Showing papers on "Golden Rule (fiscal policy) published in 2000"

Learning or Doing

Abstract: We consider a two-period overlapping generations economy in which individuals work in both periods and acquire skills when young through both learning-by-doing and formal education. We characterise the unique saddle-path stable steady state of this economy and show that individuals spend too much (too little) time in formal education when the economy is dynamically inefficient (efficient). Overeducation is, therefore, linked to overaccumulation of physical capital. Finally, we show that the social planner can decentralise the golden rule by issuing public debt when the laissez-faire economy is dynamically inefficient; there is no room for education policy in the absence of social externalities in the process of skill acquisition.

Public Debt in a Federation - Growth and Stability / Staatsverschuldung in einer Föderation - Wachstum und Stabilität

Abstract: In this paper a neoclassical growth model is used to analyze public debt in a growing economy with two levels of government. The main focus is on the existence and the stability of long run equilibria in a growing federal state. It is shown that the equilibrium in a federation with two levels of government is more likely to be unstable than the equilibrium in a centralized state. Moreover, if the saving rate is below the golden rule, the equilibrium will be unambiguously unstable. In order to avoid instability, sufficient flexibility at all levels of government in federations and confederations such as the European union is required.

Time preference, international migration, and social security

Abstract: This paper analyzes both the formation of long-run migration incentives and the consequences of a regime change from \"autarky\" to \"free migration\" in an overlapping-generations framework with two countries. Under autarky the countries may differ with respect to their aggregate savings rate or with respect to their pension-wage ratio. It is shown that an individual prefers to live in a country where the capital-labor ratio is close to the Golden Rule level and where his characteristics are relatively scarce. Both the migration incentives and the consequences of free migration are determined by these two effects.

Optimal Sequence of Inter-GenerationalBorrowing and Lending Leading to Escape fromthe Poverty Trap through an Invisible Hand

Abstract: The overlapping generations (OLG) model of micro-based macroeconomics has been utilized in order to calculate the optimal sequence of inter-generational transfer payments and evaluate its effects on the operation of an economy which suffers from the poverty trap. Each generation has been assumed to live for two periods and aims to find the optimal relationship between its borrowing from the previous generation and its lending to the next generation so that its discounted utility function is maximized. This optimization is subjected to budget constraints, the competitiveness of labor and capital markets and the equilibrium condition of savings and capital. Individuals in all of the generations are assumed to pay no attention to the utility level of the next generation (i.e. they do not have altruism). Furthermore, government limits the domain of choices of the generations with the additional constraint that the borrowing and lending amounts of each generation should be positively correlated. Each generation, when it compares its discounted utility levels corresponding to the two options – i.e. participation in the payment system or not, assuming perfect information – understands that participation in the system is beneficial and thus wishes to share in the payments system. This participation consists of two parts, one is borrowing when young (saving together with consuming), and the other is lending when old (consuming only). A moral hazard may thus occur due to the fact that the young generation after borrowing decides not to pay its share back to the new young generation when it becomes old. Thus, the government is also necessary in order to prevent this moral hazard. However, no special objective function of the government enters the problem formulation. It is observed that, as an important side effect, the sequence of transfer payments obtained can not only bring the economy out of the poverty trap, but it also raises the stable equilibrium level of the capital-labor ratio to a level higher than that is achievable by a comparable competitive economy without transfer payments. The steady-state obtained has another advantage over the competitive equilibrium, viz., such an improved equilibrium is dynamically efficient and in this equilibrium the economy would operate within the golden rule situation. These side effects, which are the benefits received by the whole economy as a result of the decisions made by selfish generations, seem to be inter-generational interpretations of the Invisible Hand concept of Adam Smith.

Staatsverschuldung in einer Föderation - Wachstum und Stabilität

Abstract: In this paper a neoclassical growth model is used to analyze public debt in a growing economy with two levels of government. The main focus is on the existence and the stability of long run equilibria in a growing federal state. It is shown that the equilibrium in a federation with two levels of government is more likely to be unstable than the equilibrium in a centralized state. Moreover, if the saving rate is below the golden rule, the equilibrium will be unambiguously unstable. In order to avoid instability, sufficient flexibility at all levels of government in federa tions and confederations such as the European union is required.