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Firewall (construction)

About: Firewall (construction) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 6157 publications have been published within this topic receiving 79464 citations.


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Patent
20 Sep 2001
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present methods, systems, and configured storage media for discovering software updates, discovering if a given computer can use the software update, and then updating the computers with the software as needed automatically across a network without storing the updates on an intermediate machine within the network.
Abstract: Methods, systems, and configured storage media are provided for discovering software updates, discovering if a given computer can use the software update, and then updating the computers with the software as needed automatically across a network without storing the updates on an intermediate machine within the network. Furthermore, when a failure is detected, the rollout is stopped and the software can be automatically removed from those computers that already were updated. The software update can be stored originally at an address that is inaccessible through the network firewall by intermediately uploading the software update to an update computer which is not a part of the network but has access through the firewall, which is then used to distribute the update.

985 citations

Patent
13 Nov 2004
TL;DR: In this article, the file may be stored in at least one remote storage device associated with the at least 1 remote computer, respectively, and versions of the file contained on the one or more remote storage devices are synchronized with that on the local device by transmitting over the network connecting the one and more remote devices with the local devices.
Abstract: Applications, systems and methods for permitting simultaneous use of a file by two or more computers over a network may include storing the file locally in a local storage device associated with a local computer; providing access to the file by at least one remote computer which is connectable to the local computer via the network, and wherein at least one of the computers is connectable to the network through a firewall element. The file may be stored in at least one remote storage device associated with the at least one remote computer, respectively, and versions of the file contained on the one or more remote storage devices are synchronized with that on the local device by transmitting over the network connecting the one or more remote storage devices with the local device, at least one of Delta files and Inverse Delta files between the remote storage devices and the local storage device. A method of remotely observing computer activity on a second computer remote with respect to a first computer is also provided. Further, file sharing systems and methods are provided for sharing files among computers.

846 citations

Patent
03 Dec 1999
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a method and system for monitoring or profiling quality of service within one or more information sources in a network of computers, which includes a step of providing a network-of-computers, each being coupled to each other to form a local area network.
Abstract: A method and system ( 100 ) for monitoring or profiling quality of service within one or more information sources in a network of computers. The method includes a step of providing a network of computers, each being coupled to each other to form a local area network. The network of computers has a firewall server ( 110 ) coupled to the network of computers and a distributed traffic management tool coupled to the firewall server. The method also includes implementing traffic monitoring or profiling of incoming and outgoing information from one of the information sources.

793 citations

Patent
06 Nov 2003
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors proposed a firewall that achieves maximum network security and maximum user convenience by employing envoys that exhibit the security robustness of prior-art proxies and the transparency and ease-of-use of packet filters, combining the best of both worlds.
Abstract: The present invention provides a firewall that achieves maximum network security and maximum user convenience. The firewall employs “envoys” that exhibit the security robustness of prior-art proxies and the transparency and ease-of-use of prior-art packet filters, combining the best of both worlds. No traffic can pass through the firewall unless the firewall has established an envoy for that traffic. Both connection-oriented (e.g., TCP) and connectionless (e.g., UDP-based) services may be handled using envoys. Establishment of an envoy may be subjected to a myriad of tests to “qualify” the user, the requested communication, or both. Therefore, a high level of security may be achieved. The usual added burden of prior-art proxy systems is avoided in such a way as to achieve fall transparency-the user can use standard applications and need not even know of the existence of the firewall. To achieve full transparency, the firewall is configured as two or more sets of virtual hosts. The firewall is, therefore, “multi-homed,” each home being independently configurable. One set of hosts responds to addresses on a first network interface of the firewall. Another set of hosts responds to addresses on a second network interface of the firewall. In one aspect, programmable transparency is achieved by establishing DNS mappings between remote hosts to be accessed through one of the network interfaces and respective virtual hosts on that interface. In another aspect, automatic transparency may be achieved using code for dynamically mapping remote hosts to virtual hosts in accordance with a technique referred to herein as dynamic DNS, or DDNS.

751 citations

Book
06 Mar 2003
TL;DR: The first edition made a number of predictions, explicitly or implicitly, about the growth of the Web and the patterns of Internet connectivity vastly increased, and warned of issues posed by home LANs, and about the problems caused by roaming laptops.
Abstract: From the Book: But after a time, as Frodo did not show any sign of writing a book on the spot, the hobbits returned to their questions about doings in the Shire. Lord of the Rings —J.R.R. TOLKIEN The first printing of the First Edition appeared at the Las Vegas Interop in May, 1994. At that same show appeared the first of many commercial firewall products. In many ways, the field has matured since then: You can buy a decent firewall off the shelf from many vendors. The problem of deploying that firewall in a secure and useful manner remains. We have studied many Internet access arrangements in which the only secure component was the firewall itself—it was easily bypassed by attackers going after the “protected” inside machines. Before the trivestiture of AT&T/Lucent/NCR, there were over 300,000 hosts behind at least six firewalls, plus special access arrangements with some 200 business partners. Our first edition did not discuss the massive sniffing attacks discovered in the spring of 1994. Sniffers had been running on important Internet Service Provider (ISP) machines for months—machines that had access to a major percentage of the ISP’s packet flow. By some estimates, these sniffers captured over a million host name/user name/password sets from passing telnet, ftp, and rlogin sessions. There were also reports of increased hacker activity on military sites. It’s obvious what must have happened: If you are a hacker with a million passwords in your pocket, you are going to look for the most interesting targets, and .mil certainly qualifies. Since the First Edition, we have been slowlylosing the Internet arms race. The hackers have developed and deployed tools for attacks we had been anticipating for years. IP spoofing Shimomura, 1996 and TCP hijacking are now quite common, according to the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). ISPs report that attacks on the Internet’s infrastructure are increasing. There was one attack we chose not to include in the First Edition: the SYN-flooding denial-of- service attack that seemed to be unstoppable. Of course, the Bad Guys learned about the attack anyway, making us regret that we had deleted that paragraph in the first place. We still believe that it is better to disseminate this information, informing saints and sinners at the same time. The saints need all the help they can get, and the sinners have their own channels of communication.Crystal Ball or Bowling Ball?The first edition made a number of predictions, explicitly or implicitly. Was our foresight accurate? Our biggest failure was neglecting to foresee how successful the Internet would become. We barely mentioned the Web and declined a suggestion to use some weird syntax when listing software resources. The syntax, of course, was the URL... Concomitant with the growth of the Web, the patterns of Internet connectivity vastly increased. We assumed that a company would have only a few external connections—few enough that they’d be easy to keep track of, and to firewall. Today’s spaghetti topology was a surprise. We didn’t realize that PCs would become Internet clients as soon as they did. We did, however, warn that as personal machines became more capable, they’d become more vulnerable. Experience has proved us very correct on that point. We did anticipate high-speed home connections, though we spoke of ISDN, rather than cable modems or DSL. (We had high-speed connectivity even then, though it was slow by today’s standards.) We also warned of issues posed by home LANs, and we warned about the problems caused by roaming laptops. We were overly optimistic about the deployment of IPv6 (which was called IPng back then, as the choice hadn’t been finalized). It still hasn’t been deployed, and its future is still somewhat uncertain. We were correct, though, about the most fundamental point we made: Buggy host software is a major security issue. In fact, we called it the “fundamental theorem of firewalls”: Most hosts cannot meet our requirements: they run too many programs that are too large. Therefore, the only solution is to isolate them behind a firewall if you wish to run any programs at all. If anything, we were too conservative.Our ApproachThis book is nearly a complete rewrite of the first edition. The approach is different, and so are many of the technical details. Most people don’t build their own firewalls anymore. There are far more Internet users, and the economic stakes are higher. The Internet is a factor in warfare. The field of study is also much larger—there is too much to cover in a single book. One reviewer suggested that Chapters 2 and 3 could be a six-volume set. (They were originally one mammoth chapter.) Our goal, as always, is to teach an approach to security. We took far too long to write this edition, but one of the reasons why the first edition survived as long as it did was that we concentrated on the concepts, rather than details specific to a particular product at a particular time. The right frame of mind goes a long way toward understanding security issues and making reasonable security decisions. We’ve tried to include anecdotes, stories, and comments to make our points. Some complain that our approach is too academic, or too UNIX-centric, that we are too idealistic, and don’t describe many of the most common computing tools. We are trying to teach attitudes here more than specific bits and bytes. Most people have hideously poor computing habits and network hygiene. We try to use a safer world ourselves, and are trying to convey how we think it should be. The chapter outline follows, but we want to emphasize the following: It is OK to skip the hard parts. If we dive into detail that is not useful to you, feel free to move on. The introduction covers the overall philosophy of security, with a variety of time-tested maxims. As in the first edition, Chapter 2 discusses most of the important protocols, from a security point of view. We moved material about higher-layer protocols to Chapter 3. The Web merits a chapter of its own. The next part discusses the threats we are dealing with: the kinds of attacks in Chapter 5, and some of the tools and techniques used to attack hosts and networks in Chapter 6. Part III covers some of the tools and techniques we can use to make our networking world safer. We cover authentication tools in Chapter 7, and safer network servicing software in Chapter 8. Part IV covers firewalls and virtual private networks (VPNs). Chapter 9 introduces various types of firewalls and filtering techniques, and Chapter 10 summarizes some reasonable policies for filtering some of the more essential services discussed in Chapter 2. If you don’t find advice about filtering a service you like, we probably think it is too dangerous (refer to Chapter 2). Chapter 11 covers a lot of the deep details of firewalls, including their configuration, administration, and design. It is certainly not a complete discussion of the subject, but should give readers a good start. VPN tunnels, including holes through firewalls, are covered in some detail in Chapter 12. There is more detail in Chapter 18. In Part V, we apply these tools and lessons to organizations. Chapter 13 examines the problems and practices on modern intranets. See Chapter 15 for information about deploying a hacking-resistant host, which is useful in any part of an intranet. Though we don’t especially like intrusion detection systems (IDSs) very much, they do play a role in security, and are discussed in Chapter 15. The last part offers a couple of stories and some further details. The Berferd chapter is largely unchanged, and we have added “The Taking of Clark,” a real-life story about a minor break-in that taught useful lessons. Chapter 18 discusses secure communications over insecure networks, in quite some detail. For even further detail, Appendix A has a short introduction to cryptography. The conclusion offers some predictions by the authors, with justifications. If the predictions are wrong, perhaps the justifications will be instructive. (We don’t have a great track record as prophets.) Appendix B provides a number of resources for keeping up in this rapidly changing field.Errata and UpdatesEveryone and every thing seems to have a Web site these days; this book is no exception. Our “official” Web site is . We’ll post an errata list there; we’ll also keep an up-to-date list of other useful Web resources. If you find any errors—we hope there aren’t many—please let us know via e-mail at .AcknowledgmentsFor many kindnesses, we’d like to thank Joe Bigler, Steve “Hollywood” Branigan, Hal Burch, Brian Clapper, David Crocker, Tom Dow, Phil Edwards and the Internet Public Library, Anja Feldmann, Karen Gettman, Brian Kernighan, David Korman, Tom Limoncelli, Norma Loquendi, Cat Okita, Robert Oliver, Vern Paxson, Marcus Ranum, Eric Rescorla, Guido van Rooij, Luann Rouff (a most excellent copy editor), Abba Rubin, Peter Salus, Glenn Sieb, Karl Siil (we’ll always have Boston), Irina Strizhevskaya, Rob Thomas, Win Treese, Dan Wallach, Avishai Wool, Karen Yannetta, and Michal Zalewski, among many others. BILL CHESWICK STEVE BELLOVIN AVI RUBIN 020163466XP01302003

730 citations


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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers in the topic in previous years
YearPapers
20224
2021105
2020278
2019378
2018377
2017333