overcrowding and by lack of supervision. Both are the result of financial constraints, plaguing all forms of public transport, which result in too little space for passengers at busy periods and not enough staff to supervise vehicles and facilities at other times. Many successful measures have been reported in dealing with specific crimes. More generally, much crime can be "designed out" of new subway systems and older train and bus stations, and order maintenance may be an effective transit policing strategy. Research has been less successful in determining whether transit systems spread crime from high...
220 citations
TL;DR: This paper presents TRUSTS, an application for scheduling randomized patrols for fare inspection in transit systems, an efficient algorithm for computing such patrol strategies and presents experimental results using real-world ridership data from the Los Angeles Metro Rail system.
Abstract: In proof-of-payment transit systems, passengers are legally required to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about the transit system, inspecting the tickets of passengers, who face fines if caught fare evading. The deterrence of fare evasion depends on the unpredictability and effectiveness of the patrols. In this paper, we present TRUSTS, an application for scheduling randomized patrols for fare inspection in transit systems. TRUSTS models the problem of computing patrol strategies as a leader-follower Stackelberg game where the objective is to deter fare evasion and hence maximize revenue. This problem differs from previously studied Stackelberg settings in that the leader strategies must satisfy massive temporal and spatial constraints; moreover, unlike in these counterterrorism-motivated Stackelberg applications, a large fraction of the ridership might realistically consider fare evasion, and so the number of followers is potentially huge. A third key novelty in our work is deliberate simplification of leader strategies to make patrols easier to be executed. We present an efficient algorithm for computing such patrol strategies and present experimental results using real-world ridership data from the Los Angeles Metro Rail system. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s department is currently carrying out trials of TRUSTS.
184 citations
Proceedings Article•
22 Jul 2012
TL;DR: TRUSTS as discussed by the authors models the problem of computing patrol strategies as a leader-follower Stackelberg game, where the objective is to deter fare evasion and hence maximize revenue.
Abstract: In proof-of-payment transit systems, passengers are legally required to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about the transit system, inspecting the tickets of passengers, who face fines if caught fare evading. The deterrence of such fines depends on the unpredictability and effectiveness of the patrols. In this paper, we present TRUSTS, an application for scheduling randomized patrols for fare inspection in transit systems. TRUSTS models the problem of computing patrol strategies as a leader-follower Stackelberg game where the objective is to deter fare evasion and hence maximize revenue. This problem differs from previously studied Stackelberg settings in that the leader strategies must satisfy massive temporal and spatial constraints; moreover, unlike in these counterterrorism-motivated Stackelberg applications, a large fraction of the ridership might realistically consider fare evasion, and so the number of followers is potentially huge. A third key novelty in our work is deliberate simplification of leader strategies to make patrols easier to be executed. We present an efficient algorithm for computing such patrol strategies and present experimental results using real-world ridership data from the Los Angeles Metro Rail system. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's department has begun trials of TRUSTS.
94 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined travel pattern changes based on individual travel habit survey shortly before and almost 1 year after the introduction of free-fare public transport (FFPT) policy in Tallinn based on interviews and travel diaries of a random sample of 1500 household.
Abstract: The subsidy level of public transport systems varies considerably among systems worldwide. While limited-scale free-fare public transport (FFPT) services such as limited campaigns and fare evasion for special groups or specific services are prevalent, there is only limited evidence on the consequences of introducing a full-fledged FFPT. The case of Tallinn, Estonia offers a full-scale experiment that provides a unique opportunity to investigate the impacts of FFPT. This study examines travel pattern changes based on individual travel habit survey shortly before and almost 1 year after the introduction of FFPT policy in Tallinn based on interviews and travel diaries of a random sample of 1500 household. We analyse modal shift effects and whether they are driven by trip generation or trip substitution, travel attitudes and satisfactions as well as impacts on equity, employment prospects, and trip destination choices. Almost a year after the introduction of FFPT, public transport usage increased by 14 % and there is evidence that the mobility of low-income residents has improved. The effect of FFPT on ridership is substantially lower than those reported in previous studies due to the good level of service provision, high public transport usage and low public transport fees that existed already prior to the FFPT.
91 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors find that young individuals, males and non-European immigrants in their sample are more likely to travel without a ticket than those traveling with a valid ticket.
Abstract: What are the individual demographic characteristics that correlate with unethical behavior? To answer this question we randomly interviewed 541 passengers who used the bus in Reggio Emilia (Italy). Exploiting the high level of fare evasion (43% without a valid ticket) we find that young individuals, males and non-European immigrants in our sample are more likely to travel without a ticket. Interestingly, traveling with other people correlates with the probability of holding a valid ticket but its effect depends on who the passenger and the others are. Finally, we find that all passengers’ beliefs on fine costs, ticket inspection frequency, and percentage of passengers without a ticket are surprisingly close to actual figures. However, cheaters perceive inspections as more frequent than those traveling with a valid ticket.
89 citations