Game theory

Abstract: This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior." In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences.

Abstract: The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm In part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints In part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises

Abstract: I want in this article to trace the history of an idea. It is beginning to become clear that a range of problems in evolution theory can most appropriately be attacked by a modification of the theory of games, a branch of mathematics first formulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 for the analysis of human conflicts. The problems are diverse and include not only the behaviour of animals in contest situations but also some problems in the evolution of genetic mechanisms and in the evolution of ecosystems. It is not, however, sufficient to take over the theory as it has been developed in sociology and apply it to evolution. In sociology, and in economics, it is supposed that each contestant works out by reasoning the best strategy to adopt, assuming that his opponents are equally guided by reason. This leads to the concept of a ‘minimax’ strategy, in which a contestant behaves in such a way as to minimise his losses on the assumption that his opponent behaves so as to maximise them. Clearly, this would not be a valid approach to animal conflicts. A new concept has to be introduced, the concept of an ‘evolutionary stable strategy’.

Abstract: I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy 1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy 2. An Essay on Bargaining 3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War II. A Reorientation of Game Theory 4. Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision 5. Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves 6. Game Theory and Experimental Research III. Strategy with a Random Ingredient 7. Randomization of Promises and Threats 8. The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance IV. Surprise Attack: A Study in Mutual Distrust 9. The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack 10. Surprise Attack and Disarmament Appendices A. Nuclear Weapons and Limited War B. For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory C. Re-interpretation of a Solution Concept for "Noncooperative" Games Index

Abstract: A new treatment is presented of a classical economic problem, one which occurs in many forms, as bargaining, bilateral monopoly, etc It may also be regarded as a nonzero-sum two-person game In this treatment a few general assumptions are made concerning the behavior of a single individual and of a group of two individuals in certain economic environments From these, the solution (in the sense of this paper) of classical problem may be obtained In the terms of game theory, values are found for the game См также: Two-person cooperative games, автор - Джо Нэш