Golden Rule (fiscal policy)

About: Golden Rule (fiscal policy) is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 661 publications have been published within this topic receiving 9789 citations.

Böhm-Bawerk and Hicks modernized

Abstract: The paper offers a modernized BA¶hm-Bawerkian approach to capital theory. The Wicksell effect turns out to be a measure for the degree of vertical distribution of labor. I show that a marginal rise in the rate of interest reduces the (modernized) period of production. A ‘generalized golden rule of accumulation’ is one result of our approach. Based on these results I define a coefficient of intertemporal substitution (CIS). As opposed to the traditional elasticity of substitution between labor and capital, the CIS is also well defined for negative real rates of interest. This is important in the twenty-first century, since we observe a strong overhang of private savings over private investments (secular stagnation).

The Trinity of Budget Institutions, Political Institutions and Fiscal Cyclicality: Evidence from Egypt

Abstract: Fiscal policy is empirically proven in many papers as pro-cyclical in developing countries as a result of longstanding weaknesses in budgetary and political institutions. We investigate the cyclicality of fiscal policy in Egypt and the influence of budgetary and political institutions on fiscal indicators during economic cycles. We measure the cyclicality of different components of the Egyptian budget in a dis-aggregated manner. Golden rule violation in Egypt adversely affected fiscal aggregates and contributed to adopting a counter-cyclical behavior during business cycles; then a pro-cyclical policy over the long run when debt and deficit reach uncontained levels. Moreover, common pool, principal-agent and voracity problems in Egypt have also influenced the cyclicality of fiscal policy in Egypt as they have lead into an exacerbated pressure on public expenditure during booms and recessions in the examined period. Re-adopting the Golden rule to control the current spending trends and limit discretionary fiscal interventions is recommended. In the longer term, we recommend enhancing the quality of political institutions through changing the electoral system towards a party-based, rather than an individual-based system in order to moderate opportunistic abuse of fiscal aggregates and limit political influences over the budget.