Topic
Great Rationality Debate
About: Great Rationality Debate is a research topic. Over the lifetime, 453 publications have been published within this topic receiving 15642 citations. The topic is also known as: rationality debate & GRD.
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TL;DR: Rubinstein this paper defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded, and discusses the fundamental difficulties of modeling bounded rationality in games, concluding with a discussion of computability constraints in games.
Abstract: The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently has it influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel Rubinstein defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modeling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications. In the first part of the book, the author considers the modeling of choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to the modeling of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the choice of what to know, and group decisions. In the second part, he discusses the fundamental difficulties of modeling bounded rationality in games. He begins with the modeling of a game with procedural rational players and then surveys repeated games with complexity considerations. He ends with a discussion of computability constraints in games. The final chapter includes a critique by Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the author's response.
1,103 citations
TL;DR: The authors compare and contrast the concepts of rationality that are prevalent in psychology and economics, respectively, and conclude that economics has almost uniformly treated human behavior as rational and psychology has always been concerned with both the irrational and the rational aspects of behavior.
Abstract: The task I shall undertake here is to compare and contrast the concepts of rationality that are prevalent in psychology and economics, respectively. Economics has almost uniformly treated human behavior as rational. Psychology, on the other hand, has always been concerned with both the irrational and the rational aspects of behavior. In this paper, irrationality will be mentioned only obliquely; my concern is with rationality. Economics sometimes uses the term "irrationality" rather broadly (e.g., Becker 1962) and the term "rationality" correspondingly narrowly, so as to exclude from the domain of the rational many phenomena that psychology would include in it. For my purposes of comparison, I will have to use the broader conception of psychology. One point should be set immediately outside dispute. Everyone agrees that people have reasons for what they do. They have motivations, and they use reason (well or badly) to respond to these motivations and reach their goals. Even much, or most, of the behavior that is called abnormal involves the exercise of thought and reason. Freud was most insistent that there is method in madness, that neuroses and psychoses were patients' solutions-not very satisfactory solutions in the long run-for the problems that troubled them. The assumption that actors maximize subjective expected utility (economic rationality) supplies only a small part of the premises in economic reasoning, and that often not the essential part. The remainder of the premises are auxiliary empirical assumptions about actors' utilities, beliefs, expectations, and the like. Making these assumptions correctly requires an empirically founded theory of choice that specifies what information decision makers use and how they actually process it. This behavioral empirical base is largely lacking in contemporary economic analysis, and supplying it is essential for enhancing the explanatory and predictive power of economics.
1,005 citations
Book•
01 Oct 2001TL;DR: Searle's Rationality in Action as discussed by the authors is an alternative theory of the role of rationality in thought and action, arguing that rationality is possible only where one has a choice among various rational as well as irrational options.
Abstract: The study of rationality and practical reason, or rationality in action, has been central to Western intellectual culture. In this invigorating book, John Searle lays out six claims of what he calls the Classical Model of rationality and shows why they are false. He then presents an alternative theory of the role of rationality in thought and action. A central point of Searle's theory is that only irrational actions are directly caused by beliefs and desires -- for example, the actions of a person in the grip of an obsession or addiction. In most cases of rational action, there is a gap between the motivating desire and the actual decision making. The traditional name for this gap is "freedom of the will." According to Searle, all rational activity presupposes free will. For rationality is possible only where one has a choice among various rational as well as irrational options. Unlike many philosophical tracts, Rationality in Action invites the reader to apply the author's ideas to everyday life. Searle shows, for example, that contrary to the traditional philosophical view, weakness of will is very common. He also points out the absurdity of the claim that rational decision making always starts from a consistent set of desires. Rational decision making, he argues, is often about choosing between conflicting reasons for action. In fact, humans are distinguished by their ability to be rationally motivated by desire-independent reasons for action. Extending his theory of rationality to the self, Searle shows how rational deliberation presupposes an irreducible notion of the self. He also reveals the idea of free will to be essentially a thesis of how the brain works.
840 citations
Book•
31 Dec 2010
TL;DR: This book discusses Dual Process Theory, the current State of Play Properties of Type 1 and Type 2 Processing, and the Social Implications of Separating the Concepts of Intelligence and Rationality.
Abstract: Preface CHAPTER I: Dual-Process Theory and the Great Rationality Debate The Great Rationality Debate Individual Differences in the Great Rationality Debate Dual Process Theory: The Current State of Play Properties of Type 1 and Type 2 Processing Dual-Process Theory and Human Goals: Implications for the Rationality Debate The Rest of This Book: Complications in Dual Process Theory and Their Implications for the Concepts of Rationality and Intelligence CHAPTER II: Differentiating the Algorithmic Mind and the Reflective Mind Unpacking Type 2 Functioning Using Individual Differences Cognitive Ability and Thinking Dispositions Partition the Algorithmic and the Reflective Mind Intelligence Tests and Critical Thinking Tests Partition the Algorithmic from the Reflective Mind Thinking Dispositions as Independent Predictors of Rational Thought CHAPTER III: The Key Functions of the Reflective Mind and the Algorithmic Mind that Support Human Rationality So-Called "Executive Functioning" Measures Tap the Algorithmic Mind and Not the Reflective Mind CHAPTER IV: The Tri-Process Model and Serial Associative Cognition The Cognitive Miser and Focal Bias Converging Evidence in the Dual Process Literature CHAPTER V: The Master Rationality Motive and the Origins of the Nonautonomous Mind Metarepresentation and Higher-Order Preferences What Motivates the Search for Rational Integration? The Master Rationality Motive as a Psychological Construct Evolutionary Origins of the Master Rational Motive and Type 2 Processing CHAPTER VI: A Taxonomy of Rational Thinking Problems (with Richard F. West) Dual-Process Theory and Knowledge Structures The Preliminary Taxonomy Heuristics and Biases Tasks in Terms of the Taxonomy Multiply-Determined Problems of Rational Thought Missing Input from the Autonomous Mind CHAPTER VII: Intelligence as a Predictor of Performance on Heuristics and Biases Tasks (with Richard F. West) Intelligence and Classic Heuristics and Biases Effects Belief Bias and Myside Bias Why Thinking Biases Do and Do Not Associate with Cognitive Ability Cognitive Decoupling, Mindware Gaps, and Override Detection in Heuristics and Biases Tasks CHAPTER VIII: Rationality and Intelligence: Empirical and Theoretical Relationships and Implications for the Great Rationality Debate Intelligence and Rationality Associations in Terms of the Taxonomy Summary of the Relationships Individual Differences, the Reflective Mind, and the Great Rationality Debate Skepticism About Mindware-Caused Irrationalities CHAPTER IX: The Social Implications of Separating the Concepts of Intelligence and Rationality Broad Versus Narrow Concepts of Intelligence Intelligence Imperialism Intelligence Misidentified as Adaptation and the Deification of Intelligence Strategies for Cutting Intelligence Down to Size Society's Selection Mechanisms CHAPTER X: The Assessment of Rational Thought (with Richard F. West and Maggie E. Toplak) A Framework for the Assessment of Rational Thinking Operationalizing the Components of Rational Thought The Future of Research on Individual Differences in Rational Thought References Figures and Tables
575 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that most cognitive anomalies operate through errors in perception that arise from the way information is stored, retrieved, and processed, or through the errors in process that lead to formulation of choice problems.
Abstract: Rationality is a complex behavioral theory that can be parsed into statements about preferences, perceptions, and process. This paper looks at the evidence on rationality that is provided by behavioral experiments, and argues that most cognitive anomalies operate through errors in perception that arise from the way information is stored, retrieved, and processed, or through errors in process that lead to formulation of choice problems as cognitive tasks that are inconsistent at least with rationality narrowly defined. The paper discusses how these cognitive anomalies influence economic behavior and measurement, and their implications for economic analysis.
517 citations