About: Financial intermediary is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 9538 publications have been published within this topic receiving 334411 citations.
Papers published on a yearly basis
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined a cross-section of about 80 countries for the period 1960-89 and found that various measures of financial development are strongly associated with both current and later rates of economic growth.
Abstract: Joseph Schumpeter argued in 1911 that the services provided by financial intermediaries - mobilizing savings, evaluating projects, managing risk, monitoring managers, and facilitating transactions -stimulate technological innovation and economic development. The authors present evidence that supports this view. Examining a cross-section of about 80 countries for the period 1960-89, they find that various measures of financial development are strongly associated with both current and later rates of economic growth. Each measure has shortcomings but all tell the same story: finance matters. They present three main findings, which are robust to many specification tests: The average level of financial development for 1960-89 is very strongly associated with growth for the period. Financial development precedes growth. For example, financial depth in 1960 (the ratio of broad money to GDP) is positively and significantly related to real per capita GDP growth over the next 30 years even after controlling for a variety of country-specific characteristics and policy indicators. Financial development is positively associated with both investment rate and the efficiency with which economies use capital. Much work remains to be done, but the data are consistent with Schumpeter's view that the services provided by financial intermediaries stimulate long-run growth.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders, and presented a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary.
Abstract: This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. It presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary. Diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs, even in a risk neutral economy. The paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems. In the environment assumed in the model, debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal. The analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries.
TL;DR: This paper examined whether financial development facilitates economic growth by scrutinizing one rationale for such a relationship; that financial development reduces the costs of external finance to firms, and found that industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of foreign finance develop disproportionately faster in countries with more developed financial markets.
Abstract: Does finance affect economic growth? A number of studies have identified a positive correlation between the level of development of a country's financial sector and the rate of growth of its per capita income. As has been noted elsewhere, the observed correlation does not necessarily imply a causal relationship. This paper examines whether financial development facilitates economic growth by scrutinizing one rationale for such a relationship; that financial development reduces the costs of external finance to firms. Specifically, we ask whether industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of external finance develop disproportionately faster in countries with more developed financial markets. We find this to be true in a large sample of countries over the 1980s. We show this result is unlikely to be driven by omitted variables, outliers, or reverse causality.
TL;DR: The authors argued that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first-order relationship between financial development and economic growth, and that financial development level is a good predictor of future rates of economic growth.
Abstract: The author argues that the preponderance of theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence suggests a positive first order relationship between financial development and economic growth. There is evidence that the financial development level is a good predictor of future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and technological change. Moreover, cross-country, case-style, industry level and firm-level analysis document extensive periods when financial development crucially affects the speed and pattern of economic development. The author explains what the financial system does and how it affects, and is affected by, economic growth. Theory suggests that financial instruments, markets and institutions arise to mitigate the effects of information and transaction costs. A growing literature shows that differences in how well financial systems reduce information and transaction costs influence savings rates, investment decisions, technological innovation, and long-run growth rates. A less developed theoretical literature shows how changes in economic activity can influence financial systems. The author advocates a functional approach to understanding the role of financial systems in economic growth. This approach focuses on the ties between growth and the quality of the functions provided by the financial systems. The author discourages a narrow focus on one financial instrument, or a particular institution. Instead, the author addresses the more comprehensive question: What is the relationship between financial structure and the functioning of the financial system?
TL;DR: This paper argued that the average quality is likely to be low, with the consequence that even projects which are known (by the entrepreneur) to merit financing cannot be undertaken because of the high cost of capital resulting from low average project quality.
Abstract: NUMEROUS MARKETS ARE characterized by informational differences between buyers and sellers. In financial markets, informational asymmetries are particularly pronounced. Borrowers typically know their collateral, industriousness, and moral rectitude better than do lenders; entrepreneurs possess "inside" information about their own projects for which they seek financing. Lenders would benefit from knowing the true characteristics of borrowers. But moral hazard hampers the direct transfer of information between market participants. Borrowers cannot be expected to be entirely straightforward about their characteristics, nor entrepreneurs about their projects, since there may be substantial rewards for exaggerating positive qualities. And verification of true characteristics by outside parties may be costly or impossible. Without information transfer, markets may perform poorly. Consider the financing of projects whose quality is highly variable. While entrepreneurs know the quality of their own projects, lenders cannot distinguish among them. Market value, therefore, must reflect average project quality. If the market were to place an average value greater than average cost on projects, the potential supply of low quality projects may be very large, since entrepreneurs could foist these upon an uninformed market (retaining little or no equity) and make a sure profit. But this argues that the average quality is likely to be low, with the consequence that even projects which are known (by the entrepreneur) to merit financing cannot be undertaken because of the high cost of capital resulting from low average project quality. Thus, where substantial information asymmetries exist and where the supply of poor projects is large relative to the supply of good projects, venture capital markets may fail to exist. For projects of good quality to be financed, information transfer must occur. We have argued that moral hazard prevents direct information transfer. Nonetheless, information on project quality may be transferred if the actions of entrepreneurs ("which speak louder than words") can be observed. One such action, observable because of disclosure rules, is the willingness of the person(s) with inside information to invest in the project or firm. This willingness to invest may serve as a signal to the lending market of the true quality of the project; lenders will place a value
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